# ThreatByte-MCP

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##
ThreatByte-MCP is a deliberately vulnerable, MCP-based case management web app. It mirrors a realistic SOC analyst workflow with a server-rendered UI and a real MCP server. The **MCP tools are intentionally vulnerable** for training and demonstration.

> [!NOTE]
> **For educational use in controlled environments only.**

<center><img width="1891" height="891" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d86037a3-67f7-4ece-a244-676b32ff7764" /></center>

## Features
- Safe web authentication (signup/login/logout)
- Case management UI (create/list/view cases)
- Notes and attachments tied to cases
- Indicator search and agent workflows via MCP tools
- Agent customization with schema-based tool registry

## MCP Server (SDK, JSON-RPC)
ThreatByte-MCP is a split architecture:
- SOC Web App (client/UI) runs on port 5001.
- MCP Server (tools + agent) runs on port 5002 using the official MCP Python SDK (FastMCP).

The MCP server exposes JSON-RPC at `POST http://localhost:5002/mcp` (Streamable HTTP). The web UI calls the MCP server through a server-side proxy to keep auth consistent with the SOC session; the proxy streams agent responses to the browser via SSE. A sample `mcp.json` manifest is included at the repo root.
All direct MCP calls must include `MCP-Protocol-Version: 2025-11-25` and `Accept: application/json, text/event-stream`.

Architecture (simplified):
```
          Browser
             |
             v
    +------------------+        X-TBMCP-Token + X-TBMCP-User        +-------------------+
    |  SOC Web App     |  ---------------------------------------> |     MCP Server     |
    |  (Flask, :5001)  |           /mcp-proxy (server-side)         |  (FastMCP, :5002)  |
    +------------------+                                            +-------------------+
             |                                                                  |
             v                                                                  v
         SQLite DB                                                      Tool registry
                                                                       Agent + tool handlers
```

Architecture (detailed):
```
Mode A (Web UI as HTTP MCP client)
  Browser (Analyst)
    |
    v
  SOC Web App (Flask, :5001)
    - Auth session (cookie)
    - Dashboards, cases, notes, files UI
    - POST /mcp-proxy forwards JSON-RPC
    - Injects X-TBMCP-Token + X-TBMCP-User to the MCP server
    |
    +--> SQLite DB (users/cases/notes/files/indicators)
    +--> Uploads (app/uploads)
    |
    v
  MCP Server (FastMCP, :5002)
    - /mcp JSON-RPC (Streamable HTTP)
    - Tool registry (mcp_tools)
    - Agent runtime + tool handlers
    - Persistence: agent_contexts, agent_logs, mcp_audit_logs

Mode B (Local agent/IDE as stdio MCP client)
  Local Agent / IDE (e.g., Claude Desktop) spawns:
    python run_mcp_server.py --stdio
  and communicates via stdin/stdout JSON-RPC (stdio transport).
```

Diagram: [ThreatByte-MCP architecture diagram](docs/architecture-diagram.svg)

### MCP Auth Between Web App and MCP Server
The web app proxies MCP calls with these headers:
- `X-TBMCP-Token`: shared secret from `TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN` (configured on both servers).
- `X-TBMCP-User`: current user id from the authenticated SOC session.

Direct MCP calls require the same headers.

Supported tools:
- `cases.create`
- `cases.list`
- `cases.list_all`
- `cases.get`
- `cases.rename`
- `cases.set_status`
- `cases.delete`
- `notes.create`
- `notes.list`
- `notes.update`
- `notes.delete`
- `files.upload` (base64)
- `files.list`
- `files.get` (base64)
- `files.read_path`
- `indicators.search`
- `agent.summarize_case`
- `agent.run_task`
- `tools.registry.list`
- `tools.builtin.list`
- `tools.registry.register`
- `tools.registry.delete`

## Vulnerability Themes (Training-Focused)
The following weaknesses are **intentionally present** for teaching:
- Broken object level authorization (cases/notes/files, list_all)
- Stored XSS (notes rendered as trusted HTML)
- SQL injection in indicator search
- Prompt injection in agent task runner
- Token mismanagement & secret exposure (hardcoded tokens in prompts, persisted contexts, full logs)
- Tool poisoning via schema-driven tool registry overrides (MCP03)
- Over-trusting client context (MCP header identity spoofing)
- Arbitrary file read via `files.read_path`
- Cross-user file overwrite (shared filename namespace)

## Running Locally
```sh
cd ThreatByte-MCP
python -m venv venv_threatbyte_mcp
source venv_threatbyte_mcp/bin/activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
python db/create_db_tables.py
python run_mcp_server.py --http
python run.py
```
Open: `http://localhost:5001`

MCP Server: `http://localhost:5002/mcp`

### HTTP vs stdio
This repository ships two MCP server transports:
- **HTTP (Streamable HTTP)**: what the ThreatByte web app uses. The web app is an **HTTP MCP client only**, via the server-side `/mcp-proxy` forwarder.
- **stdio**: for external MCP clients (e.g., IDE/agent clients) that **spawn** the MCP server and communicate over stdin/stdout.

Examples:
```sh
# HTTP (required for the web app)
python run_mcp_server.py --http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5002

# stdio (for MCP clients that support stdio transport; the web app will NOT work with this)
# In stdio mode there are no HTTP headers, so the server reads user context from env vars.
# Note: stdio mode runs the MCP server on AnyIO's Trio backend; ensure `trio>=0.28.0` is installed.
export TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN=tbmcp-mcp-token
export TBMCP_MCP_USER_ID=1
python run_mcp_server.py --stdio
```

#### Claude Desktop compatibility (tool names)
Some MCP clients (e.g., Claude Desktop) enforce strict tool name validation (`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$`) and will reject dotted tool names like `cases.create`.

To run the MCP server in a Claude-compatible mode, set:
- `TBMCP_TOOL_NAME_MODE=claude`

This exposes tools as underscore names (e.g., `cases_create`, `tools_registry_register`, `files_read_path`) instead of dotted names.

For a complete walkthrough (Windows + WSL stdio), see [Claude Desktop setup](docs/claude-desktop.md).

## Running with Docker or Podman
The repository includes a `Dockerfile` and startup script that initialize the DB and run both services in one container:
- SOC Web App on `:5001`
- MCP Server on `:5002`

Build the image:
```sh
# Docker
docker build -t threatbyte-mcp .

# Podman
podman build -t threatbyte-mcp .
```

Run the container:
```sh
# Docker
docker run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 threatbyte-mcp

# Podman
podman run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 threatbyte-mcp
```

Run with optional environment variables:
```sh
# Docker
docker run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 \
  -e TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN=tbmcp-mcp-token \
  -e OPENAI_API_KEY=your_api_key \
  -e TBMCP_OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini \
  threatbyte-mcp

# Podman
podman run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 \
  -e TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN=tbmcp-mcp-token \
  -e OPENAI_API_KEY=your_api_key \
  -e TBMCP_OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini \
  threatbyte-mcp
```

Persist SQLite data between runs (optional):
```sh
# Docker
docker run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 \
  -v "$(pwd)/db:/app/db" \
  -v "$(pwd)/app/uploads:/app/app/uploads" \
  threatbyte-mcp

# Podman
podman run --rm -p 5001:5001 -p 5002:5002 \
  -v "$(pwd)/db:/app/db:Z" \
  -v "$(pwd)/app/uploads:/app/app/uploads:Z" \
  threatbyte-mcp
```

## Populate Sample Data
```sh
python db/populate_db.py --users 8 --cases 20 --notes 40 --files 20
```
This creates random users, cases, notes, and file artifacts. All user passwords are `Password123!`.

## LLM Integration (Required for Agent Responses)
The agent task endpoint requires a real LLM. Without an API key, the agent returns an error indicating it is unavailable.

Environment variables:
- `TBMCP_OPENAI_API_KEY` or `OPENAI_API_KEY`
- `TBMCP_OPENAI_MODEL` (default: `gpt-4o-mini`)

Keep API keys server-side only and never expose them in the browser.

## MCP Server Configuration
The SOC web app proxies MCP calls to the MCP server using a shared token.

Environment variables:
- `TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_URL` (default: `http://localhost:5002/mcp`)
- `TBMCP_MCP_SERVER_TOKEN` (shared secret between the SOC app and MCP server)

## Notes
- The UI uses server-rendered templates.
- MCP tools are exposed under `http://localhost:5002/mcp` (JSON-RPC). The UI calls them through `/mcp-proxy`.
- Useful UI pages for training:
  - `My Cases` (all cases owned by the logged-in user)
  - `MCP Audit Logs` (server-side audit trail of MCP tool calls from HTTP + stdio clients)
  - `Agent Logs` (internal agent runner traces; populated by `agent.run_task`)
- This app is intentionally insecure. Do not deploy it to the public internet.