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Electron Debug MCP Server

Electron Debug MCP Server

by amafjarkasi

offline_resilience_check

Simulate offline, latency, or HTTP 500 faults during Electron app interactions to detect crashes and unhandled rejections, restore network, and return a Resilience Grade.

Instructions

Audit how gracefully the Electron app handles network loss, high latency, or HTTP 500 server faults during interactions. Emulates faults, checks for crashes or unhandled rejections, restores network, and computes a Resilience Grade (A-F).

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "offline_resilience_check"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionNoOptional user action to trigger during network disruption
targetIdNo
faultTypeNoType of network disruption to simulate (default 'offline')
processIdNoProcess ID. If omitted, uses the single running app.
durationMsNoDisruption window duration in ms (default 1000)
urlPatternNoURL pattern to intercept/fault (default '*')

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.15.1

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare openWorldHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so the description carries the real behavioral load and does it well: it discloses that faults are emulated, that the tool inspects for crashes and unhandled rejections, that network is restored afterwards, and that the result is a grade. It omits limits like the 10s disruption cap and whether the app state persists after the run, which would have pushed this higher.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tightly packed sentences with zero filler; the audit target is front-loaded and the emulation/inspection/restore/grading sequence follows in logical order.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a six-parameter tool with a nested action object and no output schema, the description covers what the tool does and partially what it returns (a Resilience Grade A-F), which is the key unknown an agent would otherwise lack. It stops short of describing grade criteria or the full result payload, but nothing essential to invoking it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents faultType, durationMs, urlPattern, processId, and the nested action object. The description maps loosely onto the fault types (network loss/latency/HTTP 500) but adds no syntax, defaults, or interaction semantics (e.g., what happens when action is supplied during a fault window) beyond what the schema states. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb ('Audit') plus a concrete resource ('how gracefully the Electron app handles network loss, high latency, or HTTP 500 server faults') and outlines the full workflow: emulate fault, check for crashes/unhandled rejections, restore network, compute a Resilience Grade. It is clearly distinct in spirit from the bare fault-injection siblings (emulate, emulate_network, block_urls), but it never names those siblings to draw the boundary explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the purpose statement – you would call this when you want an end-to-end resilience assessment rather than a single emulated fault – but there is no explicit when-to-use clause, no exclusions, and no pointer to emulate_network/emulate for simpler one-off fault injection despite those being the obvious alternatives in the catalog.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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