Cloud DevOps MCP Server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| assess_terraform_changeA | Evaluate Terraform/IaC release risk using plan evidence plus change-governance facts such as rollback, peer review and stateful impact. Use this for overall change/release decisions; for security-only inspection of a raw Terraform plan, use review_terraform_security. It analyzes supplied evidence only and never applies a plan, changes infrastructure, or writes Terraform state. |
| assess_cloud_change_bundleA | Correlate evidence from at least two domains (Terraform, IAM, Kubernetes, GitHub Actions) into one deployment-risk assessment and identify cross-domain change paths. Use domain-specific review tools when only one evidence domain is available. It analyzes caller-supplied artifacts only and does not query providers, clusters, GitHub, or deploy changes. |
| build_incident_runbookA | Generate a practical incident-response runbook from a known service symptom, severity, environment and optional signals. Use this to structure response actions and evidence collection; do not use it to fetch or diagnose from live telemetry. It does not execute remediation or make changes to the service. |
| review_cicd_pipelineA | Evaluate generic CI/CD production-readiness controls from structured pipeline facts, separating missing evidence from failed controls. Use this for platform-agnostic delivery process review; for raw GitHub Actions YAML, use review_github_actions_workflow. It is analysis-only and does not trigger builds, deployments, approvals, or pipeline changes. |
| estimate_slo_error_budgetA | Calculate remaining SLO downtime budget and, when request counts are supplied, remaining failed-request budget for a fixed period. Use this as a deterministic budget calculator; do not use it to fetch monitoring data or forecast reliability. It performs no external calls and changes no service state. |
| review_iam_policyA | Evaluate AWS IAM policy risk from structured facts or raw policy JSON, including wildcard scope, privilege-escalation actions and conditions. Use this for AWS IAM operational risk; for provider-specific AWS/Azure/GCP policy-pack checks, use review_cloud_identity_policy. It analyzes supplied policy data only and does not call AWS or modify IAM. |
| review_kubernetes_deploymentA | Evaluate Kubernetes workload production readiness and reliability from structured facts or multi-document YAML, including probes, resources, replicas, disruption protection and exposure. Use this for deployability/readiness; for workload security hardening, use review_kubernetes_security. It examines supplied evidence only and does not connect to a Kubernetes cluster. |
| review_github_actions_workflowA | Evaluate GitHub Actions workflow security and deployment readiness from structured facts or raw workflow YAML, including triggers, action pinning, token permissions, caching, environment protection and concurrency. Use review_cicd_pipeline for generic non-GitHub delivery-process review. It examines supplied evidence only and does not call GitHub or dispatch workflows. |
| review_cloud_identity_policyA | Apply deterministic provider-specific identity policy packs to raw AWS IAM, Azure RBAC or GCP IAM policy documents. Use this for cross-cloud identity security analysis; use review_iam_policy when assessing AWS IAM from mixed structured facts or policy JSON. It analyzes supplied policy JSON only and does not call cloud APIs or change permissions. |
| review_terraform_securityA | Inspect raw Terraform plan JSON for security-relevant changes such as destructive actions, public exposure, encryption gaps, deletion protection and IAM wildcard risk. Use this for Terraform security posture; use assess_terraform_change for broader release/change risk and governance. It parses the supplied plan only and does not execute Terraform or write state. |
| review_kubernetes_securityA | Apply Kubernetes workload security rules to manifest YAML for privileged mode, host access, Linux capabilities, service accounts, seccomp, filesystem settings and network policy. Use this for security hardening; use review_kubernetes_deployment for reliability and production-readiness checks. It analyzes supplied YAML only and does not connect to a cluster. |
| review_software_supply_chainA | Correlate CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM quality with CI action pinning, Kubernetes image immutability, artifact signing and build provenance to assess software-supply-chain risk. Use this when an SBOM is available and supply-chain evidence needs to be evaluated together. It analyzes supplied artifacts only and does not call registries, CI systems, or clusters. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
Descriptions explicitly cross-reference paired tools (e.g., review_iam_policy vs review_cloud_identity_policy, review_terraform_security vs assess_terraform_change), helping agents distinguish them. However, the set includes several adjacent 'review_' tools (Kubernetes deployment vs security, GitHub Actions vs generic CI/CD) that could still cause hesitation without careful reading.
All tool names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern using assess_, build_, estimate_, and review_ prefixes. No naming inconsistencies or mixed conventions are present.
With 12 tools, the set sits comfortably within the ideal 3–15 range. Each tool targets a distinct domain or analysis type, and no tool appears redundant.
The surface covers major DevOps analysis domains: Terraform change and security, cloud change bundles, CI/CD and GitHub Actions, IAM and cloud identity, Kubernetes deployment and security, SLO budgets, incident runbooks, and supply chain. Some gaps exist (e.g., cost optimization, compliance, or actual remediation), but the server explicitly scopes itself as analysis-only, so coverage is strong for that purpose.