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Vet an MCP server through the full WARDEN gate chain

vet_mcp_server
Read-onlyIdempotent

Vets an MCP server and its advertised tools through WARDEN's ordered gate chain, returning an allow/block verdict, findings, and allowed/blocked tool lists before definitions reach the model.

Instructions

Run WARDEN's ordered gate chain (static-scan → threat-feed → origin → pinning) over a server identity plus its advertised tools/list payload and return a recordable verdict (allow/block, 0..1 product score, findings, allowedTools/blockedTools, ruleset digest).

When to use: you have a complete server record and want the same decision a host should make before any of those tool definitions reach the model. Prefer this over calling the four gates yourself.

When NOT to use: inspecting descriptions only (call static_scan_tools — no origin/pinning); splitting tools by operator glob (classify_sensitive_tools); checking one outbound URL (check_egress_url); producing RFC 8785 bytes (canonicalize_json).

Behaviour: local, deterministic, no network. This stdio process uses the built-in 11-record threat floor (it does not fetch a signed feed) and a durable local pin store. First contact is TOOL_DEF_UNPINNED/advisory until explicitly approved. Origin defaults to allowUnknownServers=true so catalog-discovered servers are not fail-closed. Override policy when you need the host's real knobs. Does not connect to, start, or approve the target server.

Returns structured JSON matching outputSchema. Example: vet_mcp_server({ server: { id: "demo@0", name: "demo", transport: "stdio", command: "npx" }, tools: [{ name: "add", description: "Add two integers.", inputSchema: { type: "object" } }] }).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "server": "<server>",
      "tools": "<tools>"
    },
    "name": "vet_mcp_server"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toolsYesExact tools/list payload (1..256 tools). Each item is name + description + inputSchema from the server. Do not filter before vetting — blockedTools is the partition.
policyNoOptional WardenPolicy overlay. Omitted keys keep the stdio defaults: blockAtSeverity=high, empty sensitiveToolPatterns, allowUnknownServers=true, pinToolDefs=true. Use classify_sensitive_tools when you only want the glob split.
serverYesIdentity of the MCP server being vetted — the host's McpServerRef, not a live connection. WARDEN never launches this command or fetches this URL.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
allowYesfalse when a gate was fatal or a non-advisory finding reached blockAtSeverity.
scoreYesProduct of per-gate scores in [0, 1]. One bad gate drags the whole server down; it is not an average.
findingsYesAccumulated findings across all gates, including advisory.
rulesetsYesRule-table identity in force for this verdict. Store this with the scan.
decidedByNoGate that produced the blocking decision, present only when allow is false.
allowedToolsYesTool names individually permitted; the host MUST also require allow=true before exposure.
blockedToolsYesTool names quarantined; the rest of the server may still be usable.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.24.0
    • changedOutput schema / properties / rulesets / properties / staticScan / properties / version / description
      Previous value: -"Monotonic static-scan ruleset version (currently \"12\")."New value: +"Monotonic static-scan ruleset version. Use list_scan_rules for the current version and digest."
  2. Changed9 schema fields changedv0.16.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / policy / properties / capabilityBindings
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Operator-reviewed capabilities, bound to launch identity and complete definitions. Unbound capabilities remain unknown.",
      +  "items": {
      +    "additionalProperties": false,
      +    "properties": {
      +      "identityHash": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "serverId": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "tools": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {
      +          "items": {
      +            "enum": [
      +              "private",
      +              "untrusted",
      +              "outbound"
      +            ]
      +          },
      +          "type": "array"
      +        },
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "toolsHash": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "serverId",
      +      "identityHash",
      +      "toolsHash",
      +      "tools"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  "maxItems": 1000,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / policy / properties / pinToolDefs / description
      Previous value: -"When true, tool-def drift after a stored pin is fatal. This process has an empty pin store, so first contact stays UNPINNED/advisory. Default true."New value: +"When true, tool-def drift after a stored pin is fatal. Pins persist across calls and restarts; first contact stays UNPINNED/advisory. Default true."
    • addedInput schema / properties / policy / properties / requireApproval
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Require an explicit operator approval of every advertised field and server identity. Automatic and legacy pins do not qualify. Default false.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / tools / items / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -falseNew value: +true
    • addedInput schema / properties / tools / items / properties / annotations
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Advertised hints; untrusted metadata, never authorization.",
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / tools / items / properties / outputSchema
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Unmodified output schema, including nested descriptions; scanned and pinned.",
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / tools / items / properties / title
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Unmodified advertised tool title; scanned and pinned.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / properties / allowedTools / description
      Previous value: -"Tool names the host may expose to the model."New value: +"Tool names individually permitted; the host MUST also require allow=true before exposure."
    • changedOutput schema / properties / rulesets / properties / staticScan / properties / version / description
      Previous value: -"Monotonic static-scan ruleset version (currently \"4\")."New value: +"Monotonic static-scan ruleset version (currently \"12\")."
  3. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/closed-world, and the description adds substantial non-obvious context on top: local, deterministic, no network, a built-in 11-record threat floor rather than a signed feed, a durable local pin store, first-contact TOOL_DEF_UNPINNED advisory semantics, and the allowUnknownServers=true default. It also explicitly scopes out side effects ("Does not connect to, start, or approve the target server"), which an agent cannot infer from the hints.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then cleanly partitioned into When to use / When NOT to use / Behaviour / Returns. Dense but nearly every clause carries information; the one verbose element is the inline example call, which is long but demonstrates real payload shape.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex, nested-schema, multi-gate tool with an outputSchema, the description covers what it does, when to use it, what it will not do, its trust/state model (pins, threat floor, approval), and default policy behavior. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and every property (server, tools, policy and its sub-keys) is already documented in detail, so the baseline applies. The description contributes a concrete example invocation that illustrates the server/tools shape and points at policy as the override surface, but adds no parameter semantics the schema lacks.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and pipeline ("Run WARDEN's ordered gate chain (static-scan → threat-feed → origin → pinning) over a server identity plus its advertised tools/list payload") and names the exact return artifacts (verdict, score, findings, allowedTools/blockedTools, ruleset digest). This is clearly separable from static_scan_tools, classify_sensitive_tools, check_egress_url, and canonicalize_json without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit "When to use" (complete server record, host-equivalent decision) and "When NOT to use" routing four distinct alternatives to their own tools with the reason each differs (no origin/pinning, glob-only split, single URL, RFC 8785 bytes). It also states the preference over calling the four gates manually.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.