Tanod MCP server

chainpeek: check a transfer recipient for address poisoning on Base, Ethereum or Robinhood Chain

check_address_poisoning

Read-onlyIdempotent

Check a transfer recipient for address-poisoning lookalikes in the sender's past transfers, returning a risk level and evidence before you send funds.

Instructions

chainpeek: Check a transfer recipient for address poisoning: lookalikes in the sender's history. For balance, gas and blacklist checks too use transfer_preflight; for OFAC use check_sanctions. Returns a risk (high | medium | low) for paying to: reads from's transfers of one token (default USDC) over the last 2,000 blocks and finds addresses with to's first 4 and last 4 hex characters; each reason carries its evidence (tx hash, block, amount, direction). High: to was never paid and imitates an address from paid or a contact, or appears only in zero-value or dust transfers. Medium: a lookalike exists but to was paid or is a contact. Older history, other tokens and other lookalikes are not seen. Bad input is a 422, a failed read a 502 (neither charged). Typically 0.5-4 s. Price: USD 0.002. Free: 10 chain reads per IP per UTC day. Docs: https://tanod.dev/learn/address-poisoning-check-api.html

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`to`	Yes	The recipient about to be paid (0x + 40 hex). Must differ from `from`.
`from`	Yes	The sending wallet whose transfer history is read (0x + 40 hex).
`chain`	Yes	ethereum, base or robinhood (Robinhood Chain, chain id 4663).
`token`	No	USDC (default), USDT, or a token contract address. Only this token's transfers are read. On robinhood pass a contract address.	USDC
`contacts`	No	Up to 100 addresses you trust (your address book); `to` is compared with them too, without any chain read.
`dust_threshold`	No	Incoming transfers below this many token units count as dust. Default 0.01 for USDC and USDT; off for other tokens unless set; 0 turns it off.
`lookback_blocks`	No	How many of the latest blocks of history to read (0-2,000; default 2,000, about 67 minutes on Base and 6.7 hours on Ethereum). 0 reads nothing and checks `contacts` only.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`to`	No
`from`	No
`risk`	No
`chain`	No
`error`	No	Only on an error result: an object {code, message}, or the reason string of an x402 PaymentRequired object.
`rules`	No
`token`	No
`limits`	No
`history`	No
`matches`	No
`reasons`	No
`decimals`	No
`rpc_calls`	No
`to_history`	No
`token_symbol`	No
`matches_total`	No
`dust_threshold`	No
`contacts_checked`	No
`dust_threshold_raw`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.3.0Oct 15, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover the read-only/idempotent safety profile; the description adds the real behavioral payload: the exact read performed (one token, last 2,000 blocks), the lookalike matching rule (first 4 and last 4 hex chars), the high/medium/low decision rules, error semantics (422 bad input, 502 failed read, neither charged), latency (0.5-4 s), price and a free-tier rate limit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense paragraph, front-loaded with the purpose and the sibling routing before the mechanics. Nearly every clause carries information (risk rules, errors, price, quota), though the length and lack of sentence breaks make it harder to scan than it needs to be.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, yet the description still summarizes the `risk` field and its reason/evidence shape. Combined with the error mode and rate-limit disclosure, an agent has everything needed to invoke and interpret this tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 7 parameters including defaults, ranges and the dust/lookback semantics — the baseline is 3. The description reinforces the read scope (one token, default USDC, ~2,000 blocks) but adds no syntax or constraint detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (check), resource (transfer recipient), and threat (address poisoning) and spells out the detection method — lookalikes in the sender's history. It explicitly names the sibling tools it is not (transfer_preflight, check_sanctions), so an agent can route without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly routes alternatives: 'For balance, gas and blacklist checks too use transfer_preflight; for OFAC use check_sanctions.' It also states scope limits ('Older history, other tokens and other lookalikes are not seen'), so the agent knows when results will be incomplete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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