mcp-authprobe

Active authorization testing for remote MCP servers you own.

Passive scanners read what a remote Model Context Protocol server announces: its OAuth metadata, its TLS setup, its tool descriptions. Some properties can only be confirmed by actually exercising the authorization server: does it really rotate refresh tokens, does it really refuse a redirect URI it never registered, does it enforce PKCE, does it accept a token meant for another server, does it slow down repeated failures?

mcp-authprobe runs those active checks, against servers whose ownership you have proven, and reports the results as JSON, SARIF and Markdown.

19 checks, field-tested against a certified OpenID provider: OAuth discovery, refresh token rotation and replay, redirect URI strictness, PKCE enforcement, single-use codes, token audience, Origin validation, tokens in URLs, session IDs used as credentials, CORS, throttling and consent CSRF (in a real browser). It works as a CLI with an interactive login, as an MCP server so an AI assistant can run the audit, and as a GitHub Action. A deliberately vulnerable lab lets you try everything in a minute.

Only test servers you own or are explicitly authorized to test. Active checks change state on the target. The tool enforces an ownership proof before running them, but responsibility stays with the operator.

Contents

• Field-tested

• Why another scanner?

• Install

• Try it in a minute: the lab

• Quick start

• Ownership proof

• Refresh token checks

• Interactive login

• Redirect URI checks

• Throttling check

• Consent CSRF check

• Use it from an MCP client

• What it checks

• Reports and exit codes

• GitHub Action

• Safety of the scanner

• Roadmap

• Development

• Contributing and security

Related MCP server: Pentest MCP

Field-tested

Besides its own test suite and lab, mcp-authprobe was run against real authorization stacks before each release:

• node-oidc-provider (an OpenID Certified authorization server) with dynamic registration, resource indicators and JWT access tokens, in front of an MCP server built with the official TypeScript SDK that validates the token audience and the Origin header. Every check that can be judged from outside passed; MAP-THR01 failed, as expected, since that provider leaves rate limiting to the deployment; and its consent page, protected by a per-flow identifier instead of an anti-CSRF field, is reported as inconclusive with the reason.

• The MCP TypeScript SDK's OAuth example server, a demonstration that is not meant for production. The results matched its code: redirect_uri not bound to the code, no Origin validation, unsafe redirect URIs accepted at registration, no refresh tokens, and crashes reported as inconclusive rather than passes. Its sessions correctly require the token on every request (MAP-SES01 passes).

These runs led to several fixes: results kept when a server issues no refresh token or crashes during login, a throttling check that copes with a broken refresh grant, and the per-flow identifier analysis above.

Why another scanner?

Good tools already exist, and this one is meant to sit next to them, not replace them:

mcp-authprobe focuses on what only an active, authorized test can confirm, and uses check IDs (MAP-…) that do not clash with mcp-posture's (MCPP-…), so both reports can be read side by side.

Install

Requires Node.js 22.19 or later.

# run without installing
npx mcp-authprobe --help

# or install globally
npm install -g mcp-authprobe

Releases are published from GitHub Actions with npm trusted publishing; check the provenance on the package page before installing a security tool.

From source:

git clone https://github.com/Enigmacker/mcp-authprobe.git
cd mcp-authprobe
npm ci
npm run build
node dist/cli.js --help

Try it in a minute: the lab

mcp-authprobe lab starts a small MCP server with its own OAuth authorization server on 127.0.0.1, so you can see every check at work without touching a real server:

# Terminal 1: a deliberately vulnerable server (or --profile secure)
npx mcp-authprobe lab

# Terminal 2
npx mcp-authprobe scan http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp --allow-private
npx mcp-authprobe login http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp --allow-private --out lab-grant.json
npx mcp-authprobe scan http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp --allow-private --credentials-file lab-grant.json

Log in with the account test / test and click Allow.

The lab only listens on 127.0.0.1 or ::1 (--host, --port, default 8787; names such as localhost are refused so that no resolver can move it elsewhere), keeps everything in memory, and stops with Ctrl-C. Its access tokens are unsigned JWTs, so MAP-AUD01 can read their audience. It is vulnerable on purpose: never expose it.

Quick start

# 1. Create a secret and the proof to publish for your MCP host
mcp-authprobe ownership init mcp.example.com

# 2. Publish the proof (well-known file or DNS TXT), then keep the secret in your environment
export MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET='…'

# 3. Check the proof is visible
mcp-authprobe ownership verify mcp.example.com

# 4. Scan
mcp-authprobe scan https://mcp.example.com/mcp --sarif results.sarif --markdown summary.md

# 5. Log in once with a dedicated test account to create a test grant
mcp-authprobe login https://mcp.example.com/mcp --out ./test-grant.json

# 6. Full scan, including the refresh token checks
mcp-authprobe scan https://mcp.example.com/mcp --credentials-file ./test-grant.json

Without a valid proof the scan still runs discovery (the same read-only requests any MCP client sends before logging in), and every active check is reported as skipped.

For a local lab on your own machine:

mcp-authprobe scan http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp --allow-private

Loopback targets with --allow-private do not need a proof.

Ownership proof

Active checks register clients, rotate tokens and send failing requests. To make sure they only ever hit servers whose operator agreed to it, the scanner requires a proof for every host it would contact: the MCP server host and, when it differs, the authorization server host.

The proof is a hash, bound to the host, of a secret that only you hold:

mcp-authprobe-verification=sha256:<hex(sha256("<host>:<secret>"))>

Publish it in one of two places:

Design choices:

• The secret never leaves your machine. Only its hash is published, so a proof found in the wild cannot be reused by someone else to scan your server.

• Proofs are host-bound. A proof for mcp.example.com is useless for any other host.

• The secret is read from MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET or --secret-file, never from the command line, so it does not land in shell history or process listings.

• Hosted authorization servers. If your authorization server is a third-party service on its own domain, you can only publish a proof if you control that domain (for example a custom domain). Check the provider's penetration testing policy before running active checks against it.

You can remove the proof as soon as you are done testing.

Refresh token checks

MCP clients are usually public clients, so OAuth 2.1 requires their refresh tokens to be rotated, and RFC 9700 recommends revoking the whole token family when an old one is reused. These properties cannot be read from metadata; they have to be exercised.

The checks need a test grant: a client and a refresh token obtained by logging in to your own server with a dedicated test account.

The easy way is mcp-authprobe login (see Interactive login), which writes the file for you. You can also write it by hand, readable only by you (chmod 600):

{
  "client_id": "your-test-client-id",
  "refresh_token": "the-refresh-token",
  "client_secret": "only-for-confidential-clients",
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"
}

token_endpoint_auth_method is none (default for public clients), client_secret_post (default when a secret is present) or client_secret_basic.

The scan sends at most three refresh_token requests to the token endpoint found by discovery:

Important:

• The grant is consumed. On a compliant server, step 3 revokes it. Never use a grant you still need.

• If tokens are not rotated, MAP-RTK01 fails and the two replay checks are reported as not applicable.

• A throttled or unexpected response is reported as error (inconclusive), never as a pass.

• Token values never appear in output or reports; evidence only shows status codes and OAuth error codes.

Interactive login

mcp-authprobe login https://mcp.example.com/mcp --out ./test-grant.json

login behaves like a careful native MCP client (RFC 8252):

• It registers a client through dynamic client registration, with a loopback redirect URI on 127.0.0.1 and a random port.

• It opens your browser on the discovered authorization endpoint only (or prints the URL with --no-browser). Log in with your test account.

• The loopback listener accepts a single GET /callback carrying the expected state, and echoes nothing back.

• It uses PKCE S256, a random state, the RFC 8707 resource, and checks the RFC 9207 iss parameter against the discovered issuer.

• It writes the grant with mode 600, never through a symbolic link, and never over an existing file unless you pass --force. Tokens are never printed.

• The grant records the target and token endpoint it belongs to. A scan of any other target, or a server announcing another token endpoint, will not use it.

• login itself does not require an ownership proof: it only does what any MCP client does when you connect it (one registration, your own browser login, one code exchange). Only the extra login checks below require the proof.

• If login fails, the client it registered is deleted when the server allows it.

Seven checks are observed during login, because they need a fresh authorization code or a valid access token. They run only when ownership of every contacted host is proven (--no-probe skips them), in this order:

The results are stored in the grant file and reported by the next scan of the same target. The refresh token kept in the grant is always the newest one, so rotation during these probes does not break the scan. A network failure during a probe makes that check inconclusive; it never loses the grant or the other results.

If a probe obtains tokens (the check fails), the code is spent: the following pre-exchange probes are reported as not observed, the tokens obtained are kept as the grant, and MAP-COD01 still runs (presenting the code again is its second use).

Some strict servers invalidate a code after any failed attempt. That is acceptable behaviour: only the first refusal is trusted and the following probes are reported as inconclusive. Likewise, a server that revokes the tokens after a code reuse (recommended) passes MAP-COD01. In both cases login writes the results without a grant; log in again with --no-probe --force --out <same file> to add a grant: the earlier results of the same target are kept.

Redirect URI checks

If an authorization server redirects to a URI the client never registered, authorization codes can end up with an attacker. OAuth 2.1 requires exact string matching. These checks need dynamic client registration on your server; no test grant and no login are required.

How they work:

1. The scanner registers a temporary client whose only redirect URI is https://client.mcp-authprobe.invalid/callback.

2. It sends a baseline authorization request with that registered URI (PKCE S256, random state, RFC 8707 resource), then one request per variant, and compares the answers. Redirects are never followed.

3. It deletes every client it created (RFC 7592). Clients it could not delete are listed in the report, named mcp-authprobe test client (safe to delete).

Safety by design: every host used lives under the reserved .invalid top-level domain (RFC 2606), which can never resolve. Even a vulnerable server could not deliver a code anywhere.

Reading the results: a variant answered exactly like the baseline (for example both redirected to the login page) is reported as inconclusive (error), never as a pass, because some servers only check redirect_uri after the user logs in. MAP-RDR03 (token endpoint enforcement) is observed during interactive login.

Throttling check

Without rate limiting, refresh tokens, authorization codes and client secrets can be guessed at line speed. MAP-THR01 checks that the token endpoint slows down repeated failures, with strict bounds:

• It sends 10 token requests by default (--throttle-attempts, between 5 and 20, hard-capped), one at a time.

• Each request carries a freshly generated random refresh token that cannot be valid. Nothing is guessed, and user passwords and login forms are never involved. If the very first one gets a server error or unsupported_grant_type (a server without a working refresh grant), the check switches once to random authorization codes and starts counting again.

• It uses your test client when a grant is supplied (your real refresh token is not sent), otherwise a temporary client that is deleted afterwards.

• It stops at the first sign of throttling: HTTP 429, a Retry-After header, or an OAuth slow_down / temporarily_unavailable error.

• It runs last in a scan, so a throttled token endpoint cannot disturb the other checks.

A failure means no throttling was seen within the cap. Your limit may simply be higher than 20; the finding asks you to confirm that one exists.

Consent CSRF check

If a third-party website can submit your consent page on behalf of a logged-in user, it can make them grant access without noticing (the confused deputy described in the MCP security best practices). MAP-CSR01 checks that the consent decision is protected, in a real browser with your test account:

npx -p mcp-authprobe -p playwright-core mcp-authprobe consent-check https://mcp.example.com/mcp

1. The ownership of every contacted host must be proven first.

2. It registers a temporary client and opens your installed Chrome (or --browser msedge, or --browser-path <executable>) on the authorization page. No browser is downloaded; playwright-core is an optional dependency used only by this command.

3. You log in with the test account. When the consent page is shown, do not click anything: go back to the terminal and press Enter.

4. The tool reads the consent form and the cookie attributes exactly as the server set them, closes the browser, then sends form submissions with the session cookies:

   • without any anti-CSRF field, from a foreign Origin: must be refused;

   • with the anti-CSRF field altered (same length and alphabet), from a foreign Origin: must be refused;

   • the untouched form, from a foreign Origin: informational, shows whether the server also checks Origin;

   • a control: the untouched form from the page's own Origin, which must be accepted.

5. It deletes the temporary client. The loopback redirect URI is served by the tool itself, so even an accidental approval delivers the code nowhere else.

Many authorization servers (node-oidc-provider, Ory Hydra, Keycloak) have no anti-CSRF field: the consent form carries a per-flow identifier issued by the server, in a hidden field or in the form's URL (/interaction/<id>). When there is no anti-CSRF field but such an identifier, two extra submissions come first, before anything can be granted: one with the identifier altered and one without any cookie, both from a foreign Origin. If either is accepted, the check fails. If both are refused and the untouched form is accepted, the result is inconclusive with an explanation: this design is safe when the identifier is bound to the user's own session, which cannot be proven from a single session.

The check fails when consent is granted without a valid anti-CSRF token. It only passes when the control proves that the tool reproduces a real grant; otherwise (labels it cannot recognise, consent sent by JavaScript, multi-step flows, single-use tokens) the result is inconclusive, never a pass. The finding also reports whether the session cookies are explicitly SameSite=Lax/Strict, which blocks the attack from other sites in modern browsers, but not from same-site subdomains or older clients; a cookie without the attribute is reported as Unspecified. Ctrl-C, closing the browser or a 10-minute timeout stop the check cleanly and still delete the temporary client.

It is not available in MCP server mode, because it needs you to log in.

Use it from an MCP client

mcp-authprobe mcp runs the same engine as an MCP server over stdio, so an AI assistant in any MCP client can audit your servers for you.

Add it to your client's MCP configuration (most clients use this mcpServers format):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-authprobe": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-authprobe", "mcp"],
      "env": {
        "MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET_FILE": "/home/you/.config/mcp-authprobe/secret",
        "MCP_AUTHPROBE_CREDENTIALS_FILE": "/home/you/.config/mcp-authprobe/test-grant.json"
      }
    }
  }
}

The server is also listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.Enigmacker/mcp-authprobe, so registry-aware clients can install it directly.

From a source checkout, use "command": "node" with "args": ["/path/to/mcp-authprobe/dist/cli.js", "mcp"].

The server is built so that the assistant, or a prompt injection reaching it, cannot widen what the scanner may do:

• Everything sensitive is set by you in the configuration, never by tool arguments: the ownership secret, the test grant, and private-address access. The scan tool takes a URL and nothing else.

• scan is annotated as destructive, so well-behaved clients ask for your confirmation before each call. It consumes the test grant and registers temporary clients.

• Only https targets are accepted; plain http only for loopback or private-address labs with MCP_AUTHPROBE_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1. URLs with embedded credentials are refused, and only one scan runs at a time.

• Loopback targets still need a proof in MCP mode, unless you list their origin in MCP_AUTHPROBE_LAB_ORIGINS. An assistant cannot point active requests at arbitrary local services.

• The test grant is only used if it names the scanned target (grants created by login do), so it cannot be spent on another server.

• Reports are marked as data: every scan result ends with a notice that server-controlled text in it must not be treated as instructions.

With Docker

The repository's Dockerfile builds the same stdio MCP server:

docker build -t mcp-authprobe https://github.com/Enigmacker/mcp-authprobe.git
docker run -i --rm -e MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET mcp-authprobe

In a container, --allow-private labs on your machine are not reachable as 127.0.0.1; use the npm package for the lab.

What it checks

mcp-authprobe checks list prints the catalogue, and mcp-authprobe checks show <ID> explains a check: why it matters, how to fix it, and references. IDs are stable and never reused.

Families: DSC discovery, RTK refresh tokens, RDR redirect URIs, THR throttling, CSR consent CSRF, PKC PKCE, COD authorization codes, AUD token audience, ORG Origin validation, TOK token transport, SES sessions, COR CORS.

MAP-ORG01 runs in every scan without an ownership proof: it sends two ordinary initialize requests, one with a foreign Origin. Most servers ask for a token before looking at Origin; the scan then reports it as inconclusive, and login observes it with a valid token. MAP-COR01 also runs in every scan: a CORS preflight and an ordinary request with a foreign Origin; it fails only when that origin is reflected together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.

Choosing checks

--only and --skip take comma-separated check IDs (MAP-RDR01, or just RDR01) or families (RDR), case-insensitive. --skip wins over --only; an unknown name is a usage error, so a typo never silently changes what runs.

mcp-authprobe scan https://mcp.example.com/mcp --skip THR        # production: no failed token requests
mcp-authprobe scan https://mcp.example.com/mcp --only RDR02      # re-check one fix

A check that is not selected sends no request and is listed as skipped (not selected), so a report never suggests it passed. The three refresh token checks are one sequence: selecting any of them runs the three (the others are then reported as not selected), and skipping all three leaves the test grant untouched. The MCP server's scan tool takes the same only and skip arguments.

Reports and exit codes

All server-controlled text is neutralized before it reaches a report: terminal escape sequences, bidi overrides and invisible characters are escaped, and token-shaped values are redacted.

GitHub Action

Run the scan on every deployment, or every night, so a change that reintroduces a flaw is caught before anyone else finds it.

name: MCP authorization
on:
  schedule:
    - cron: "17 3 * * *"
  workflow_dispatch:

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write   # only for upload-sarif

jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: Enigmacker/mcp-authprobe@v0.7.0
        with:
          url: https://staging.example.com/mcp
          secret: ${{ secrets.MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET }}
          skip: THR            # optional: no failed token requests
          upload-sarif: true   # optional: findings in the Security tab

The results table is added to the job summary. The step fails when a check fails at or above fail-on.

Outputs: exit-code, failed (number of failing checks), json-file, sarif-file, markdown-file.

The secret is passed through the environment, never on a command line. The refresh token checks and the login checks are not run by the action: they need a test grant from an interactive login, and a grant is consumed by a scan. Run them by hand after a change to your authorization server.

Run active scans against a staging environment rather than production whenever you can.

Without the action, the same thing in plain steps:

- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
  with:
    node-version: 22
- run: npx mcp-authprobe scan "$MCP_URL" --sarif results.sarif --markdown summary.md
  env:
    MCP_URL: https://mcp.example.com/mcp
    MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MCP_AUTHPROBE_SECRET }}
- run: cat summary.md >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
  if: always()

Safety of the scanner

The scanner talks to servers that may be hostile, and it may be driven by an AI agent. It protects both you and third parties:

• Ownership gate: no active request without a valid proof for every contacted host (the only exception is login, which behaves like an ordinary MCP client; see above).

• HTTPS only: every request, including endpoints announced by a server's metadata, must use HTTPS. Plain HTTP is accepted only for loopback or private-address labs with --allow-private, so tokens and secrets never travel in cleartext over the internet.

• Inconclusive is never a pass: rate limits (429, Retry-After) and server errors (5xx) make a check report error, never pass.

• SSRF protection: loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, reserved and cloud-metadata addresses are refused at connect time, after DNS resolution, unless --allow-private is passed.

• No automatic redirects: every redirect is inspected, never followed blindly.

• Bounded resources: per-request timeouts, response bodies capped at 1 MiB, no compression requested.

• Secrets stay secret: tokens and the ownership secret are never printed, and are redacted from every report.

• No telemetry.

Roadmap

0.1.0

• Refresh token checks (RTK01-03) done, from a test grant file.

• Interactive login creating the test grant done.

• Redirect URI checks (RDR01, RDR02, RDR04) done.

• MAP-RDR03 done, observed during login.

• Throttling check (THR01) done.

• MCP server mode (stdio) done.

• npm release done.

0.2.0

• Consent CSRF check (CSR01), driven through a browser session done.

0.3.0

• PKCE enforcement (PKC01), code reuse (COD01), token audience (AUD01), Origin validation (ORG01) done.

• Local practice server (lab) done.

0.4.0

• GitHub Action, --only / --skip done.

0.5.0

• Field trial against node-oidc-provider and the MCP SDK's OAuth example, with the fixes it led to done.

0.6.0

• Token in the URL (TOK01), session ID without a token (SES01), CORS with credentials (COR01) done.

0.7.0

• Readable terminal output and an animated demo done.

Next

• Optional integration with mcp-posture: run it alongside, or import its JSON report, and merge both into one report where active results confirm or refute what the metadata announces.

Development

npm ci
npm run typecheck
npm test          # unit and integration tests against a local fixture server
npm run build
npm run check     # all of the above
npm run demo      # re-record docs/demo/demo.gif (needs Chrome and ffmpeg)

Tests never leave the machine: integration tests run against a fixture server bound to 127.0.0.1.

Contributing and security

• How to add a check: CONTRIBUTING.md

• Reporting a vulnerability in mcp-authprobe itself: SECURITY.md

• Changes: CHANGELOG.md

License

MIT © 2026 Enigmacker