jev-mcp
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@jev-mcp triage this failing test: my change, environment, or flaky timing?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
jev-mcp
A fast, typed-judgment MCP server that lets coding agents (Claude Code first) ask TypeSafe's Jev
yes/no, choice, score and box questions, and act on the answer.
See SPEC.md for the full design and PROBE-RESULTS.md for live measurements.
What Jev is. Jev is the first System One model from TypeSafe: a model built to be used by machines, not to chat. "Send state and typed questions; get structured answers your code can use directly." It never writes text or code; it returns typed decisions with calibrated probabilities and a separate confidence, so software can act when confidence is high and escalate when it is low. TypeSafe's own comparison on a System One task: 0.114 s vs 8.566 s and $0.000081 vs $0.013880 against an LLM. With this server, the ~110-call live probe cost about $0.002 in total.
What jev-mcp adds. Three tools for coding agents, input refs instead of pasted state (
$file:,$diff,$log:), a secret guard that masks credentials before anything is sent, decision presets (auto | confirm | review), caching, rate and cost caps, and calibration from your own feedback. Stdio MCP server, TypeScript, Node >= 22, ESM,@typesafe-ai/sdk0.7.0 (exact pin).
Question types
Type | Jev returns | Typical use in coding work |
Noul | probability that the answer is yes | "Does this diff hunk change behaviour?", gate an action |
Choice | one option from a set, a probability per option, confidence | triage a failing test: my change / pre-existing / environment / timing / test bug |
Score | a level on an ordered, described scale, probabilities, confidence | rate the risk of a change, grade a review comment |
Box | four edges of a region in an image (fractions of width/height) | find a button or field in a screenshot |
Ground truth for the API: the TypeSafe docs at https://docs.typesafe.ai (index:
https://docs.typesafe.ai/llms.txt) and the schema at https://api.typesafe.ai/openapi.json.
Where SPEC.md disagrees with them, the official docs win.
Related MCP server: jev-code
Where Jev helps, from our tests
Measured with this server's stress suite (about 11,000 live calls on jev-1.13.0 / jev-1.14.0, 95% intervals, synthetic and real labelled items). Ranked from most to least useful for coding work:
Rank | Task | Result | Verdict | Final decision |
1 | Triage of failing tests and logs (what kind of failure is this?) | 100% accuracy, AUROC 1.000 on labelled test logs | Use it | Confirmed: same answers as a large model at about 1/80 of the cost. Jev handles it. |
2 | Clear, one-step classification (language, intent, sentiment, category) | 96.7 to 100% accuracy, AUROC 0.999; paraphrases agree 99.3% | Use it | Confirmed: a tie with a large model; disputed severity calls upheld 4 of 4. Jev handles it. |
3 | Many questions about one state (batch up to 30 per call) | same verdict as separate calls in 99.2% of pairs, 12.4x cheaper, 29.9x faster | Use it | Server default: up to 30 questions per request. |
4 | Finding a fact in a long file or log | 100% needle accuracy from 1 KB to 256 KB (long-context header above ~48 KB of logs) | Use it | Trim first; long context only when a log is over the limit. |
5 | Gating on confidence (act when sure, ask when not) | at confidence >= 0.9: 100% accuracy on 85% of items | Use it |
|
6 | Scoring on a scale; locating a region in a screenshot | score: 97.5 to 100% exact level; box: mean IoU 0.73, 87% hits | Use it, compare levels, not exact p | Compare levels and bands, never p to two decimals. |
7 | Screening diff hunks for relevance | 94% on security-diff decoys; mismatched bug/hunk pairs rejected 100% | Use it as a filter | First, cheap filter; the final code review stays with tests and a second review. |
8 | Subjective engineering choices ("A or B?") | winner changed with wording in 19.6% of framed calls, with option order in 17 to 33% of subjective items | Only with an order check and a human | Reversed-order check; a changed winner goes to |
9 | Three-step reasoning chains | 73 to 87% (two steps: 100%) | Split into single steps | One step per question; compute the rest in code. |
10 | "Is this bug report real?" / "Does this patch fix the bug?" | AUROC 0.64 and 0.57: near chance; accuracy equals the always-yes base rate | Do not use; run the tests, ask a reviewer | No model decides this: tests and a review do. A high p is never proof that a fix is right. |
Against a large general-purpose model judging the same items inline, Jev tied on clear classification, was also unusable on the two hard judgments, and cost about 80x less (about $0.00005 vs $0.0039 per item) at about 0.3 s per call.
Jev models compared
The same test sets on every model we could call (2026-10-21). jev-preview answered as jev-1.14.0 at the
time, so its column is a second sample of 1.14.0.
Measure | jev-1.13.0 | jev-1.14.0 | jev-preview |
Accuracy, 210 labelled items | 96.7% | 98.6% | 98.1% |
AUROC / calibration error (ECE) | 0.999 / 0.039 | 0.998 / 0.049 | 0.999 / 0.054 |
Clear items, 10 options: accuracy | 100% | 99.5% | 99.5% |
First-position bias, 10 options (none = 10%) | 9.2% | 10.0% | 10.4% |
Verdict flips over 20 identical calls | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Three-step reasoning | 73.3% | 86.7% | 80.0% |
Counting / arithmetic | 90.0% / 96.7% | 93.3% / 100% | 93.3% / 100% |
Dates, negation, long numbers, Hebrew = English | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Prompt injection inside the state: flip rate | 7.3% | 2.1% | 1.7% |
Latency p50 / p95 | 262 / 326 ms | 225 / 278 ms | 222 / 280 ms |
Pick: jev-1.14.0, pinned by default in this server: same accuracy and calibration as 1.13.0, better on three-step reasoning and prompt injection, and about 15% faster. Pin a version rather than a moving alias, so a model change never shifts your thresholds silently.
Short demo: triage a failing test
The agent pastes nothing; it sends the log line and five labelled options:
jev_ask {"recipe": "classify", "args": {
"state": "FAIL test/unit/day-usage-lock.test.ts > reclaims a stale lock: expected 5, received undefined. The test passed before the last commit that changed DayUsageStore.add.",
"options": {"my_change": "Caused by the current diff", "preexisting": "Failed before this change",
"env_infra": "Environment or infrastructure", "timing": "Timing or ordering", "test_bug": "The test itself is wrong"},
"none_option": "noul"}}Live answer (jev-1.14.0):
{"choice": "my_change", "confidence": 1, "probabilities": {"my_change": 1, "preexisting": 0, "env_infra": 0, "timing": 0, "test_bug": 0},
"usage": {"requests": 1, "input_tokens": 423, "est_cost_usd": 0.000018}}The agent now knows to look at its own last change first, for less than two thousandths of a cent.
Install
Requirements: Node.js >= 22, git, and a TypeSafe API key (create one at https://console.typesafe.ai/keys).
Clone and build (any folder, any OS):
git clone https://github.com/ablau911-ux/jev-mcp.git jev-mcp cd jev-mcp npm install npm run buildAPI key: set the environment variable
TYPESAFE_API_KEY, or put the key in the file~/.typesafe/api-key.txt(Windows:%USERPROFILE%\.typesafe\api-key.txt). The variable wins when it is not empty. The key only goes into theAuthorizationheader and is scrubbed from every output and log.Register with Claude Code (user scope), from the clone folder. The command stores the absolute path of your clone:
# bash / zsh claude mcp add --scope user jev -- node "$(pwd)/dist/server.js"# PowerShell claude mcp add --scope user jev -- node "$PWD\dist\server.js"Any other MCP client: add a stdio server to the client's MCP config. Use the absolute path of your clone:
{ "mcpServers": { "jev": { "command": "node", "args": ["/absolute/path/to/jev-mcp/dist/server.js"], "env": { "TYPESAFE_API_KEY": "<your key>" } } } }
Tools (exactly three)
Tool | Role |
| ONE state, N questions in one request. Or a recipe: |
| N items x ONE question set, one request per item. |
|
|
Recipes (former helper tools): classify, decide, verify_claim, rerank,
self_consistency, find_lines, locate. The server instructions are the router: routing
words first, rule 0, a "NOT for" list, one example per recipe and the fallback rule, under
4,096 characters. The full guide is the resource jev://guide.
Every result is concise JSON (structuredContent plus the same text, matching the declared
outputSchema): verdict, p, conf, decision (auto | confirm | review), model, an
id for feedback. Errors are isError with {kind, message, fix, retryable}; kind is
invalid_input | too_large | secret | auth | unavailable | rate_limited | budget_exceeded | cancelled | internal, plus cause, status, request_id and a JSON-path loc.
On unavailable, rate_limited or budget_exceeded: judge inline, do not retry in a loop.
Input refs (never paste state)
Ref | Expands to |
| the file text (line range, 1-based, inclusive) |
|
|
| the last N lines, stack traces cut to the top 5 non-library frames |
Files must be inside the working directory or the client's MCP roots (1 MiB max). Credential
files (.env*, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa*, app.ini, .ssh/, .aws/, .typesafe/, tea
config.yml, *credentials*, ...) are refused after realpath, with the same message as a
missing file; errors never echo the allowed roots.
Safety
Secret guard, no override. Every outbound string (state, instructions, criteria, every ref and
$diffhunk) is scanned. Matches are replaced by[REDACTED:<kind>]and the count is reported (secrets_redacted). Kinds: PEM keys, AWS, GitHub, Gitea, Slack, JWT, Bearer, genericsecret=..., connection strings, every value next to a secret-like key, and live secrets read at runtime (the TypeSafe key, the tea token). No argument, env var or config key turns it off;JEV_SECRET_MODE=refuseonly makes it stricter: mode: refuse refuses on any detection; the default is redact. It covers accidental leaks; deliberate obfuscation is out of scope. Threat model, coverage and how to report: SECURITY.md.Injection. Name untrusted fields
untrusted_*(and$log/ out-of-workspace files count as untrusted): a probe Noul runs in the same request and decisions are capped atconfirm(reviewwhen the probe fires).Egress. Every call sends data to TypeSafe. Tools carry
openWorldHint: trueandreadOnlyHint: true(Jev changes no local state, which may reduce approval prompts).JEV_CONFIRM_EGRESS=1addsanthropic/requiresUserInteraction(a prompt on every call, impractical for agent loops). The vendor's/legalterms (retention, region) were not read.
Models, decisions, calibration
Text and locate/box are pinned to
jev-1.14.0(live stress run 2026-10-21: prompt-injection flips 2.1% vs 7.3% on 1.13.0). The cache is keyed on the version; aliases are tracked fromresponse.model, and a changed version purges its cache namespace and caps decisions atconfirm.Presets in config:
gate(default),triage,review_filter(recall filter, flags p >= 0.3),strict(tight bands plus a reversed-order Choice check). Each threshold names its metric and sayscalibrated: falseandtuned_on. The live probe found no first-option bias on clear two-option code Choices, so order checks are opt-in.Calibration: every decision is logged (metadata only) to
~/.typesafe/jev-decisions.jsonl(Windows:%USERPROFILE%\.typesafe\). Labels come fromjev_status {action:"feedback", id, label}and from auto-labels (a flagged hunk later edited, a reranked file later read, a rerun that keeps or flips the verdict).jev_status {action:"calibrate", seed_git:true}reports ECE and a Wilson-bound threshold per preset once 30+ labels exist; it never changes config by itself.
Hooks (optional, no agent tokens)
jev-mcp-hook pre-tool-use asks before a Bash command that is not confidently harmless
(never auto-allows). jev-mcp-hook post-tool-use adds a warning when tool output looks like
injected instructions. Both fail open. Register them in settings.json only if you want them.
Limits and defaults
Price $0.042 per million input tokens (estimate). Context 64k per request, 32k per question, refused before sending;
long_context: "auto"uses the 262k header when needed.Token estimates use the probe factors: 3.3 chars/token for code and text, 1.4 for JSON structure, 1.2 for Hebrew and other non-Latin text (chars/4 under-counted by 17-69%).
Timeouts 5 s per attempt, 15 s per call (fitted inside
MCP_TOOL_TIMEOUTwhen set). Retries: 429, 529, network; other 5xx once; every retry resends the data.Session caps: 2M input tokens, 120 requests per minute, 5M per day, 200k tokens/s.
Batch: 6 workers, cap 8, halves on 429/529. Rerank window 16 (cap 64).
Images and Box: off unless
JEV_IMAGES=1. PNG/JPEG; EXIF removed; out-of-range PNGs resized.
Configuration
~/.typesafe/jev-config.json (Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.typesafe\jev-config.json) overrides any default in src/config/defaults.ts
and src/config/prompts.ts, with two floors: the secret guard's patterns and the credential
denylist can only be ADDED to (never removed, replaced or switched off), and a model pin
changes only through models.override: {text?, locate?} (results then carry
model_overridden: true; tool arguments and env vars cannot change a pin). Environment:
TYPESAFE_API_KEY, TYPESAFE_BASE_URL (official TypeSafe hosts only), JEV_COMPRESSION
(auto|zstd|off|gzip), JEV_CACHE_DIR (disk cache, refused inside a git repo),
JEV_BACKEND=mock (offline placeholders for tests and CI), JEV_IMAGES, JEV_SECRET_MODE,
JEV_CONFIRM_EGRESS, JEV_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_TOOL_TIMEOUT. Logs go to stderr only.
Checks and probe
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
JEV_LIVE=1 npm run probe # opt-in live probe (~110 calls, ~$0.002); see PROBE-RESULTS.mdThe probe needs a TypeSafe API key and sends synthetic data only.
License
MIT
Available Tools
3 toolsjev_askAsk Jev about one stateARead-only
ONE state, N questions: ask every typed question (noul yes/no p, choice label, score level) about one state in one call; answers come back with verdict, p and decision (auto | confirm | review). Use for: judging one failure log, one diff, one file, one command. For many items use jev_batch. Or run a recipe: {recipe:"classify"|"decide"|"verify_claim"|"rerank"|"self_consistency"|"find_lines"|"locate", args}. Not for: counting, dates, arithmetic, test pass/fail (exit code), summaries, judging whether a bug report is real or a patch fixes it. Refs instead of pasting: "$file:a.ts#L1-80", "$diff", "$log:x.log". If it returns unavailable / rate_limited / budget_exceeded, judge inline; do not retry in a loop. Example: {state:{diff:"$diff:staged"}, questions:{leak:{type:"noul",instructions:"Does diff add a hardcoded credential?"}}}
Inputs: args, cache, state, detail, +5 more. Returns: id, error, model, usage, +5 more
jev_batchJudge many items with one question setARead-only
N items x ONE question set: one request per item (failing tests, diff hunks, files), concurrent with a shared rate gate. Returns rows {item, verdict, p, decision} sorted by p as top-k or only the flagged ones, plus a summary and every failure. items_from builds items on the server: "$diff:staged" (one per hunk) or ["$file:a.ts", ...]. Diff review: preset review_filter with narrow Nouls where true = bad. Not for several questions about one state (jev_ask). If it returns unavailable / rate_limited / budget_exceeded, judge inline; do not retry in a loop. Example: {items_from:"$diff:staged", preset:"review_filter", questions:{no_err:{type:"noul",instructions:"Does diff remove error handling?"}}}
Inputs: questions (required), cache, items, top_k, +11 more. Returns: error, items, model, summary, +4 more
jev_statusJev health, usage and modelsARead-only
Jev health and housekeeping, no judgments: health (is Jev reachable, which models are pinned), usage (tokens, cost estimate, caps, estimate/actual ratio), models (aliases and versions), validate (offline dry run of a jev_ask input), presets (decision thresholds), feedback (label a past decision), calibrate (fit thresholds from labels). Free except health/models refresh (one GET).
Inputs: id, label, reset, action, +4 more. Returns: ok, error, action
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
The three tools split cleanly along orthogonal axes: jev_ask (one state, many questions), jev_batch (many items, one question set), and jev_status (health/housekeeping, no judgments). Descriptions explicitly include 'Not for' clauses that steer agents away from the wrong tool (e.g., 'For many items use jev_batch', 'Not for several questions about one state').
All names follow a single predictable pattern: the shared `jev_` prefix plus a short snake_case noun (ask, batch, status). No mixed conventions or verb-style drift.
Three tools is on the lean side, but each occupies a distinct role (single judgment, batched judgment, meta/ops) and nothing feels redundant. A slightly larger surface (e.g., a recipe-listing tool) might round it out, but the current set is well-scoped.
The surface covers the full judgment lifecycle: single calls, concurrent batch calls, offline validation, threshold presets, feedback labeling, and calibration. Minor gaps exist — no dedicated tool to list or inspect past decisions/history, and recipe discovery is only implied through the `recipe` arg rather than being a first-class operation.
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