RavensPort
Stores and retrieves credentials from 1Password, keeping OAuth tokens and API keys out of local configuration files.
Handles OAuth2 sign-in and token refresh for GitHub.
Handles OAuth2 sign-in and Google service accounts, refreshing tokens for Google APIs.
Handles OAuth2 sign-in and token refresh for Nextcloud.
Uses Proton Pass as a credential store for OAuth tokens and API keys, so secrets are not written to disk.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
RavensPort is an MCP proxy that lives in your tray and listens on 127.0.0.1. Point Claude Code,
Cursor, VS Code or any other MCP client at it, and each agent gets one endpoint carrying exactly
the tools you granted, from as many MCP servers and APIs as you like. Windows is the supported
platform; an experimental Debian/Ubuntu build is available for x86-64 and arm64.

Why
Too many tools. Connect three MCP servers and your agent sees all ninety of their tools, crowding its context. RavensPort lets you say "this agent gets these six".
OAuth everywhere. More and more MCP servers sit behind OAuth2, but most clients expect a plain HTTP endpoint. RavensPort signs in once, refreshes the tokens, and no token ever goes in your
mcp.json.No MCP server at all. The system you want the agent to reach often has only a REST API. RavensPort turns that API into MCP tools without you writing an MCP server.
No say over what leaves. An agent can paste a key, a customer's address or a
DROP TABLEinto any call. RavensPort checks every call before any server sees it, on your PC.
Related MCP server: agent-bus-mcp
What it does
MCP Funnel — an MCP gateway that pools several MCP servers behind one endpoint per agent, with per-tool filtering of tools, resources and prompts
Call filters — per agent, five steps check what goes out before any server sees it: secrets (the gitleaks rule set, always denied), personal data by editable patterns, personal data by a local entity model (GLiNER), meaning by an embedding model (local ONNX on CPU or GPU, Ollama, llama.cpp, OpenAI or Voyage AI), and your own statements answered with a probability by a decision model (TypeSafe Jev, Laya, or any zero-shot / cross-encoder ONNX model on CPU or GPU). Each step's matches are replaced before the next reads the call; matched values are never logged. Set up as profiles and chosen per route, bridge, funnel or upstream (how)

API to MCP — turn a REST API you already proxy into an MCP server from a JSON manifest, or import an OpenAPI (Swagger) spec and pick which of its operations become tools
OAuth2, handled — Google, GitHub, Nextcloud or any custom provider; device-code sign-in; client-credentials and Google service accounts for logins with nobody at the keyboard; static API keys for the services that never offered OAuth. Tokens refresh in the background
Secrets stay in your password manager — 1Password or Proton Pass holds every credential, and nothing is written to this PC
A proxy key per endpoint — every route, funnel and bridge has its own, so a key leaked from one client cannot reach the rest. Optionally require a client certificate as well
Safety approach
AI agents act through tools, and some actions can't be undone: deleting data, sending money, pushing to production, leaking a key. RavensPort sits between the agent and every server it reaches. It limits what each agent can do, keeps credentials out of the agent's hands, and checks what each call says before any server sees it. The layers stack, so one failing does not open everything.
1. Each agent gets only the tools you allow (least privilege).
Each agent has its own endpoint. Include is a closed list: a tool you don't tick doesn't exist for that agent, and an empty list exposes nothing.
Enforced on the call path, not just the tool list. A tool the agent saw before you unticked it, or simply guessed, is refused and never reaches the server. Edits apply on the next call.
The surest way to prevent an irreversible action is not to offer the tool. The shipped templates are read-only where it matters (
google-drive-readonly,tailscale-readonly), and an OpenAPI import only turns into tools the operations you pick.
2. Agents never hold the credentials.
RavensPort signs in and attaches the token or API key itself. The agent gets only a proxy key for its own endpoint: one key opens one endpoint and nothing else. It can expire, and regenerating it revokes the old one at once. Optionally a client certificate (mTLS) is required as well.
Secrets live in 1Password or Proton Pass, not on disk.
The forwarding path can't be turned against the credential. Redirects are refused rather than followed, a manifest can't set
AuthorizationorCookie, tool paths can't leave their route, and requests looping through the proxy are refused.
3. Every call is checked before it leaves (call filters). Five steps, chosen per endpoint as a profile:
Step | What it catches | How |
1 Secrets | API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings | 247 rules (gitleaks plus stricter ones), always denied |
2 RegEx | Emails, card numbers, IBANs, phone numbers, tax IDs | Patterns with checksums |
3 Entities | Names, addresses, medical conditions | A local GLiNER model |
4 Meaning | Calls close to what you deny ("delete files or whole disks") | An embedding model, taught by deny and allow examples |
5 Decision | Your rules in plain words ("This text is about sending money.") | A zero-shot or Laya model returns a probability |
A Block stops the call before any server sees it, and the agent is told which step stopped it. Watch only logs, so a rule can be tried before it is enforced.
Steps 4–5 never see what steps 1–3 found: a match there either stops the call or is replaced first.
A missing profile, a broken pattern, or a failed model on a Block step blocks the call (fails closed). Everything can run on this PC.
4. Everything is on record. The activity log records each call, refusal and filter match, with the step and field that matched, but never the matched value or the call's arguments.
Evidence
Demo: the tour above, and screenshots of every tab. The Filters tab's Try it shows each step's verdict and score for a call you paste in.
Tests: about 1,400 core tests and 120 UI tests run on every pull request. A system suite runs against a real 1Password vault. Coverage and quality are tracked on SonarCloud. The safety claims above each have tests, for example:
Claim
Tests
An unticked tool is refused on the call path
McpFunnelIsolationTests:FilteringHolds_WhenBothEndpointsAreHammeredAtOnce;McpFunnelSelectionTests:IncludeIsAClosedList,AnEmptyIncludeListExposesNothingOne key opens one endpoint; revoking is immediate
McpApiBridgeKeyIsolationTests:OnlyTheBridgesOwnKeyOpensIt,RegeneratingTheKeyRevokesTheOldOneImmediately,AnExpiredKeyStopsOpeningTheEndpointRedirects don't carry the credential away
McpApiBridgeEndToEndTests:ARedirectIsRefusedRatherThanFollowedWithoutTheCredentialA blocked call never reaches the server
McpFunnelFilterTests:ABlockedCall_NeverReachesTheSource_AndSaysWhy;EndpointFilterTests:ARouteWithAProfile_RefusesARequestCarryingAPassword_AndForwardsACleanOneFilters fail closed
AProfileDeletedUnderneath_BlocksTheCall,ARouteWhoseProfileIsGone_RefusesRatherThanForwarding,FilterServiceTests:AnEntityModelThatFails_ReportsTheCallRatherThanWavingItThroughPersonal data found by steps 1–3 doesn't reach steps 4–5
FilterServiceTests:Entities_EveryOccurrenceIsReplacedForStep4_EvenOneTheModelReadAcrossAPlaceholderMeasured with real models, through RavensPort's own code: the zero-shot model
deberta-v3-base-zeroshot-v2.0(CPU, about 50 ms per call for three statements) scoredrm -rf …1.00, a money transfer 1.00 andDROP TABLE0.70, and a weather lookup,git statusand a file listing 0.00. The embedding model stella-en-400M-v5 scored a paraphrase of a denied action 0.91 and an unrelated text 0.28, in about 70 ms.Supply chain: CodeQL, SonarCloud, gitleaks, DevSkim, Trivy, OSV-Scanner, Snyk, zizmor and dependency review run in CI, and the installer is scanned. Every release carries a build-provenance attestation (
gh attestation verify).Documentation: the wiki, including Call filters and Setting up filter models.
Limitations
Not a sandbox. RavensPort governs only what an agent sends through it. An agent with its own shell, network access or local (stdio) MCP servers can go around it, and RavensPort can't protect against a process that already controls your user account. Local stdio MCP servers can't be pooled at all.
Outgoing calls only. What a tool returns isn't checked, so instructions hidden in a web page or a document (prompt injection) reach the agent unfiltered.
No human approval yet. A step blocks or logs; there is no "ask me first" for a risky call.
Each call is judged on its own. A harmful action split across several harmless-looking calls isn't recognised.
Detectors make mistakes. Rules and models miss some things and flag some harmless ones. Steps 4–5 depend on how statements and examples are worded, and most of the suggested models are English. A Watch step whose model fails lets the call through, with the failure logged.
Remote models see call text. If step 4 or 5 uses an API rather than a local model, that API receives every call it checks, minus what steps 1–3 replaced.
Setup effort. No model ships with the app; you download and add them yourself. RavensPort's Laya runner hasn't yet been checked against Laya's reference outputs.
Platforms. Windows is the supported platform. The Linux build is experimental and runs models on the CPU only.
Install
winget install RavensPortOr take the installer from Releases, or the Microsoft Store. Windows 10/11. Full instructions, including building from source, are in Installation.
Debian / Ubuntu experimental
v5.0.0 moved the interface to Avalonia and added a .deb for Debian and Ubuntu. Since v5.0.1 there
is one for x86-64 (amd64) and one for 64-bit Arm (arm64, which covers a Raspberry Pi running
64-bit Raspberry Pi OS), and apt picks the right one. Install it from the RavensPort apt
repository, and apt upgrade keeps it current:
sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://abishekvupputur.github.io/ravensPort/apt/ravensport.asc \
| sudo tee /etc/apt/keyrings/ravensport.asc > /dev/null
echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/ravensport.asc] https://abishekvupputur.github.io/ravensPort/apt ./" \
| sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ravensport.list
sudo apt update
sudo apt install ravensportOr take the .deb from Releases and sudo apt install ./ravensport_<version>_<amd64|arm64>.deb,
or build one from a checkout with packaging/build-deb.sh.
It has had far less use than the Windows build, and a few things differ by necessity — the Proton
Pass session key lives in the desktop keyring rather than behind Windows Hello, and pass-cli must
be installed in a system location. Everything is on the wiki:
Linux build.
Documentation
Everything lives in the wiki.
Page | |
How credentials, routes, funnels and bridges fit together | |
Every sign-in method, and how to test one | |
Proxying an upstream, and choosing how the credential is sent | |
Manifests, variants, and importing an OpenAPI document | |
Pooling sources into one endpoint and filtering what it exposes | |
Profiles, the five steps, models on CPU or GPU, and the secret rules | |
Proxy keys, how long they last, and why there is one per endpoint | |
Requiring a certificate as well as a key | |
What is in the vault, what is on disk, and what syncs | |
What is recorded, what is redacted, and where it goes | |
When something does not work | |
Building, testing and packaging from source | |
Building, installing and running the experimental Debian/Ubuntu package |
Manifests ready to use are in templates/api-mcp/, and the format is
documented in AUTHORING.md.
License
MIT — see LICENSE. Third-party dependencies (all MIT or Apache-2.0) are listed in THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md, which also covers what redistributing the published exe requires.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Shared memory MCP server for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI and Cursor. Cited, editable.
Real-time chat hub for AI agents — Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Codex over MCP or REST.
Talk to your public-facing AI from any MCP client — Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf.
Real-time chat for AI agents. Claude Code, Cursor, Cline and Codex join channels over MCP.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceAgent Connectivity Gateway — turn any authenticated API into an MCP Server. Self-hosted reverse proxy with OAuth 2.0/OIDC credential injection, per-agent isolation, NAT traversal for localhost services, and REST-to-MCP auto-wrap from OpenAPI specs. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Codex. Rust.441Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceA local MCP server that connects AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, etc.) on the same machine via a shared message bus, enabling them to chat, delegate tasks, and collaborate privately without cloud or internet.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityAmaintenanceOne local gateway for all your MCP servers — shared by every AI coding tool (Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex). Set up each server once; keys stay in the OS keychain; lazy discovery keeps agent context small. Local-first, open source.4241MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceCodeMCP — a secure, workspace-bound bridge between your machine and ChatGPT, Claude, or any AI agent.4MIT