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abdulbrown

ransomware-live-mcp

by abdulbrown

get_group

Read-only

Retrieve a full intelligence profile for a ransomware group, covering background, activity dates, victim count, leak-site URLs, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, exploited CVEs, tools, and negotiation/ransom note flags.

Instructions

Get a full intelligence profile for one ransomware group.

Includes background description, first/last seen dates, victim count, known leak-site URLs (Tor and clearweb), MITRE ATT&CK TTPs, exploited CVEs with CVSS scores, tools and malware used, and flags for whether negotiation chats and ransom notes are on file.

Args: group_name: Group name, case-insensitive (e.g. "lockbit3", "blackcat", "clop").

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
group_nameYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already characterize it as read-only and non-destructive, and the description adds useful disclosure about what the profile contains, including flags reflecting whether negotiation chats and ransom notes exist. It does not describe rate limits or error behavior, but the safety profile is already supplied by annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Every line earns its place: the first sentence states the purpose, the middle enumerates returned data, and the Args block documents the only parameter. It is front-loaded and readable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with an output schema and clear annotations, the description is complete. It covers the input semantics, the breadth of the response, and the safety profile without requiring an agent to inspect schemas.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, but the description compensates for the single required parameter by naming it, stating it is case-insensitive, and giving concrete examples. This is sufficient for a one-argument lookup, though it does not explain how to discover valid group names.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Get a full intelligence profile for one ransomware group.' It then enumerates the profile's contents, making the tool's scope unmistakable and distinguishing it from list-style siblings like list_groups and get_group_iocs.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear context: use this when a single group's full profile is needed, as opposed to listing groups. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.