aarifmms/keyblind
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| KEYBLIND_AUTO_INIT | No | true |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| resolve_secretA | Resolve a secret by name using the configured backend (local vault, 1Password, Bitwarden, or env vars). Returns the decrypted value at runtime. The secret value is never visible in the LLM conversation transcript — it is resolved just-in-time for the current operation. |
| store_secretB | Store a secret in the encrypted vault. The value is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before storage. The secret value is never visible in the LLM conversation transcript after this call. |
| list_secretsB | List all stored secret names (names only — values are never revealed in this listing). |
| sandbox_envA | Replace real values in your .env file with deterministic fake values. Real values are encrypted and backed up to the vault. AI agents reading .env files will only see fakes. Use unsandbox_env to restore real values. |
| unsandbox_envC | Restore real .env values from the vault. Reverses the sandbox operation. |
| delete_secretC | Delete a secret from the vault. |
| audit_logA | View the audit log of secret resolutions, stores, and deletes. Shows who accessed which secret and when. |
| totp_codeA | Generate a TOTP 2FA code for a stored secret. Returns the current 6 or 8 digit code and seconds remaining until rotation. |
| totp_storeB | Store a TOTP configuration from an otpauth:// URI (from QR code scan or manual entry). |
| totp_listB | List all stored TOTP configurations. |
| totp_deleteC | Delete a stored TOTP configuration. |
| create_share_linkA | Create an encrypted, expiring share link for a secret. The secret is encrypted into the URL fragment and never sent to any server. |
| receive_shareA | Receive and decrypt a shared secret from a share URL fragment. |
| deadman_statusB | Check dead man's switch status — days until vault access is released to designated contacts. |
| deadman_checkinB | Check in to reset the dead man's switch timer. |
| team_initA | Create a new shared team vault (encrypted SQLite). Requires a passphrase. |
| team_pushC | Push a local secret to the shared team vault. |
| team_pullC | Import all secrets from the team vault into your local vault. |
| team_listB | List all secret names in the team vault. |
| team_resolveC | Resolve (decrypt) a single secret from the team vault. |
| team_deleteC | Delete a secret from the team vault. |
| sso_statusB | Check SSO/OIDC authentication status for team vault access. |
| register_agentA | Register an AI agent in the Know Your Agent registry, bound to a human sponsor. Returns the agent identity and its Ed25519 private key, which the agent holds to sign its own actions. |
| record_actionA | Append a signed action to the tamper-proof agent ledger. Each entry is hash-chained and Ed25519-signed, so any later edit or reorder is detectable. |
| verify_ledgerA | Verify the integrity of the agent action ledger by re-walking the hash chain and signatures. Returns the first sequence that fails if the ledger was tampered with. |
| list_agentsB | List all agents in the Know Your Agent registry. |
| export_complianceB | Export the agent action ledger as a compliance report (JSON or CSV) with human-sponsor attribution. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 27 tools
Tools are organized into clear domain clusters (team_*, totp_*, deadman_*, plus local secret and agent-ledger operations), so most purposes are distinguishable. The main risk is the parallel local vs. team vault surface (store_secret vs team_push, resolve_secret vs team_resolve, list_secrets vs team_list, delete_secret vs team_delete), which an agent could occasionally confuse, but naming largely disambiguates them.
Everything is snake_case and readable, grouped by domain prefix (team_, totp_, deadman_). The ordering is slightly mixed—some are noun-first prefixes (team_init, sso_status) while others are verb-first (store_secret, register_agent, create_share_link)—but the convention is predictable enough to follow.
27 tools is heavy for one server and spans many distinct sub-domains (team vault, KYA/agent ledger, local secrets, TOTP, env sandboxing, secret sharing, dead man's switch). Each tool is meaningful, but the breadth pushes this into borderline-overloaded territory.
Coverage is strong across nearly every domain: team vault CRUD, local secret lifecycle, TOTP store/code/list/delete, agent register/record/verify/export, share create/receive, and dead man's switch status/checkin. Minor gaps exist (e.g. no explicit secret rotation/update, limited SSO beyond status), but agents can work around these.