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MELRA

Modular Execution Layer for Reliable Autonomy

The open-source autonomy kernel

The LLM reasons. The harness manages the loop. MELRA owns the effect lifecycle.

An agent-independent effect runtime for governed, durable, and verifiable autonomous execution. MELRA begins where the tool call leaves the model loop.

Your models can change. Your agents can change. Your execution foundation shouldn't have to.

WARNING

MELRA is an alpha release. Its local stdio runtime is tested end to end, but APIs may change before 1.0. Use an isolated workspace, keep domain and command allowlists narrow, and review every consequential approval.

Durable Core Alpha — 0.3.0-alpha.11

Shipped in this source release

Evidence

Restart-safe bounded workflows across nine node kinds

Real MCP process is stopped, replaced, and resumed in E2E

Encrypted exact task, workflow, and result payloads

AES-256-GCM storage plus plaintext-leak checks across SQLite/WAL and public projections

Eleven MCP tools for tasks and workflows

Container and stdio discovery checks require the exact tool set

Recovery without silent mutation replay

8/8 deterministic recovery scenarios, zero duplicates, zero false success

Loopback HTTP transport, event stream, and read-only console

Same runtime as stdio, token on every route, 405 on any non-GET to the JSON API

A client authenticates itself and is named on every receipt

OAuth 2.1 registration through approval to a token, then the approved client at the head of the delegation chain

Two deployment modes, so a kernel can say whether it is the only door

--unsafe-local and a non-loopback bind are both refused under MELRA_MODE=enforced, no client can self-register, and mode is stamped on every receipt

HTTP and API calls as a first-class effect

Same nine stages as a file write; a mutation whose reply never arrived is reported unknown rather than failed

Agents receive capabilities, not credentials

The kernel holds the secret and scopes it by host and capability; grants carry a size as well as an expiry and are drawn down durably

Evidence says how it is known

execution / state / independent / semantic, derived in one place from the predicate type, so a caller can tell a re-read of the target from the adapter's own word

An effect can be confirmed by a channel that did not perform it

http_resource_matches executes through POST and verifies through a separate GET, so an accepted-but-not-done request lands partial


Contents


Related MCP server: Container-MCP

Why MELRA

An LLM decides what to do. A harness runs the loop that gets it there. Something still has to decide whether the resulting effect is allowed, run it exactly once, prove it worked, and survive a crash in the middle. Today that machinery is rebuilt inside every agent harness, in a way that dies with the harness.

MELRA is that machinery, factored out and made agent-independent:

The LLM reasons. The harness manages the loop. MELRA owns the effect lifecycle.

An effect is a named operation that changes or observes the world outside the model — file.write, terminal.execute, browser.click, computer.keyboard, http.request, database.mutate, stripe.refund, github.merge. MELRA does exactly nine things to every one of them, and nothing else:

MELRA does

Which answers

1

Types the effect against a strict, bounded schema

Exactly what may change?

2

Classifies it as read, mutation, or destructive

How much does this matter?

3

Authorises it against policy, re-checked at execution

Is this allowed, still?

4

Gates it on an exact human approval phrase

Does a person decide?

5

Records it durably before anything runs

What was in flight?

6

Deduplicates it by idempotency key

Has this already happened?

7

Runs it under a budget and a cancel signal

When does it stop?

8

Verifies it against declared evidence

What proves it worked?

9

Receipts it, redacted and hash-linked

What can be audited later?

That list is the whole job. Everything upstream of it — what to attempt, in what order, and why — stays with the model and the harness.

Which is why MELRA never receives a goal. "Fix the production server" requires judgement about what is broken and what should change; that is reasoning, and it belongs to the model. The model resolves it to a bounded operation, and that is what arrives:

{ "effect": "terminal.execute", "command": "systemctl",
  "args": ["restart", "api"], "environment": "production" }

An interface that accepted the sentence would have to interpret it, and a kernel that interprets is a kernel whose guarantees depend on a model.

Most tool servers hand a model a tool and hope. A command runs, a click lands, a file is written — and "it returned without an error" is treated as success. MELRA separates the action succeeded from the goal was achieved.

  • Tool call executes immediately

  • Success = no exception thrown

  • Policy, if any, checked once

  • Mutations are indistinguishable from reads

  • Output is trusted

  • No durable record

  • Rules live inside one agent

  • Plan and execute are separate tool calls

  • Success = declared evidence predicates passed

  • Policy re-evaluated at execution time

  • Mutations need evidence and an exact approval phrase

  • Page content is explicitly marked untrusted

  • Redacted receipt + SHA-256 execution certificate

  • Rules outlive the agent that used them

If a mutation succeeds but its required evidence is missing or false, the task is partialnever verified_success.

Agents should be replaceable. The infrastructure that owns consequences should not be. Swap the harness on Friday; the policies, approvals, credentials, workflow history, idempotency records, and receipts are still there on Monday.

Next to the two layers it is most often mistaken for:

Agent harness

MCP server

MELRA

Model loop and reasoning

Tools

via adapters

Execution

Agent-independent policy

usually ✗

possible

core

Durable effect state

sometimes

rarely

core

Idempotency across restarts

varies

rare

core

Crash recovery without replay

varies

rare

core

Independent verification

uncommon

possible

core

Evidence receipts

uncommon

possible

core

Works across agents

Credential isolation

varies

varies

core

Hard capability boundary

varies

usually ✗

partly shipped

Plenty of MCP servers can do these things — this is not a claim that none of them do. The difference is that in MELRA they are the execution contract rather than a per-tool option. The boundary is partly shipped: MELRA_MODE=enforced closes every door MELRA owns, but the OS isolation that stops a harness reaching the filesystem around the kernel is the operator's to build, and there is no Unix-socket transport yet (#52). A kernel cannot verify it is the only door; enforced mode is the operator asserting that, and MELRA holding up its end.


Where it sits 🧭

Three layers, not two. The reasoning loop is the model and the harness together; the effect lifecycle is below both of them.

            ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  reasoning │  LLM    Claude · GPT · Gemini · Llama      │
            │  reasons · decides what should happen      │
            └────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                           ▲ tool call   │ tools + context
                           │             ▼
            ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
   the loop │  AGENT HARNESS   OpenClaw · Hermes ·       │
            │  ATLAS · Claude Code · your own            │
            │  sessions · context · prompts · dispatch   │
            └────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                   │  effect request
                                   ▼
            ╔════════════════════════════════════════════╗
    effects ║  MELRA — autonomy kernel                   ║
            ║                                            ║
            ║  identity · capability · policy ·          ║
            ║  authorization · credential broker ·       ║
            ║  durable execution · idempotency ·         ║
            ║  recovery · verification · evidence        ║
            ╚════════════════════════════════════════════╝
                                   │
                                   ▼
            ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
   adapters │  EFFECT ADAPTERS                           │
            │  files · terminal · browser · computer ·   │
            │  HTTP — planned: database · cloud · SaaS   │
            └────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                   ▼
             Linux · macOS · Windows · APIs · cloud

Many harnesses, one execution foundation:

   OpenClaw ─┐
   Hermes ───┤
   ATLAS ────┼──→  MELRA  ──→  your systems
   Custom ───┘

Who owns what, and this does not move:

Layer

Owns

LLM

Reasoning · tool selection · planning

Harness

Conversation · prompt construction · model routing · semantic memory · agent personality · subagent reasoning

MELRA

Effect authorization · effect execution · durable effect state · recovery · verification · evidence · credentials and capabilities

MCP is one way to reach the kernel, not what the kernel is. MCP, CLI, SDK, and loopback HTTP all enter the same runtime, take the same policy decision, and write the same durable record.


Reference effect adapters 🔌

The kernel is the contract; these are its shipped implementations of it. Every one passes through the same policy, approval, budget, verification, receipt, and certificate pipeline — an adapter that skipped it would not be an adapter.

Adapter

What is implemented

🗂️

Files

Root-confined read, hash, atomic write, move, mkdir, and delete with symlink-escape defenses

💻

Terminal

Shell-free foreground and supervised background processes with allowlists, traits, timeouts, interactive input, cancellation, and redaction

🌐

Browser

Isolated Playwright sessions, semantic DOM targets, bounded artifacts, network policy, popup policy, opt-in profiles, and condition-based post-action settling

🖥️

Computer

Capability discovery plus governed screenshot, pointer, keyboard, and scroll adapters on macOS and supported Linux/X11 setups

📡

HTTP

GET/HEAD as reads and every other method as an approval-gated at-most-once mutation, pinned to the address the destination check resolved, with credentials injected by the kernel rather than handed to the caller

The diagram above also shows database, cloud, and SaaS adapters. Those are designed and on the roadmapnot shipped today. HTTP is, because a serious amount of autonomous work happens through APIs rather than mouse clicks, and an API effect needs the same nine guarantees as a file write.

Operational memory is a kernel service rather than an adapter: what MELRA knows about its own effects — which operation changed what, which attempt was already committed, what a previous run observed. Scoped SQLite storage with hybrid lexical ranking, episode context, confidence, freshness, expiry, supersession, provenance, and redaction. Semantic memory about the user — preferences, project context, conversation history — belongs to the harness above, not here.


Where you can use MELRA 🛠️

MELRA works with any MCP client that can launch a local stdio server.

Client

Setup

Status

Claude Desktop

docs

Cursor

docs

VS Code

docs

Any stdio MCP client

docs

NOTE

A named client is markedverified only after the released artifact — not a source checkout — passes discovery, planning, approval, execution, cancellation, and receipt retrieval in that client. Current per-client status is tracked in COMPATIBILITY.md.

What people actually do with it

Use case

Small example

Verified outcome

👩‍💻

Coding clients

Inspect a repository, run pnpm check, write a bounded file change

Exit code, file existence, content, or hash

🌐

Browser workflows

Open an allowlisted page, inspect it, fill a form after approval

Final URL and page content

💻

Terminal automation

Run a shell-free build or supervise a background process

Exit code and bounded stdout

🖥️

Computer use

Discover local support, capture a screenshot, approve pointer or keyboard input

Adapter result plus declared evidence

🧠

Project memory

Store a test command, architectural decision, or operating procedure

Scoped record with provenance and redaction

🔁

Durable workflows

Inspect, write an approved artifact, restart between nodes, then checkpoint

Ordered events, independent file evidence, receipt, and certificate

A coding client submits one bounded operation with the evidence it expects:

{
  "goal": "Run the repository checks",
  "operation": {
    "kind": "terminal",
    "action": "run",
    "command": "pnpm",
    "args": ["check"]
  },
  "requiredEvidence": [
    { "type": "exit_code", "value": 0 }
  ]
}

The task reaches verified_success only if the process exits 0. A process that runs and exits 1 is a completed action with failed evidence — reported as partial.

pnpm melra run --request examples/07-project-decision-memory/task.json

Records are scoped, provenance-tagged, and pass through secret redaction before they are persisted.

See all runnable examples — browser inspection, verified file writes, terminal checks, scoped memory, and computer capability discovery.


Quickstart 🚀

npm (fastest — needs Node 22+):

npx @melra/cli@alpha setup

One command: writes a safe local policy, prints a ready-to-paste MCP client config, and runs every readiness check. Add --client claude|cursor|vscode|codex to label the config for a specific client. Use doctor alone to check readiness without writing anything.

Container (no Node install needed):

docker run --rm ghcr.io/xagi-lab/melra:alpha doctor

Prebuilt release: Download from the releases page, extract, and run:

tar -xzf melra-node-<version>.tar.gz -C melra
node melra/dist/bin.js doctor

From source (for development):

git clone https://github.com/XAGI-Lab/melra.git
cd melra
corepack enable
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
pnpm build
pnpm melra setup

Mutations pause for an exact, expiring, task-scoped approval phrase. See installation and client setup for Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, generic clients, Python, and Docker.

MELRA creates <MELRA_HOME>/payload.key with private permissions on first start. Back it up together with the SQLite files: losing or changing the key makes persisted executable payloads unreadable. Never commit the key or place it directly in a shared client configuration.

CAUTION

Theunscoped npm package melra and the PyPI package melra are unrelated third-party projects. This project publishes only under the @melra/ npm scope — @melra/cli is the CLI. Install from that scope, from this repository, or from official XAGI-Lab releases.


Restart-safe first workflow 🔁

The committed example performs a read, pauses for an approved file write, and finishes at a durable checkpoint. Each CLI invocation is a new process, so this sequence exercises restart persistence without keeping a daemon alive:

node apps/cli/dist/bin.js workflow plan \
  --definition examples/workflows/restart-safe.json
# save the returned workflow id

node apps/cli/dist/bin.js workflow advance <workflow-id>
node apps/cli/dist/bin.js workflow advance <workflow-id>
# the second command exits 3 and returns the write approval challenge

node apps/cli/dist/bin.js workflow advance <workflow-id> \
  --approval '<approval-id>:<exact phrase>'
node apps/cli/dist/bin.js workflow advance <workflow-id>

Shortened output captured from the 0.3.0-alpha.0 release candidate:

planned            stateVersion=2
running            stateVersion=4   inspect=verified_complete
awaiting_approval  stateVersion=7   phrase="APPROVE <digest prefix>"
running            stateVersion=10  write=verified_complete
verified_complete  stateVersion=14  checkpoint=verified_complete

The final file is read independently in the real-process E2E test. Closing the process after any displayed boundary and running the next command against the same MELRA_HOME resumes the persisted workflow.


A deliberately small MCP surface ✨

Eleven tools in front of the reference effect adapters and one durable workflow controller. The CLI, both SDKs, and loopback HTTP reach the same eleven operations — this list is the kernel contract, not an MCP-specific API:

MCP tool

Purpose

melra_capabilities

Discover operations, platform support, limits, and policy posture

melra_plan

Validate, persist, and policy-check one bounded operation

melra_execute

Execute an approved plan and verify the declared outcome

melra_task_status

Read durable task state

melra_task_cancel

Cooperatively cancel pending or running work

melra_receipt

Retrieve redacted evidence and the execution certificate

melra_workflow_plan

Validate, preflight, encrypt, and persist a bounded workflow

melra_workflow_advance

Execute one ready scheduling wave

melra_workflow_status

Read the durable workflow projection

melra_workflow_cancel

Cooperatively cancel nonterminal workflow work

melra_workflow_control

Pause, resume, or suspend a run without losing its place

Workflow definitions compose operation, approval, condition, parallel, bounded-loop, checkpoint, compensation, human-input, and delegation nodes while every effect still travels through the task policy and evidence pipeline.

If you would rather your model saw the tool names it already knows, set MELRA_HARNESS_TOOLS=1 and thirteen more appear alongside these — read_file, write_file, run_command, browser_click, approve, and the rest. They are not a second path: each one builds an ordinary task and runs the same pipeline, and a mutation still stops on its approval phrase. See INSTALLATION.md.


How execution works ⚙️

flowchart LR
    Client["MCP · CLI · SDK"] --> Plan["Persist task or workflow"]
    Plan --> Policy{"Policy at plan time"}
    Policy -->|deny| Stop["Policy blocked"]
    Policy -->|allow or exact approval| Recheck{"Policy at execution time"}
    Recheck --> Runtime["File · terminal · browser · memory · computer"]
    Runtime --> Observe["Post-action observation"]
    Observe --> Verify{"Evidence predicates pass?"}
    Verify -->|yes| Success["Verified success"]
    Verify -->|no| Partial["Partial or failed"]
    Success --> Event["Ordered event + projection"]
    Event --> Receipt["Redacted receipt + SHA-256 certificate"]
    Partial --> Receipt

Task lifecycle:

planned → awaiting_approval → running → verifying
                                     ↘ verified_success
                                     ↘ partial | failed | cancelled | budget_exhausted

Policy is evaluated twice — once when the plan is persisted and again at execution — so a stale plan can never ride a since-tightened policy.

IMPORTANT

Current alpha boundary: exact task and workflow payloads survive restart in AES-256-GCM envelopes. Interrupted reads may retry; interrupted mutations are never silently repeated and are settled by re-observation — a filesystem re-read, or a declared reconciliation predicate asking the provider — or enter recovery_required. A request that went out and was never answered parks there too, because failed would assert an outcome nobody holds. Evidence predicates remain caller-authored, and what a predicate is worth depends on where its answer came from: http_resource_matches asks a channel that did not perform the effect, filesystem predicates re-read state, and result, terminal, URL, and page predicates evaluate adapter observations. Every evidence item carries that level in strength, derived from the predicate type rather than declared by the caller.


Evidence, not leaderboard theatre 📊

The numbers below come from committed scripts and JSON artifacts measured on an Apple Silicon Mac. They are component measurements, not a claim that MELRA MCP is universally "the best" or that unlike benchmarks are comparable.

Capability

Current public result

What it means

🧠

LoCoMo retrieval

0.7597 mean evidence coverage@20

1,982 evidence-bearing questions; +20.75% relative over the previous public ranker; zero model, embedding, or network calls

🧠

Synthetic recall

100/100 Recall@1

Deterministic planted-fact regression over 1,000 records

🌐

Static-page settle

183.7 ms p50 vs 301.3 ms

39% less waiting with identical 10/10 correct reads

🌐

Slow-render settle

10/10 vs 0/10 correct

Condition-based waiting observes the final DOM; fixed 300 ms reads too early

💻

Terminal

30/30 verified executions

Shell-free process launch; 48.1 ms p50 on the measured machine

🖥️

Computer control plane

30/30 capability probes

0.032 ms p50 adapter discovery; this is not a desktop task-success score

Safety/execution evals

51/51 passing

Deterministic policy, capability-grant, credential-scope, traversal, terminal, memory, computer, HTTP, cancellation, and verification scenarios, six of them against a recorded desktop

🔁

Durable Core eval

8/8 valid scenarios

100% expected recovery, 0 duplicate execution, 0 false success, 100% event consistency

Read the research index, the benchmark methodology, and the raw microbenchmark and LoCoMo artifacts.

Browser-agent evaluation — harness registered, score not yet claimed

The repository contains a pre-registered browser-agent evaluation harness:

Track

Status

MiniWoB-125 development suite (browsergym-miniwob==0.14.3)

WebArena-Verified Hard-30 registered subset (webarena-verified==1.2.3)

Published representative score

Task IDs, upstream revisions, and dataset hashes are frozen in benchmarks/browser-agent/manifests/ and enforced by pnpm benchmark:browser:verify-upstream. A score will be published only after a full fixed-denominator run completes without infrastructure-invalid pairs and its sanitized artifact passes the publication gate.

IMPORTANT

MELRA hasnot run an official OSWorld, OSWorld-MCP, WebArena, or LongMemEval end-to-end submission. Those scores remain unclaimed until the exact public harness, environment, model policy, and evaluator are released with the result.


Safe defaults 🔒

Default

🏠

Local-only transports — stdio, or loopback HTTP behind a token; no account or hosted service required

📴

Telemetry is off

🚫

Shell interpreters, privilege escalation, and arbitrary desktop key names are denied

📁

Paths and terminal working directories stay inside the configured root

🌐

Private, link-local, loopback, and cloud-metadata destinations are blocked by the browser runtime itself, before any allowlist is consulted; allowedDomains narrows which public sites are reachable

⚠️

Browser output is marked untrusted; page content never changes policy

✍️

Mutations require both declared evidence and an exact task-scoped approval

🔑

Secret patterns are redacted before terminal output, memory, tasks, or receipts are persisted

🎛️

Computer actions use bounded typed fields and platform adapters — not a user-supplied shell command

See the threat model and security policy for residual risks.

Every row above can be turned off at once with melra serve --unsafe-local (or MELRA_UNHINGED=1): no policy, no approvals, no evidence requirement, no workspace confinement, no destination checks. The agent gets exactly the reach your OS user has. The mode announces itself on stderr, in melra doctor, and in melra_capabilities, and receipts still record what ran. See unsafe-local mode for what stays on and why.

Two deployment modes

The honest gap in a default install is that MELRA governs the effects it is asked for. A harness holding both a MELRA terminal and a native one makes the kernel optional, and an optional boundary is not a trust boundary. MELRA_MODE is where you say which situation you are in:

Mode

Meaning

developer (default)

MELRA governs what it is asked for; the harness may have another path, and you accept that. This is why MELRA can be tried in thirty seconds.

enforced

You assert the alternative is gone — the harness is sandboxed, holds no privileged secrets, and reaches these systems only through here.

MELRA cannot verify that assertion from inside its own process, and it does not pretend to: the isolation is the operating system's job, so bring a container or a sandbox profile. What enforced mode does is stop being one of the ways the claim could be false — --unsafe-local refused outright, no bind outside loopback, no client registering itself, and mode stamped on every receipt. A conformance run against it keeps the same level and narrows its caveat to naming whose word the rest rests on. See deployment modes.


Reproduce the scores 🧪

# full validation gate
pnpm check
pnpm evals
pnpm e2e
pnpm pack:check
pnpm security:audit
pnpm --filter @melra/evals evaluate:durable-core -- --publishable

# local memory, browser, terminal, and computer microbenchmarks
pnpm benchmark:core

# hardened local container and real MCP smoke
docker build -t melra:local .
docker run --rm melra:local doctor
pnpm docker:smoke
git clone https://github.com/snap-research/locomo.git /tmp/locomo
pnpm benchmark:locomo -- \
  --dataset /tmp/locomo/data/locomo10.json \
  --output docs/research/results/locomo-retrieval.json

Contract and registered-selection checks run with no model and no network environment:

pnpm benchmark:browser:check
pnpm benchmark:browser:verify-upstream

The MiniWoB development suite additionally needs the pinned MiniWoB++ assets, a built CLI (pnpm build), and an agent configuration whose api_key_env names a variable present in the environment:

uv run --project benchmarks/browser-agent --extra miniwob \
  melra-browser-bench run-miniwob \
  --manifest benchmarks/browser-agent/manifests/miniwob-125-v1.json \
  --run-dir benchmarks/browser-agent/runs/miniwob-candidate \
  --workspace benchmarks/browser-agent/runs/workspaces \
  --base-url "$MINIWOB_BASE_URL" \
  --browser-executable "$MELRA_BROWSER" \
  --implementation-commit "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
  --agent-config benchmarks/browser-agent/runs/config/agent.json

Run outputs — HAR, screenshots, video, and transcripts — are Git-ignored and must never be committed.

Benchmark artifacts include dataset hashes, environment details, sample counts, latency percentiles, and explicit claim boundaries.


SDKs and implementation languages 🧩

SDK

Package

Language

TypeScript client

@melra/sdk

Python client

melra

JSON contracts

@melra/protocol · @melra/receipt-schema

MELRA is capability-driven, not language-restricted. Rust, Go, Python, TypeScript, Swift, C#, or another language can be used when measurement shows a real improvement in isolation, portability, performance, reliability, or platform integration without fragmenting the public contracts.


Repository map 🗂️

apps/cli/                   CLI and stdio entrypoint

kernel services
packages/protocol/          strict task, workflow, event, and operation schemas
packages/runtime-core/      task/workflow lifecycle, events, recovery
packages/policy-core/       local policy and scoped approvals
packages/storage-sqlite/    transactional tasks, workflows, events, evidence
packages/verifier-core/     deterministic evidence predicates
packages/receipt-schema/    receipts and execution certificates
packages/memory/            operational memory: scoped retrieval and lifecycle
packages/server/            runtime composition, MCP and loopback HTTP

reference effect adapters
packages/file-runtime/      confined filesystem operations
packages/terminal-runtime/  shell-free process supervision
packages/browser-runtime/   isolated browser automation and stable-DOM wait
packages/computer-runtime/  governed local computer-use adapters
packages/http-runtime/      governed HTTP and API calls

clients and evidence
packages/sdk-ts/            TypeScript client SDK
sdk-py/                     Python client SDK
benchmarks/browser-agent/   pre-registered browser-agent evaluation harness
evals/                      safety and durable crash-recovery evaluations
scripts/                    benchmark and release checks
docs/research/              methods, findings, and raw results
examples/                   runnable task examples

Documentation 📚


Contributing 🤝

Code, adapters, benchmark harnesses, verifier predicates, documentation, and threat analysis are all welcome.

Looking for something to pick up?

Start here

What it is

good first issue

Scoped, with the files to touch named in the issue

help wanted

Larger, still well-defined

Milestones

The roadmap phases, as trackable work

docs/CONTRIBUTING_GUIDE.md

How the pipeline fits together and which files one change touches

Adding an operation or an evidence predicate touches a fixed, short list of places — the guide names them in order, so a first pull request does not have to be discovered by grep.

  1. Read CONTRIBUTING.md and the Code of Conduct.

  2. Sign your commits under the DCO (git commit -s).

  3. Run pnpm check before opening a pull request.

  4. Report vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting — never in a public issue.


License 📄

Software and documentation are licensed under the Apache License 2.0. The official logo and hero artwork are licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0. Third-party benchmark datasets retain their own licenses and are not included in this repository.

Built in the open by XAGI Labs.

MELRA brand assets © XAGI Labs Private Limited, licensed CC BY-ND 4.0.

A
license - permissive license
Not graded
quality - not tested
B
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Maintenance

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Release cycle
13Releases (12mo)
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