detonate-mcp
Detonates untrusted binaries inside hardened, server-side-enforced Docker containers using a fixed containment profile (no network, read-only root, cap-drop ALL, non-root user, tmpfs as the only exec-allowed mount), with timeout enforcement and evidence capture. It also exposes the exact container flag list/threat model and past detonation evidence, so containment cannot be widened by tool arguments.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
detonate-mcp
MCP server: run unknown binaries in a maximum-hardening container. The safety profile is enforced server-side and cannot be parameterized away by tool arguments.
What it does
Tool | Question answered | Key constraint |
| Does this binary do anything visible in a no-network sandbox? | fixed containment: no network, read-only root, cap-drop ALL, non-root |
| What EXACTLY is the containment boundary? | returns the flag list + threat-model, including what it does NOT defend against |
| What past detonations exist? | timestamps, evidence paths |
Related MCP server: capsule-agents
Why MCP (and not just bash)
The estate's pentest toolkit runs nmap/sqlmap/etc via shell; those are one-shot CLIs. This server is different because it needs to hold STATE: the allowlisted samples root, the evidence directory chain, the containment profile. An MCP server with typed tools makes that state explicit and testable.
Threat model honesty
The container defends against: network callback, filesystem persistence, privilege escalation, resource exhaustion.
It does NOT defend against: kernel exploits (docker shares the host kernel). For kernel-exploit-grade samples, detonate in a disposable VM.
The tmpfs is the ONE exec-allowed mount; the sample must run, and that is the single deliberate exception to the read-only root.
Architecture
detonate-mcp/
├── src/detonate_mcp/
│ ├── __init__.py
│ ├── core.py pure: profile constants, RunSpec, argv builder
│ ├── runner.py DockerRunner: subprocess.run, timeout enforcement
│ ├── server.py FastMCP tools (thin; delegate to core+runner)
│ ├── jsonc.py JSONC comment stripping for config parsing
│ ├── config.py opencode.jsonc declaration probe
│ ├── backend.py backend resolution probe
│ ├── credential.py credential entitlement probe
│ ├── handshake.py MCP initialize handshake probe
│ ├── testing.py FakeRunner/CtxBuilder test doubles
│ └── util.py shared helpers (truncate, etc)
├── tests/
└── pyproject.tomlUsage
uv run pytest # 18 tests
uv run python -m detonate_mcp.server # starts the stdio MCP serverTool Schema Changelog
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