exchange-mcp
by Wide-Moat
README.md
# exchange-mcp
An MCP server that gives an AI assistant one person's on-premises Exchange mailbox (mail,
calendar, contacts, tasks) through Exchange Web Services, acting as that person with no further rights.
| Your mailbox lives in | Use |
|---|---|
| Exchange Server in your own data centre (2016, 2019, Subscription Edition) | **this server** (Exchange Web Services) |
| Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online | [microsoft-365-mcp](https://github.com/Wide-Moat/microsoft-365-mcp) (Microsoft Graph); Microsoft turns EWS off in Exchange Online |
| Both, during a migration | both, one per mailbox location |
Free and open source (Apache-2.0). **Status: 0.1.1**, tested against Exchange Server 2016 CU23; [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) lists what each release holds. We wrote the documents below before the code, and the code follows them.
| Document | What it settles |
|---|---|
| [MANIFESTO.md](MANIFESTO.md) | the rules, each with what a violation looks like |
| [docs/requirements.md](docs/requirements.md) | the 21 tools, the EWS operations behind them, every refusal and its test |
| [docs/auth-modes.md](docs/auth-modes.md) | the two sign-in modes, their risks, and where the sealing key lives |
| [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) | components, request path, configuration, threats |
| [docs/admin-guide.md](docs/admin-guide.md) | how to deploy it and what to ask your Exchange administrators |
| [docs/code-review.md](docs/code-review.md) | what blocks a merge |
| [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | reporting, and what a deployment must provide |
## Sign-in
| Mode | Needs | This server holds | Checked against a live server |
|---|---|---|---|
| `adfs` (**preferred**) | Exchange 2019 CU13+ or Subscription Edition on every client-facing server; AD FS and Exchange configured by administrators | an AD FS token that reaches EWS only | **not yet**: unit tests against a fake AD FS only ([what to check](docs/live-findings.md#not-yet-run-live)) |
| `password` | any Exchange with EWS | the person's directory password, sealed; no second factor ([risks](docs/auth-modes.md#the-risks-of-password-and-what-holds-each)) | yes, Exchange Server 2016 CU23 ([findings](docs/live-findings.md)) |
The sealing key comes from Vault or OpenBao (recommended), or from a Kubernetes Secret generated at
deploy time. Never from an environment variable.
## Tools
| Area | Tools |
|---|---|
| account | `get_connection` |
| people | `list_people` |
| mail | `list_messages`, `get_message`, `save_mail_folder`, `delete_mail_folder`, `update_messages`, `save_draft`, `send_draft`, `save_automatic_reply` |
| calendar | `list_events`, `get_event`, `find_meeting_times`, `save_event`, `respond_to_event`, `cancel_event` |
| contacts | `save_contact`, `delete_contact` |
| tasks | `list_tasks`, `save_task`, `delete_task` |
Excluded by design: inbox rules, forwarding, delegates, permissions, other mailboxes,
impersonation, export, hard delete.
This server cannot be deployed
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