Teramind MCP Server
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Teramind MCP Server show me alerts from the last 24 hours"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Teramind MCP Server
MCP server for Teramind's insider-threat/employee-monitoring API - computer inventory, agent (user) inventory, departments, alerts, anomaly-rule and behavior-policy configuration, and monitoring-profile metadata - for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.
This connector is PII-dense by construction (insider-threat/employee-monitoring product) and requires security review before merge - see Scope and Credential scope below.
Authentication
Teramind authenticates with a JWT Access Token, self-generated per-account in the Teramind dashboard (User menu -> Access Tokens), sent as the x-access-token header. There is no OAuth flow.
Teramind's API is per-customer-instance (cloud or on-premise/private-cloud) - there is no shared multi-tenant base URL like most other connectors in this catalog. Every credential set also carries the customer's own instance URL (e.g. https://yourcompany.teramind.co). In gateway mode both arrive per-request via the X-Teramind-Access-Token / X-Teramind-Instance-Url headers; in local/stdio mode they're read once from TERAMIND_ACCESS_TOKEN / TERAMIND_INSTANCE_URL.
Related MCP server: Segment MCP
Configuration
Env var | Description |
| JWT access token issued by the Teramind dashboard's Access Tokens menu. |
| The customer's Teramind instance base URL, e.g. |
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| When set, the HTTP transport requires a valid |
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Tools
Computers
teramind_list_computers- list monitored computers (hostname, FQDN, MAC/IP, OS, monitoring status).teramind_get_computer- get full detail for a single computer.
Agents (users)
teramind_list_agents- list monitored agents (Teramind's term for a monitored employee/user identity): id, name, email, avatar, online status.teramind_get_agent- get full detail for a single agent.
Departments
teramind_list_departments- list departments (org-structure metadata).teramind_get_department- get full detail for a single department.
Alerts
teramind_list_alerts- list fired rule-violation events in a time window, optionally filtered by agent/computer/department.
Anomaly rules
teramind_list_anomaly_rules- list configured ML-based anomaly-detection rules (type, risk quotient, trigger conditions).teramind_get_anomaly_rule- get full detail for a single anomaly rule.teramind_list_anomaly_rule_tags- list the tags available to categorize anomaly rules.
Behavior policies
teramind_list_behavior_policies- list behavior policies (what activity type each policy watches and its match conditions).teramind_get_behavior_policy- get full detail for a single behavior policy.teramind_list_behavior_policy_groups- list behavior policy groups (the containers that organize behavior policies).teramind_get_behavior_policy_group- get full detail for a single behavior policy group.
Monitoring
teramind_list_monitoring_profiles- list monitoring profiles (which data types are configured to be captured, and for whom).
Account
teramind_get_account- get the authenticated account's own settings (credential sanity check).
Scope
This is a deliberately narrow, read-only v1 surface, scoped MORE conservatively than this catalog's usual bar given the sensitivity of an insider-threat/employee-monitoring product. Teramind's documented API (fetched directly from its published Postman collection, apidoc.dev.teramind.co) has 239 operations across dozens of product areas (monitoring, BI reporting, time tracking, scheduling, productivity classification, LDAP, task management, scheduling). This connector implements 16: literal HTTP GET reads covering only computer/user/session inventory, department metadata, and rule/alert configuration. Every tool is classified isAdmin: true in the Conduit gateway regardless of verb, given the sensitivity of employee-monitoring data.
No literal GET endpoint exists for session inventory. Teramind's session data (Sessions report, Login session BI grid) is only reachable through POST query/grid-style endpoints, not a plain resource GET - documented here as a finding, not fabricated as a tool. Session data is out of this connector's v1 scope as a consequence, not a separate exclusion decision.
Hard-excluded: anything that returns actual monitored content, or mints/reveals a credential - by name, even where the verb is GET
Per this connector's scope boundary, the distinction is: metadata about monitoring (who is monitored, when, what rule fired) is in scope; the actual captured content of what was monitored, or a mechanism to obtain a live credential, is not, regardless of read/write verb.
Endpoint | Rationale |
| Returns the agent's avatar/headshot image - biometric-adjacent photo content. |
| Email-activity metadata (participants/subject) - content-adjacent; excluded alongside its two siblings below rather than judged separately. |
| Returns the full captured email body as rendered HTML. Raw captured content. |
| Returns the full captured email body. Raw captured content. |
| Session-recording player/playback settings for a specific agent+computer. |
| Annotations/bookmarks tied to recorded-session timelines. |
| Timeline tags for a specific agent/computer's recorded sessions over a period. |
| Status of a screen-recording video export job. |
| Enumerates which recorded video segments exist for a computer/period - an inventory of available screen recordings. |
| Generic report-export download - the export could be of ANY report type this API supports, including keystrokes, emails, instant messages, or video, so it is excluded as a class rather than judged per export. |
| Status of a report-export job - same generic content-bearing concern as the download endpoint above. |
| Mints a new short-lived, live access token. Credential issuance, not content - held to the same bar as a credential-return endpoint in every other connector in this catalog. |
| Lists the account's active JWT token IDs - credential/session-management data. |
No GET endpoint anywhere in Teramind's documented API returns raw keystroke logs, chat/IM content, printed-document content, or social-media activity content - those are exclusively reachable through the POST /tm-api/report/*/grid and POST /tm-api/wip/tma-query (BI) families, which this connector excludes as a category below. This connector's GET-only scope therefore rules out keystroke/screenshot/chat-content exposure by construction, not merely by the per-endpoint judgment calls above - see Credential scope for what this claim does and does not cover.
Excluded by category (out of the named scope: computer/user/session inventory + rule/alert data)
Category | Why excluded |
Activities (aggregated activity) | Activity/productivity data, not inventory or rule/alert metadata. |
BI / BI Filter (37 ops) | All |
Reports / Report settings / Reports batch (~55 ops) | All |
Video export (remaining 2 ops) |
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Time Tracking Reports, Time tracker tasks, Tasks, Schedule | Employee clock-in/task/shift-scheduling features, unrelated to monitoring inventory or rule/alert data. |
LDAP | Directory-service connection config - out of scope, and a plausible vector for exposing bind-account details even as a plain read. |
SMTP, Ingestion | Single |
Shared lists | Rule-input datasets (e.g. keyword/URL watchlists referenced by rules) of ambiguous sensitivity - excluded as a judgment call rather than included by default. |
Productivity Profile, | Productivity-classification taxonomy - arguably rule-adjacent, but not named in this connector's scope; excluded to stay tight rather than included as a stretch. |
| Generic utility/status endpoints, none of which fit computer/user/session inventory or rule/alert data. |
Every | Write, provisioning, enable/disable-monitoring, or account-mutation operations. Never implemented, regardless of verb. |
Anomaly-rule / behavior-policy templates, tags-and-misc bundle, demo policy | Catalogs for AUTHORING new rules, not this org's actual configured monitoring - out of scope for a read-only inventory connector ( |
They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.
Field-level restriction, not just endpoint-level
GET /tm-api/v1/agents[/:id] supports an optional fields query parameter that can return salary_type and default_wage (compensation data) and ldap_attrs (raw directory attributes) - HR/PII data well beyond "who is monitored." This connector's client.ts never passes that parameter, so only the default identity fields (agent_id, name, email_address, avatar, online) are ever returned, regardless of what a caller requests through the tool's input schema (there is no fields parameter exposed on teramind_list_agents / teramind_get_agent at all).
Judgment call flagged for reviewer attention: alert content
teramind_list_alerts is squarely in this connector's named scope ("rule/alert data"), and its response shape is documented by Teramind to include description/caption/values fields describing why a rule fired. Depending on the rule type, those fields may carry a short excerpt of the triggering context (e.g. a matched keyword, or a visited URL) rather than pure metadata - this is passed through as Teramind returns it, unmodified. This was judged in-scope because alerts are explicitly named in this connector's scope and the excerpt (if present) is bounded to what a human already configured a rule to flag, not raw unfiltered activity capture - but it is flagged here explicitly, per this task's instruction, rather than decided unilaterally as a closed question.
Credential scope (read this before connecting a real account)
This is the single most important finding in this README. Two claims, deliberately kept at different confidence levels:
(1) STRUCTURALLY VERIFIED - this connector's own code never calls a content-capture, credential-issuance, or write endpoint. Confirmed against client.ts: exactly 16 functions exist, one per tool, each a literal GET against one of the endpoints listed in the Tools section above; there is no wildcard/passthrough/generic-request function anywhere in src/. This connector is read-only and non-content-capturing by construction.
(2) VENDOR-DOCUMENTED, NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED - whether the underlying access token itself can be restricted to a metadata-only scope is a separate question from what this connector's code calls, and the answer is more nuanced than a clean yes/no:
Per Teramind's own Knowledge Base ("User Menu"; "How to change a user's access level" - both fetched directly, 2026-09-20), an access token inherits the full permissions of whichever account created it, fixed at creation time. Teramind does not offer a token-scoping mechanism independent of account role.
The default case - a single full "Administrator" account, which is what a fresh self-serve cloud trial signup produces - has NO restrictions. A token created there can reach every one of Teramind's 239 documented operations, including screen recordings, keystroke logs, and email/chat content capture. This connector's code never calls those endpoints, but the credential itself is not restricted unless the customer takes deliberate, manual, vendor-side action beyond anything this connector or Conduit controls or verifies.
Teramind does document a reduced role, "Operational Administrator," that CAN create its own access tokens and is explicitly documented as unable to "browse any recordings or view monitoring data" and unable to see "Alerts" (per Teramind's "How to change a user's access level" article, quoted directly). This is the closest documented approximation to a metadata-only token - but (a) it is a manual account-configuration choice the customer must make, not anything this connector or the Conduit connect flow enforces or checks at connect time; (b) Teramind's documentation describes this as menu/UI-level access, and no independent test was performed sending a request with an Operational-Administrator-scoped token against one of this connector's excluded endpoints to confirm a real server-side 403 versus a UI-only restriction; and (c) that role is explicitly documented as also blocking Alerts, which this connector treats as in-scope - so even the reduced role doesn't map cleanly onto this connector's own scope boundary.
A further role, "Infrastructure Administrator," is more restrictive still, but (a) cannot create its own access tokens at all (only be assigned one after creation by an Administrator), and (b) per Teramind's docs is "not able to list employee or computer accounts" - i.e. it would also block this connector's own computer/agent inventory tools, so it is not a usable configuration for this connector's purpose either.
Net finding: by default, nothing about the Teramind access token credential itself prevents it from reaching every endpoint this connector deliberately excludes. The connector's own code is the actual control boundary (per point 1 above), not the credential. Recommendation for whoever operates Gate 3 review or advises customers connecting this vendor: consider documenting that customers should create the token under a dedicated Operational Administrator account rather than a full Administrator, as defense-in-depth against a differently-configured client reusing the same stored token - while treating this connector's own code (which never calls a content-capture endpoint) as the primary, verified control.
Request limits
HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the
X-Gateway-S2Scheck passes, aContent-Lengthabove the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies withoutContent-Lengthare capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.tools/callarguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return anisErrortool result and are never dispatched.
These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).
Development
npm install
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint # tsc --noEmitDocker
docker build -t teramind-mcp .
docker run -p 8080:8080 -e TERAMIND_ACCESS_TOKEN=... -e TERAMIND_INSTANCE_URL=https://yourcompany.teramind.co teramind-mcpAvailable Tools
16 toolsteramind_get_accountA
Get the authenticated account's own settings (account name, timezone, currency) - a credential sanity check, not employee/agent data. Does not reveal what permission tier the access token's creating account holds; see this connector's README Credential scope section.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_get_agentA
Get full detail for a single monitored agent (user). Requires an agent ID from teramind_list_agents. Same field restriction as teramind_list_agents - no compensation or LDAP attribute data.
Inputs: agent_id (required).
teramind_get_anomaly_ruleA
Get full detail for a single anomaly rule. Requires a rule ID from teramind_list_anomaly_rules.
Inputs: id (required).
teramind_get_behavior_policyA
Get full detail for a single behavior policy. Requires a policy ID from teramind_list_behavior_policies.
Inputs: id (required).
teramind_get_behavior_policy_groupA
Get full detail for a single behavior policy group. Requires a group ID from teramind_list_behavior_policy_groups.
Inputs: id (required).
teramind_get_computerA
Get full detail for a single monitored computer. Requires a computer ID from teramind_list_computers.
Inputs: computer_id (required).
teramind_get_departmentA
Get full detail for a single department. Requires a department ID from teramind_list_departments.
Inputs: department_id (required).
teramind_list_agentsA
List Teramind agents (Teramind's term for a monitored employee/user identity - not the software agent installed on a computer): id, name, email, avatar, online status. Agent IDs from this response are required by teramind_get_agent and are usable as filters on teramind_list_alerts. This connector never requests the underlying API's optional extended fields (salary_type, default_wage, ldap_attrs) - only these basic identity fields are ever returned.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_alertsA
List alerts (fired rule-violation events) in a time window - which rule fired, when, for which agent/computer, and the rule's own description/caption fields. periodStart and periodEnd are required (ISO 8601 datetime, e.g. 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z); optionally scope to specific agents/computers/departments (comma-separated IDs). NOTE: depending on the rule type that fired, a rule's description/caption/values fields MAY include a short excerpt of the triggering context (e.g. a matched keyword or URL) rather than pure metadata - this is Teramind's documented alert response shape, passed through as received.
Inputs: periodEnd (required), periodStart (required), limit, agents, +3 more.
teramind_list_anomaly_rulesA
List configured ML-based anomaly-detection rules (Teramind UI: "Anomaly Rules") - rule name, type/subtype, risk quotient, trigger conditions, and assignment scope. Rule CONFIGURATION metadata only - describes what is being watched for, never the captured activity that triggered a rule. Rule IDs from this response are required by teramind_get_anomaly_rule.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_anomaly_rule_tagsA
List the tags available to categorize anomaly rules.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_behavior_policiesA
List behavior policies (Teramind UI: "behavior policy rule") - what activity type each policy watches (e.g. web/email/print), its match conditions, and configured actions/reactions. Rule CONFIGURATION metadata only - the condition a policy matches on, never the captured activity that matched it. Policy IDs from this response are required by teramind_get_behavior_policy.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_behavior_policy_groupsA
List behavior policy groups (Teramind UI: "Behavior policy") - the containers that organize behavior policies. Group IDs from this response are required by teramind_get_behavior_policy_group.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_computersA
List computers under Teramind monitoring - hostname, FQDN, MAC/IP addresses, OS, monitoring status (is_monitored), and agent-software install/update state. Computer IDs from this response are required by teramind_get_computer. Inventory metadata only - never screen recordings or captured activity content.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_departmentsA
List departments configured in Teramind - org-structure metadata used to group agents/computers. Department IDs from this response are usable as filters on teramind_list_alerts.
Inputs: no named parameters.
teramind_list_monitoring_profilesA
List monitoring profiles - named configurations describing WHICH data types are captured (e.g. web activity, email, keystrokes) and for which agents, plus whether the profile is private. This is metadata ABOUT the scope of monitoring (what is configured to be watched, and for whom) - never the captured content itself.
Inputs: no named parameters.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 16 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource or operation: computers, agents, departments, alerts, rules, policies, groups, profiles, and account settings are clearly separated. The list/get pairs are unambiguous, and descriptions clarify potentially overlapping concepts like anomaly rules versus behavior policies.
All tools follow a consistent teramind_list_<plural> / teramind_get_<singular> pattern with snake_case throughout. Minor exceptions like teramind_get_account and teramind_list_alerts still fit the broader list/get convention and do not create confusion.
With 16 tools, the server is slightly above the typical 3-15 range, but each tool maps to a meaningful entity or lookup operation in the Teramind domain. The count is reasonable for the breadth of resources covered and does not feel bloated.
The read-only metadata surface covers the major Teramind entities: computers, agents, departments, alerts, anomaly rules, behavior policies, policy groups, and monitoring profiles. Minor gaps exist, such as no single-alert getter or monitoring-profile detail endpoint, but agents can accomplish core monitoring and configuration-discovery workflows without dead ends.
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