Inforcer MCP Server
Official# Inforcer MCP Server
[](https://github.com/WYRE-AI/inforcer-mcp/actions/workflows/release.yml)
[](https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0)
[](https://nodejs.org/)
A [Model Context Protocol (MCP)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/) server that gives AI assistants structured, **mostly read-only** access to [Inforcer](https://www.inforcer.com) Microsoft 365 baseline-governance data — tenants, baselines, alignment/drift, policies, secure scores, identity, audit logs, and report generation — plus two write actions to trigger an assessment run or queue a report.
> **Note:** This project is maintained by [Wyre Technology](https://github.com/WYRE-AI).
## ⚠ Community-sourced API
Inforcer does not (at time of writing) publish an official REST API specification. This server wraps the [`@wyre-technology/node-inforcer`](https://github.com/WYRE-AI/node-inforcer) SDK, whose API surface is **community-sourced** from [royklo/InforcerCommunity](https://github.com/royklo/InforcerCommunity). Endpoints, field shapes, and behavior may change without notice. Treat results accordingly and verify anything load-bearing against the Inforcer portal.
## Read-only scope
Every tool in this server is **read-only** EXCEPT two:
- `inforcer_assessments_run` — triggers an assessment run for a tenant.
- `inforcer_reports_run` — queues one or more report runs across one or more tenants.
Both are **HIGH-IMPACT** (not destructive): they kick off real work in Inforcer and are visible to operators. Both are annotated accordingly and ask for confirmation before running. **Confirm with the user before invoking.**
There are **no** create/update/delete tools for policies, tenants, or baselines — those operations are not exposed by the community API and are intentionally absent here.
## Quick Start
**Claude Code (CLI):**
```bash
claude mcp add inforcer-mcp \
-e INFORCER_REGION=us \
-e INFORCER_API_KEY=your-api-key \
-- npx -y github:WYRE-AI/inforcer-mcp
```
See [Installation](#installation) for Docker and from-source methods.
## Features
- **🔌 MCP Protocol Compliance**: Full support for MCP tools and prompts
- **🛡️ Governance Coverage (read-only)**: Tenants, baselines, alignment/drift, policies, Microsoft Secure Score, Entra ID identity, and the audit log
- **🔍 Decision-Tree Navigation**: Start with `inforcer_navigate` to explore domains, then call domain-specific tools
- **🧭 Flexible Tenant Resolution**: Most tools accept a `tenant` as a numeric Client Tenant ID, a tenant DNS name, an Azure AD GUID, or a friendly name — resolved automatically
- **🔒 Secure Authentication**: `Inf-Api-Key` header auth, region-scoped
- **🌐 Dual Transport**: stdio (local) and HTTP Streamable (gateway/Docker)
- **🐳 Docker Ready**: Containerized deployment with HTTP transport and health checks
- **📊 Structured Logging**: Configurable levels, credentials never logged
## Table of Contents
- [Installation](#installation)
- [Configuration](#configuration)
- [Tenant identifiers](#tenant-identifiers)
- [Domains and tools](#domains-and-tools)
- [Gateway connection](#gateway-connection)
- [Docker Deployment](#docker-deployment)
- [Development](#development)
- [Testing](#testing)
- [Contributing](#contributing)
- [License](#license)
## Installation
### Option 1: Claude Code (CLI)
```bash
claude mcp add inforcer-mcp \
-e INFORCER_REGION=us \
-e INFORCER_API_KEY=your-api-key \
-- npx -y github:WYRE-AI/inforcer-mcp
```
### Option 2: Docker
The image listens on `0.0.0.0` inside the container and defaults to `AUTH_MODE=gateway`. Publish the port on loopback and pass a real S2S secret. In gateway mode the Inforcer region and API key arrive on each request as headers; they are not read from the environment.
```bash
docker build -t inforcer-mcp .
docker run \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
inforcer-mcp
```
Or pull the pre-built image:
```bash
docker run -d \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
ghcr.io/wyre-ai/inforcer-mcp:latest
```
Compose reads `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` from the project `.env` and refuses to start when that value is unset. Do not assign the variable on the command line: an empty shell value overrides `.env`.
```bash
docker compose up
```
### Option 3: From Source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/WYRE-AI/inforcer-mcp.git
cd inforcer-mcp
export NODE_AUTH_TOKEN=$(gh auth token) # to install @wyre-ai/* from GitHub Packages
npm ci
npm run build
```
## Configuration
| Variable | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `INFORCER_REGION` | For stdio and `AUTH_MODE=env` | Inforcer API region — one of `anz`, `eu`, `uk`, `us`. There is no default. The Compose gateway service does not load this variable. |
| `INFORCER_API_KEY` | For stdio and `AUTH_MODE=env` | Inforcer API key, sent as the `Inf-Api-Key` header. The Compose gateway service does not load this variable. |
| `MCP_TRANSPORT` | No | `stdio` (default) or `http` |
| `AUTH_MODE` | No | `gateway` (Docker image and Compose default) or `env`. Gateway mode requires `X-Inforcer-Region` and `X-Inforcer-API-Key` on each `/mcp` request and never falls back to `INFORCER_*`. `env` uses those variables only after S2S auth succeeds. |
| `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` | Yes for HTTP | Service-to-service secret. Generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`. The HTTP server logs an error and exits non-zero when this is empty or a known placeholder (`changeme`, `your-s2s-secret`, `secret`, `placeholder`, and similar public examples). Compose will not start without it. Never commit a real value. The value is never logged. |
| `MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV` | No | Set to exactly `1` only for local development to start HTTP without `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET`. The process logs a warning, does not enforce `X-Gateway-S2S`, and forces the listener onto `127.0.0.1` even if `MCP_HTTP_HOST` is a wider address. A known placeholder secret is still refused. |
| `MCP_HTTP_HOST` | No | Bind address when `MCP_TRANSPORT=http`. Defaults to `127.0.0.1` when unset. A configured `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` honors this value. The container image sets `0.0.0.0`. |
| `MCP_HTTP_PORT` | No | HTTP port. Defaults to `8080`. |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | No | Log level (`debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`). Defaults to `info`. |
`/health` stays unauthenticated and does not read credentials. The stdio transport does not use `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET`.
Both `INFORCER_REGION` and `INFORCER_API_KEY` are required for any API call in stdio and `AUTH_MODE=env`. Tool discovery (`tools/list`) works without them; the first real call will error if either is missing.
### HTTP authentication
With `MCP_TRANSPORT=http` and `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` set, every `/mcp` request must include `X-Gateway-S2S`. The check is `verifyS2sHeader` in [`src/s2s-verify.ts`](src/s2s-verify.ts): the header value is `t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>`, where the hex is HMAC-SHA256 of the literal string `t=<unix seconds>` keyed with `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` (64 lowercase hex characters). The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header returns HTTP 401 before vendor credentials are read.
`CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` must already be in the environment. The example reads that variable inside the process. It does not pass the secret as a command argument.
```bash
TS=$(date +%s)
SIG=$(printf 't=%s' "$TS" | node -e 'const {createHmac}=require("node:crypto"); const chunks=[]; process.stdin.on("data",(c)=>chunks.push(c)); process.stdin.on("end",()=>{ const secret=process.env.CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET; if(!secret){ console.error("CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is not set"); process.exit(1); } process.stdout.write(createHmac("sha256", secret).update(Buffer.concat(chunks)).digest("hex")); });')
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-H "X-Gateway-S2S: t=${TS},v1=${SIG}" \
-H 'X-Inforcer-Region: us' \
-H "X-Inforcer-API-Key: $INFORCER_API_KEY" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}'
```
In `AUTH_MODE=gateway`, `/mcp` also requires `X-Inforcer-Region` and `X-Inforcer-API-Key`. Those headers are the only credential source for the request. With `AUTH_MODE=env`, the signed request uses `INFORCER_REGION` and `INFORCER_API_KEY` from the environment.
## Tenant identifiers
Inforcer's tenant-scoped routes use an integer **Client Tenant ID** — which is **NOT** the same as the Azure AD tenant GUID (`msTenantId`). To make tools easy to use, the `tenant` argument accepts any of:
- a numeric **Client Tenant ID** (e.g. `42`),
- a **tenant DNS name** (e.g. `contoso.onmicrosoft.com`),
- an **Azure AD tenant GUID** (`msTenantId`), or
- a **friendly name** (e.g. `Contoso`).
Names/DNS/GUIDs are resolved to the numeric Client Tenant ID via the SDK's `resolveTenantId` before each tenant-scoped call. If a name matches more than one tenant, the call fails with a clear "ambiguous" error — pass the numeric Client Tenant ID instead. Use `inforcer_tenants_resolve` to see exactly which Client Tenant ID an input maps to.
## Domains and tools
The server uses decision-tree navigation. Start with `inforcer_navigate` to pick a domain, or call any tool directly. All tools are read-only except `inforcer_assessments_run` and `inforcer_reports_run`.
| Domain | Tools | Read-only |
|--------|-------|-----------|
| **navigation** | `inforcer_navigate`, `inforcer_status` (live `baselines.list()` connectivity check) | ✅ |
| **tenants** | `inforcer_tenants_list`, `inforcer_tenants_get`, `inforcer_tenants_resolve` | ✅ |
| **baselines** | `inforcer_baselines_list` | ✅ |
| **alignment** | `inforcer_alignment_scores`, `inforcer_alignment_details` (per-tenant drift) | ✅ |
| **policies** | `inforcer_policies_list` (by tenant) | ✅ |
| **secure-scores** | `inforcer_secure_scores_get` (by tenant) | ✅ |
| **identity** | `inforcer_users_list`, `inforcer_users_get`, `inforcer_groups_list`, `inforcer_groups_get`, `inforcer_roles_list` | ✅ |
| **audit** | `inforcer_audit_event_types`, `inforcer_audit_search` | ✅ |
| **assessments** | `inforcer_assessments_list` (✅), `inforcer_assessments_run` (⚠ HIGH-IMPACT, **not** read-only) | mixed |
| **reports** | `inforcer_reports_types_list`, `inforcer_reports_runs_list`, `inforcer_reports_run_status`, `inforcer_reports_download_output` (✅), `inforcer_reports_run` (⚠ HIGH-IMPACT, **not** read-only) | mixed |
`inforcer_reports_run` queues asynchronously — poll the run with `inforcer_reports_run_status` until `isTerminal: true`, then fetch each output with `inforcer_reports_download_output` (returns base64-encoded file content).
## Gateway connection
When hosted behind the WYRE MCP Gateway, set `AUTH_MODE=gateway` and `MCP_TRANSPORT=http`. In this mode the server is stateless (a fresh MCP server + transport per request) and reads credentials from per-request HTTP headers injected by the gateway. A request missing either header gets HTTP 401 and does not fall back to `INFORCER_REGION` or `INFORCER_API_KEY`.
| Header | Maps to |
|--------|---------|
| `X-Gateway-S2S` | HMAC proof described under [HTTP authentication](#http-authentication). Required on every `/mcp` request when `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET` is set. |
| `X-Inforcer-Region` | `INFORCER_REGION` |
| `X-Inforcer-API-Key` | `INFORCER_API_KEY` |
The container image defaults to `MCP_TRANSPORT=http` and `AUTH_MODE=gateway`. `/health` always returns 200, does not require authentication, and does not read vendor credentials.
## Docker Deployment
See [docker-compose.yml](docker-compose.yml). The checked-in Compose service is gateway mode. It publishes `127.0.0.1:8080:8080`, requires `CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET`, and does not set `INFORCER_REGION`, `INFORCER_API_KEY`, or `env_file`.
```bash
cp .env.example .env
# Set CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET in .env (openssl rand -hex 32). Leave INFORCER_* empty
# for the gateway service; those credentials arrive as request headers.
# Compose loads .env itself. Do not prefix the command with a shell assignment.
docker compose up -d
```
Single-tenant HTTP (`AUTH_MODE=env`) still requires the S2S secret, then uses `INFORCER_REGION` and `INFORCER_API_KEY`. It is separate from the gateway Compose service:
```bash
docker run \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET \
-e AUTH_MODE=env \
-e INFORCER_REGION=us \
-e INFORCER_API_KEY=your-key \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
inforcer-mcp
```
Local HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds `127.0.0.1` only and logs a warning. A non-loopback `MCP_HTTP_HOST` is ignored and the override is logged:
```bash
MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http
```
## Development
```bash
export NODE_AUTH_TOKEN=$(gh auth token)
npm ci
npm run build # Build the project
npm run dev # Watch mode
npm run test # Run tests
npm run lint # Type-check
npm run clean # Remove dist/
# HTTP refuses to start until CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is a real secret
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" npm run start:http
# Local HTTP only, without a service-to-service secret (always binds 127.0.0.1)
MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http
```
## Testing
```bash
npm test # Run test suite
npm run test:watch # Watch mode
```
## Contributing
See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for guidelines.
## License
Apache 2.0 — Copyright WYRE Technology
TDQS
Scored across 24 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource/action: tenants, users, groups, roles, policies, baselines, alignment, audit, assessments, and reports. Even close pairs like alignment_scores vs alignment_details or assessments_run vs reports_run are clearly separated by noun and purpose. The discovery and status tools also serve clearly different roles.
All tools share the inforcer_ prefix and mostly follow a resource_verb pattern like tenants_list, users_get, and groups_list. A few names omit the verb (inforcer_status, inforcer_alignment_scores, inforcer_audit_event_types) and report actions use compound names like reports_run_status and reports_download_output, but the overall convention remains readable and predictable.
With 24 tools, this server sits at the high end of the reasonable range and feels heavy relative to a tightly scoped MCP server. The count is justified by the breadth of the domain — tenants, identity, alignment, audit, assessments, and reports — but it is more than an agent will typically need in one session.
The toolset covers the core workflows well: tenant resolution, identity object listing/detail, baseline alignment, secure scores, audit search, assessment discovery/run, and the full report queue/status/download lifecycle. Minor gaps remain, such as no policy detail view, no role detail view, and no assessment run status polling, but these are not blocking for the main Inforcer use cases.