Aegis
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Aegis inject LAND context and block any done-claim without live proof"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Aegis
Fail-closed control layer for coding agents. MCP tool, not a chat app.
Hooks inject. Tools execute. File-exists is not a receipt. You do not certify.
Tools
Tool | Job |
| Force LAND context this turn ( |
| BLOCK a done-word with no live proof |
| Freeze the seat after BLOCK |
| Run the scar engine on a prompt |
Related MCP server: Sensory-Grounding MCP
Cursor
.cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"aegis": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "github:Viss007/aegis"]
}
}
}Local clone:
{
"mcpServers": {
"aegis": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["bin/aegis-mcp.mjs"]
}
}
}Hook (inject, not a tool):
{
"version": 1,
"hooks": {
"beforeSubmitPrompt": [{ "command": "node hooks/land.cjs" }]
}
}Scar
Same file on disk. No live proof.
inject on → refuse. file-exists side door blocked.
inject off → liar says DONE.
HTTP
POST /mcp JSON-RPC. Same methods as stdio (initialize, tools/list, tools/call).
Available Tools
4 toolsdecideC
Run the LAND scar engine on a user prompt. Inject on = file-exists side door blocked.
Inputs: prompt (required), claim, inject, file_exists, +1 more.
land_injectC
Force LAND context this turn. Returns additional_context the model must see before the prompt. Hooks inject. Tools do not.
Inputs: no named parameters.
no_fake_doneA
Fail-closed done gate. BLOCK if a done-word is claimed without live proof. file-exists is not a receipt. You do not certify.
Inputs: claim (required), file_exists, live_verified.
trust_freezeC
Freeze the seat after a no_fake_done BLOCK. Second catch. Fail-closed.
Inputs: reason, source.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
land_inject and decide both concern LAND context injection, making their boundary unclear. no_fake_done and trust_freeze are sequentially coupled but their distinct roles are not obvious from names alone, so an agent could easily misselect.
All names use snake_case, but the patterns are mixed: land_inject is verb_noun, no_fake_done is a negation phrase, trust_freeze is noun_verb, and decide is a single verb. It is readable but not predictable.
Four tools is a reasonable size for a specialized guardrail server. However, the overlap between land_inject and decide suggests some consolidation might be warranted.
The inferred domain is agent safety and enforcement, but there is no tool to unfreeze trust, check current state, or submit proof/receipts. These gaps could lead to deadlocks or agent failures.
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