shpbl-retrieval-auditor
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@shpbl-retrieval-auditorwhich retrieved documents influenced decision d4e5f6?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Retrieval Context Provenance Auditor — reference implementation
Status: released under MIT. This is the reference implementation of the public behaviour
specification at https://github.com/SweetKenneth/shpbl-spec-retrieval-auditor. It was written
fresh from that specification, then cleared an exact-file IP surface review and an explicit MIT
implementation grant naming that reviewed file set.
What it answers
After an agent makes a bad decision: which retrieved documents caused it, and were any of them poisoned, stale, or newly introduced?
It records the retrieval supply chain — source → chunk → transformation → context → decision — and afterwards reports influence ranking, lineage, transformation fidelity, advisory source trust and retirement, co-influence correlation, and retrieval schema drift.
It never performs retrieval, never ranks documents for an agent at query time, and never blocks a decision.
Related MCP server: Agent Audit Trail MCP Server
Tool surface (MCP, stdio, zero dependencies)
Tool | Purpose |
| register sources with kind, first-seen and optional declared schema |
| record one decision's assembly as digests plus declared metadata |
| record corroborations, contradictions, retrieval outcome |
| ranked influence with mandatory |
| lineage graph; missing edges reported as missing |
| advisory trust, freshness, retirement recommendation with basis |
| observed schema versus declared baseline |
| policy id and the fixed public |
| payload-free hash-linked audit records |
Install and run
Prerequisites: Bun 1.1+ (or Node 22+ with a TypeScript loader). No install step is required beyond the clone, because there are no runtime dependencies.
git clone https://github.com/SweetKenneth/shpbl-retrieval-auditor.git
cd shpbl-retrieval-auditor
bun install # dev types only
bun test # conformance suite
bun run scripts/symbol-scan.ts # build-failing forbidden-symbol scan
bun src/mcp-server.ts # MCP server: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on stdin/stdoutMCP configuration
{
"mcpServers": {
"shpbl-retrieval-auditor": {
"command": "bun",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/shpbl-retrieval-auditor/src/mcp-server.ts"]
}
}
}Outputs
Every tool returns JSON: lineage graphs, ranked influence with an explicit unexplained
residual, advisory trust and retirement recommendations with their basis, drift findings, and a
payload-free hash-linked audit export. A worked poisoned-source example is in examples/.
Boundaries held by construction
Digest-only. Raw document, chunk, query and decision text is never accepted, stored or exported. Non-digest values are rejected as
E_INPUTand never echoed back.Attribution honesty. Influence plus
unexplainedsums to exactly 1.0. The product never claims a complete explanation, because it observes assembly and observation evidence, not model reasoning.Advisory trust. A distrusted source is annotated, never withheld or removed.
No egress. No network symbol, no ambient filesystem write, no process execution — enforced by a build-failing scan.
Clean-room trust layer. Source trust and retirement are implemented from the public specification's properties T1–T10 only, and verified against those properties — never against output equality with any private implementation.
Verification
31 conformance tests, 6,415 assertions: specification properties P1–P11 and trust properties T1–T10, plus every §7 failure mode. Randomised checks use a seeded generator, so runs are reproducible.
Provenance
SHPBL discovers the invention; this package implements it from a written specification. See
PROVENANCE.md.
Known limitations
Influence attribution observes context assembly and observation evidence, not model reasoning. The reported
unexplainedresidual is the honest share it cannot account for, and it is never suppressed.Source trust is advisory. The product annotates a distrusted source; it does not withhold, remove or block retrieval, and it never performs retrieval itself.
Because only digests and declared metadata are accepted, the auditor can prove which recorded material a decision used, but it cannot recover the original document text — that remains with the operator's own systems.
The hash-linked audit export detects edits to what was recorded; it cannot prove that a retrieval was recorded at all. External anchoring of the head digest is the operator's responsibility.
Tenable status
Submitted to the Tenable CyberAgents Exchange for review on September 11, 2026. Submission does not imply review, approval, certification, validation, endorsement, or acceptance by Tenable.
SHPBL Agent Evidence series
Independently installable, interoperable at the evidence-record boundary:
shpbl-action-ledger — agent action evidence ledger
shpbl-handoff-attestor — cross-agent handoff attestation
shpbl-drift-sentinel — agent behaviour drift detection
shpbl-retrieval-auditor — retrieval context provenance
shpbl-canary-chain — synthetic canary evidence chain
Licence
MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Kenneth E. Sweet Jr. See LICENSE.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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