shpbl-retrieval-auditor
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
Retrieval Context Provenance Auditor — reference implementation
Status: released under MIT. This is the reference implementation of the public behaviour
specification at https://github.com/SweetKenneth/shpbl-spec-retrieval-auditor. It was written
fresh from that specification, then cleared an exact-file IP surface review and an explicit MIT
implementation grant naming that reviewed file set.
What it answers
After an agent makes a bad decision: which retrieved documents caused it, and were any of them poisoned, stale, or newly introduced?
It records the retrieval supply chain — source → chunk → transformation → context → decision — and afterwards reports influence ranking, lineage, transformation fidelity, advisory source trust and retirement, co-influence correlation, and retrieval schema drift.
It never performs retrieval, never ranks documents for an agent at query time, and never blocks a decision.
Related MCP server: Agent Audit Trail MCP Server
Tool surface (MCP, stdio, zero dependencies)
Tool | Purpose |
| register sources with kind, first-seen and optional declared schema |
| record one decision's assembly as digests plus declared metadata |
| record corroborations, contradictions, retrieval outcome |
| ranked influence with mandatory |
| lineage graph; missing edges reported as missing |
| advisory trust, freshness, retirement recommendation with basis |
| observed schema versus declared baseline |
| policy id and the fixed public |
| payload-free hash-linked audit records |
Install and run
Prerequisites: Bun 1.1+ (or Node 22+ with a TypeScript loader). No install step is required beyond the clone, because there are no runtime dependencies.
git clone https://github.com/SweetKenneth/shpbl-retrieval-auditor.git
cd shpbl-retrieval-auditor
bun install # dev types only
bun test # conformance suite
bun run scripts/symbol-scan.ts # build-failing forbidden-symbol scan
bun src/mcp-server.ts # MCP server: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 on stdin/stdoutMCP configuration
{
"mcpServers": {
"shpbl-retrieval-auditor": {
"command": "bun",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/shpbl-retrieval-auditor/src/mcp-server.ts"]
}
}
}Outputs
Every tool returns JSON: lineage graphs, ranked influence with an explicit unexplained
residual, advisory trust and retirement recommendations with their basis, drift findings, and a
payload-free hash-linked audit export. A worked poisoned-source example is in examples/.
Boundaries held by construction
Digest-only. Raw document, chunk, query and decision text is never accepted, stored or exported. Non-digest values are rejected as
E_INPUTand never echoed back.Attribution honesty. Influence plus
unexplainedsums to exactly 1.0. The product never claims a complete explanation, because it observes assembly and observation evidence, not model reasoning.Advisory trust. A distrusted source is annotated, never withheld or removed.
No egress. No network symbol, no ambient filesystem write, no process execution — enforced by a build-failing scan.
Clean-room trust layer. Source trust and retirement are implemented from the public specification's properties T1–T10 only, and verified against those properties — never against output equality with any private implementation.
Verification
31 conformance tests, 6,415 assertions: specification properties P1–P11 and trust properties T1–T10, plus every §7 failure mode. Randomised checks use a seeded generator, so runs are reproducible.
Provenance
SHPBL discovers the invention; this package implements it from a written specification. See
PROVENANCE.md.
Known limitations
Influence attribution observes context assembly and observation evidence, not model reasoning. The reported
unexplainedresidual is the honest share it cannot account for, and it is never suppressed.Source trust is advisory. The product annotates a distrusted source; it does not withhold, remove or block retrieval, and it never performs retrieval itself.
Because only digests and declared metadata are accepted, the auditor can prove which recorded material a decision used, but it cannot recover the original document text — that remains with the operator's own systems.
The hash-linked audit export detects edits to what was recorded; it cannot prove that a retrieval was recorded at all. External anchoring of the head digest is the operator's responsibility.
Tenable status
Submitted to the Tenable CyberAgents Exchange for review on September 11, 2026. Submission does not imply review, approval, certification, validation, endorsement, or acceptance by Tenable.
SHPBL Agent Evidence series
Independently installable, interoperable at the evidence-record boundary:
shpbl-action-ledger — agent action evidence ledger
shpbl-handoff-attestor — cross-agent handoff attestation
shpbl-drift-sentinel — agent behaviour drift detection
shpbl-retrieval-auditor — retrieval context provenance
shpbl-canary-chain — synthetic canary evidence chain
Licence
MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Kenneth E. Sweet Jr. See LICENSE.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Live behavioral security verifier, schema auditor, and trust oracle for A2A, MCP & x402 agents.
Provenance-first database for teams and agents: every value carries sources, rules and coverage.
Audit AI agents' tool calls, planning and memory; Base on-chain data; pay per call via x402.
Agent memory that refuses to guess: evidence-gated recall, exact-source reads, verifiable deletion.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceAI agent provenance, trust, and auditability layer. VERITAS multi-gate scoring, Cortex approval gates, S.E.A.L. hash-chain audit ledger, and semantic RAG with cryptographic provenance tracking for every decision an agent makes.275MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides tamper-proof audit logging for AI agents using SHA-256 hash chains, integrity verification, and compliance reporting for the EU AI Act.49 PyPI1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides an immutable, tamper-evident audit trail for AI agents, enabling event logging with cryptographic chaining, search, verification, and statistics.3MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables capturing a tamper-evident, hash-chained local record of every AI agent tool call — both the decision before a tool runs and its outcome — so you can review what the agent actually did in order, detect edits, deletions, or reordering at the exact index, and export a signed evidence pack any third party can verify with no installs.2MIT