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midPoint MCP Server

midPoint MCP Server

Disable user

disable_user

Disables a midPoint user by setting activation to disabled using their OID and matching login name; mismatched names are refused, and writes return dry-run previews until enabled.

Instructions

Disable a midPoint user (activation → disabled). userName is the user's midPoint name (their login, not the full name); the call is refused when it doesn't match the OID, so the person confirming it reads the right name. Requires the write gate; otherwise a dry-run preview. When you write to a person, name people, roles and requests by their display names rather than OIDs.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
oidYesOID of the user
userNameYesthe user's midPoint name (their login, not the full name); must match oid

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNothe JSON body of the midPoint REST request, when it has one
dryRunYes
methodYes
resultNo
appliedYes
summaryYes
endpointYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations at all, the description carries the full burden and does disclose non-obvious behavior: the call is refused if userName does not match the OID, and without the write gate it produces a dry-run preview instead of mutating. It does not describe side effects of disabling (e.g. loss of assignments or active sessions) or whether the change is reversible via enable_user.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The action and its state transition are front-loaded in the first clause, followed by the confirmation-safety rationale. The closing sentence about naming people, roles and requests by display names is generic cross-tool boilerplate that is only loosely tied to this operation, mildly diluting focus.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive tool with a 100%-covered schema and an output schema, the description covers the essentials an agent needs: what it does, the confirmation guard, and the gate/dry-run fallback. Only the post-disable effects and reversibility are left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already states that userName is the midPoint name and must match oid, so the description largely restates structured data. The 'their login, not the full name' clarification reinforces the schema but adds no new semantics beyond it, making baseline 3 appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource plus the resulting state change ('Disable a midPoint user (activation → disabled)'), which cleanly separates it from get_user, create_user and enable_user in the sibling list.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains the operational context well: the call requires the write gate and otherwise degrades to a dry-run preview, which tells the agent what to expect before invoking. It does not explicitly name alternatives (e.g. enable_user to reverse, get_user to look up the OID), so it stops short of full when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.