aegis-mcp
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| --root | Yes | Absolute path to the project root used as the sandboxed workspace root. | |
| --timeout | No | Execution timeout in seconds. | |
| --allow-exec | No | Enable execution tools such as exec_python and exec_command. Omit for strict read-only auditing mode. | |
| --allow-write | No | Enable write-capable MCP tools such as fs_write_file and fs_patch_file. Omit for strict read-only auditing mode. | |
| --wrap-untrusted | No | Enable wrapping of untrusted operations. | |
| --enable-seatbelt | No | Enable the optional macOS sandbox-exec (Seatbelt) kernel profile. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| fs_read_fileA | Read a UTF-8 text file inside the sandbox workspace root with line-range filtering, canonical path jail verification, sensitive credential blocking, and SHA-256 digest. |
| fs_list_directoryA | List files and directories inside the sandbox workspace root using bounded iterative BFS traversal. Sensitive credential files are flagged as 'protected_sensitive'. |
| fs_search_textB | Search for literal text or regular expressions across files in the sandbox workspace root with automatic binary skipping, ReDoS protection, and inline secret redaction. |
| fs_write_fileA | Atomically write a UTF-8 text file inside the workspace root using O_NOFOLLOW temp-file swap, optional Optimistic Concurrency Control (expected_sha256), and idempotency_key. |
| fs_patch_fileA | Atomically replace an exact target text block inside a workspace file with optional SHA-256 Optimistic Concurrency Control (expected_sha256) and idempotency_key. |
| exec_pythonB | Execute an isolated Python code snippet inside the sandbox with zero-trust scrubbed environment variables, POSIX resource limits, and process-group timeout SIGKILL. |
| exec_commandA | Execute an allowlisted binary (e.g. pytest, ruff, mypy, git, ls) with shell=False, argument safety guards, scrubbed environment, and process-group timeout SIGKILL. |
| sandbox_inspect_policyA | Inspect the active sandbox security policy, resource limits, capability flags, allowed binaries, and runtime RED telemetry metrics. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 8 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes: read/list/search are separate filesystem read operations, exec_python and exec_command target different execution models, and sandbox_inspect_policy is unique. The main potential overlap is fs_write_file versus fs_patch_file, both of which edit files, though their descriptions distinguish full atomic writes from exact-block replacement.
All names use consistent snake_case and follow a predictable category-prefixed pattern (fs_, exec_, sandbox_). Minor deviation exists because the fs_ tools use verb-object forms while exec_python/exec_command are more namespace-like, but the overall convention is still readable and predictable.
Eight tools is well-scoped for a sandboxed filesystem and execution server. Each tool earns its place by covering a distinct operation, with no obvious filler or redundant tools.
The surface covers read, list, search, write, patch, execution, and policy inspection, which supports most agent workflows. However, common filesystem lifecycle operations such as delete, move/rename, and directory creation are absent, leaving notable gaps for full CRUD coverage.