mcp-secure-server
Integrates with Keycloak as a trusted OAuth/OIDC issuer and token-exchange endpoint, supporting verified RS256 token validation, tenant- and scope-based authorization, and RFC 8693 subject-token exchange to downstream audiences.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
mcp-secure-server
An executable Python reference for MCP authorization. Use the official SDK with verified token audiences and tenant-scoped reads. The demo uses synthetic data.
Quick start
Requires Python 3.12+ and uv. From this repository:
uv run --locked mcp-secure-serverThe demo creates ephemeral RSA keys, binds loopback HTTP explicitly, discovers protected-resource metadata and calls the tools through the official SDK client. It verifies that a request without credentials is rejected and a north-tenant token cannot read a south-tenant record. No model, external credentials or Docker is required.
Related MCP server: pg_mcp_qauth
How it works
The verified identity supplies the tenant. Tool arguments cannot change it. A record from another tenant returns the same result as an unknown record. The downstream exchange adapter is standalone.
trusted issuer → verified RS256 token → SDK authentication context → tenant-scoped records
↓
fixed downstream exchange adapterValidate signature, issuer, resource audience, expiry and required identity claims.
Require
records:read; taketenant_idexclusively from the verified principal.Return the same response for another tenant's record and an unknown record.
Bound tool arguments and synthetic output; enable SDK host protection.
Require HTTPS in the client and exchange adapter, with an explicit loopback-only demo exception.
Exchange a validated subject token at a fixed endpoint; refuse redirects and unchanged subject tokens. Never forward an inbound token implicitly.
tenant_id, azp and record permissions are this reference's application policy. They are not universal MCP requirements. The exchange adapter is standalone; record tools do not make downstream calls.
Sources checked 16 November 2026: MCP authorization, 2026-07-28, RFC 9728, RFC 8707, RFC 9700 and RFC 8693. The standards map connects each boundary to its executable check.
The official Python SDK supplies protocol handling and auth context. This project concentrates on application boundaries. Keycloak's supported standard token exchange is tested separately from mocked adapter failures.
Verification
The recorded local run passed 85 tests and the Keycloak lab. See verification and the threat model.
With Docker available:
uv run --locked python examples/keycloak_integration.pyThis creates a dedicated, loopback-only Keycloak 26.8.2 container pinned by image digest, random temporary credentials and synthetic service accounts. It checks both tenant directions, wrong audience, missing scope, discovery and a real RFC 8693 exchange to a downstream audience. It verifies the exchanged signature and preserved subject, then removes its own container.
The local run on 16 November 2026 passed these checks:
Probe | Observed result |
No token / wrong audience | HTTP 401 / 401 |
Missing required scope | HTTP 403 |
Protected-resource metadata | HTTP 200; configured resource matches |
Two authenticated tenants | Five own records each |
Cross-tenant reads, both directions | Denied; indistinguishable from unknown ID |
Tenant supplied as a tool argument | Escalation prevented |
Downstream token exchange | Distinct signed token; target audience; original subject |
See recorded verification and safe integration output.
uv sync --locked --group dev
uv run --locked python -m pytest -q
uv run --locked ruff check .
uv run --locked ruff format --check .uv.lock pins the tested dependency graph. CI is configured for Linux and Windows, with the Keycloak lab on Linux.
Limits
This is a small read-only reference, not a production deployment or security certification. The demo and Docker lab use synthetic service accounts; they do not implement interactive user login, consent or a complete OAuth client.
The trusted RSA public key is operator-configured. Production integration needs a reviewed key-rotation strategy, TLS termination, ingress body/rate limits, request budgets, operational logging and deployment hardening. Authentication does not make retrieved content safe against prompt injection. See the threat model.
License
Tool Schema Changelog
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Maintenance
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