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Silicon Transfer MCP Server

Silicon Transfer MCP Server

Official

Silicon Transfer MCP Server

npm version npm downloads license node

FTP / FTPS / SFTP for Claude and other MCP clients - with built-in transfer proofs.

Every upload and download returns a verdict: PROVEN only when the SHA-256 of the remote file matches your local file. No more "transfer complete" on blind trust.

Philosophy: prove it, then claim it. Built from scratch by Silicon Networks - the makers of AEGIS Shield.

The complete kit: pair it with Silicon Skills - nine working rules for coding agents. The safe-deploy skill tells your agent how to deploy (local first, pull live state, stage, verify); this server gives it the tools and the proof.

Why this one?

Typical FTP tools

Silicon Transfer

Upload result

"done"

verdict + SHA-256 of both sides

Directory sync check

manual

per-file proof walk with mismatch list

Remote file fingerprint

download first

streamed SHA-256, no disk contact

Protocols

often FTP only

FTP, FTPS, SFTP (password or SSH key)

Related MCP server: Orphograph

Tools (13)

Connection: silicon_connect, silicon_disconnect, silicon_status, silicon_server_info Files: silicon_upload_file, silicon_download_file, silicon_delete_file, silicon_file_info Directories: silicon_list_dir, silicon_make_dir, silicon_upload_dir, silicon_download_dir, silicon_rename

Transfers accept proof: "hash" | "size" | "none" - hash is the default for single files, size for directory trees (switch to hash when it matters).

Install

npm install -g silicon-transfer-mcp-server

That's it - live on npm. Or run it without installing via npx (see config below).

git clone https://github.com/SiliconAINetworks/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.git
cd silicon-transfer-mcp-server
npm install
npm run build

Claude Desktop configuration

Add to your claude_desktop_config.json (no credentials in the config - you pass them at runtime through silicon_connect, for your own server):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "silicon-transfer": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "silicon-transfer-mcp-server"]
    }
  }
}
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "silicon-transfer": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["C:/path/to/silicon-transfer-mcp-server/dist/index.js"]
    }
  }
}

Usage example

Ask your AI assistant:

"Connect to my server via SFTP (host example.com, user deploy, key at ~/.ssh/id_ed25519) and upload dist/app.js to /var/www/app.js - with hash proof."

The assistant calls silicon_connect, then silicon_upload_file and answers with the verdict:

{
  "proof": {
    "verdict": "PROVEN",
    "detail": "SHA-256 identisch - Transfer bewiesen.",
    "local_sha256": "9f2a...",
    "remote_sha256": "9f2a..."
  }
}

If the hashes ever differ you get MISMATCH with both fingerprints - retry instead of trusting a broken deploy.

Security notes

Built with the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) in mind - specifically ASI02 (Tool Misuse) and ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain).

What this server does not do

  • No stored credentials. They are runtime-only tool parameters for your own server - no defaults, no config files with secrets, no server addresses shipped.

  • No dynamic tool definitions. Every tool is fixed in the source you can read; nothing is fetched from a remote registry at runtime, so no third party can rewrite what your assistant thinks a tool does.

  • No telemetry, no phone-home, no analytics.

Sharp edges - operate accordingly

silicon_delete_file, silicon_delete_directory and silicon_sync_deploy (with deleteExtras) can destroy remote data. An assistant reading untrusted content - a web page, a PDF, an email - can be steered by instructions hidden inside it (indirect prompt injection). Treat these tools like rm -rf:

  • Connect with an account scoped to the directory you intend to touch, never root.

  • Prefer SSH keys over passwords; give the key its own restricted account.

  • Run silicon_list_dir before any delete, and read the plan before approving.

  • Keep deleteExtras off unless you are deliberately mirroring.

Verifying what you installed

Package name is exactly silicon-transfer-mcp-server, published by aegisshield888. Similar names on npm are placeholders we registered to prevent typosquatting - they contain no code. Source: the GitHub repository linked above.

Reporting

Found a hole? Open an issue on GitHub, or write to security@siliconnetworks.ch.

License

MIT (c) 2026 Silicon Networks. Built from scratch - single-author codebase.

Available Tools

13 tools
silicon_connectVerbindung aufbauenA
Idempotent

Verbindet zu einem FTP-, FTPS- oder SFTP-Server. SFTP unterstuetzt Passwort oder SSH-Key (privateKeyPath).

Inputs: host (required), protocol (required), username (required), port, +3 more.

silicon_delete_fileRemote-Datei loeschenA
Destructive

Loescht eine Datei auf dem Server. Endgueltig - vorher mit silicon_list_dir pruefen.

Inputs: remotePath (required).

silicon_disconnectVerbindung trennenB
Idempotent

Trennt die aktive Verbindung sauber.

Inputs: no named parameters.

silicon_download_dirVerzeichnis herunterladen (mit Beweis-Wanderung)B
Read-onlyIdempotent

Laedt ein Remote-Verzeichnis rekursiv herunter. Danach wird jede lokale Datei gegen die Remote-Quelle verglichen (hash/size/none, Standard size).

Inputs: localDir (required), remoteDir (required), proof.

silicon_download_fileDatei herunterladen (mit Beweis)A
Read-onlyIdempotent

Laedt eine Remote-Datei herunter und liefert das Transfer-Urteil mit: PROVEN nur bei identischem SHA-256 zwischen Remote-Quelle und lokaler Kopie.

Inputs: localPath (required), remotePath (required), proof.

silicon_file_infoDatei-SteckbriefA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Groesse und SHA-256 einer Remote-Datei - der Fingerabdruck ohne Download auf Platte.

Inputs: remotePath (required).

silicon_list_dirVerzeichnis auflistenA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Listet ein Remote-Verzeichnis mit Typ, Groesse und Aenderungsdatum.

Inputs: path (required).

silicon_make_dirRemote-Verzeichnis anlegenA
Idempotent

Legt ein Verzeichnis auf dem Server an (rekursiv moeglich).

Inputs: remotePath (required), recursive.

silicon_renameUmbenennen / VerschiebenB

Benennt eine Remote-Datei oder ein Verzeichnis um bzw. verschiebt es.

Inputs: toPath (required), fromPath (required).

silicon_server_infoServer InfoA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Name, Version und Philosophie dieses MCP-Servers. Lebenszeichen-Check.

Inputs: no named parameters.

silicon_statusVerbindungsstatusA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Zeigt, ob und wohin aktuell eine Verbindung besteht.

Inputs: no named parameters.

silicon_upload_dirVerzeichnis hochladen (mit Beweis-Wanderung)A
Idempotent

Laedt ein lokales Verzeichnis rekursiv hoch. Danach wird jede Datei einzeln verglichen: proof=hash prueft SHA-256 pro Datei (gruendlich, langsamer), proof=size vergleicht Groessen (schnell), none ueberspringt.

Inputs: localDir (required), remoteDir (required), proof.

silicon_upload_fileDatei hochladen (mit Beweis)A
Idempotent

Laedt eine lokale Datei hoch und liefert das Transfer-Urteil mit: PROVEN nur, wenn der SHA-256 der Remote-Datei nach dem Upload dem lokalen entspricht.

Inputs: localPath (required), remotePath (required), proof.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A3.9/5.0

    Scored across 13 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool has a distinct purpose: connection management, file/directory operations, uploads/downloads, and server info. No overlapping functions.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tools follow the 'silver_verb_noun' pattern with snake_case, providing a clear and predictable naming convention.

    Tool Count4/5

    13 tools is within the ideal range, covering core file transfer operations without being excessive or insufficient.

    Completeness4/5

    Covers essential operations for file transfer (connect, disconnect, list, upload, download), but lacks a dedicated directory deletion tool.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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