Inspect the current project's network rules and configured secret metadata before a secret-bearing HTTP request. Takes no arguments. Returns network (allowed domains/ports and IP restrictions), secret_aliases, project_bindings, and usage instructions; no secret values. Does not change policy or verify that credentials work. Use agentsecure.secret.status for one env name, or agentsecure.get_policy_hint for a Mesh action rather than HTTP destination policy.

Check whether one environment name is assigned in the current project's secret configuration before using its ${ENV_NAME} placeholder. Returns exists and env_name; when configured, also returns source (vault_alias or project_binding), provider, mode, and alias metadata when applicable. This is a configuration lookup, not a vault-value or credential-validity check, and returns no secret value. Use agentsecure.policy.describe to list all configured aliases and bindings. Example: {"env_name": "API_KEY"}.

Send one HTTP(S) request that needs a configured secret, using ${ENV_NAME} placeholders instead of raw credentials. Checks project destination policy before resolving secrets and applies configured vault-alias host restrictions; calls without placeholders are blocked (use ordinary network tools for those). Performs the requested remote operation, does not follow redirects, and revokes temporary alias grants afterward. Returns blocked=false, status, reason, headers, and a UTF-8 body, with response body/header values sanitized for known secrets; HTTP error statuses are still responses. Blocked calls return blocked=true, reason, rule_id, and sometimes allow_command; configuration errors may instead be MCP errors. This is not a sandbox for other network tools. Example: {"url": "https://api.example.com/me", "headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer ${API_KEY}"}} requires that host and API_KEY to be configured and approved.

Look up or register identities in the local Community Mesh store. By default, agent_id returns exists plus that identity's metadata (or exists=false if unknown); omitting agent_id returns an agents array sorted by ID. Set register=true with a non-empty agent_id to create or overwrite its record and write an audit event; returns the saved identity. Registration replaces rather than merges metadata. Identity labels, trust_level, and allowed_scopes do not authenticate callers or grant permissions. Example: {"agent_id": "backend-agent"}.

Check local inbox counts before answering whether this agent has messages or approvals. Returns agent_id, unread_count, pending_approval_count, and a notice, not message content. Pending approvals are those assigned to the agent or its registered team, not all requests created by it. Does not mark messages read. Use agentsecure.list_messages for records and agentsecure.read_message to acknowledge one. Example: {"agent_id": "backend-agent"}.

List messages addressed to one agent in the local Community Mesh store. Returns agent_id and a messages array, newest first (empty if none). Each record includes message_id, sender/recipient, subject, resource, status, thread IDs, and timestamps. Body is [redacted]; body_summary may retain up to 120 characters and body_sha256 is a digest, not recoverable full content. Does not mark messages read. Use agentsecure.check_messages for counts only or agentsecure.read_message to mark a specific record read. Example: {"agent_id": "backend-agent", "include_read": true}.

Retrieve and acknowledge one local Mesh message after listing the inbox. Requires agent_id to match the record's recipient; an unknown ID or a different recipient causes an error. Returns the message record with status=read and read_at; the first read updates local state and audit. Re-reading returns the same acknowledged record. Body remains [redacted], with only body_summary/body_sha256 available; this does not recover original text. Use agentsecure.list_messages to inspect without marking read. The recipient check compares caller-supplied IDs, not authenticated identities.

Create a new unread message in the local Community Mesh store for another agent. Checks the sender's send_message policy and resource approval requirements. Returns blocked=false and message (including message_id/thread_id), or blocked=true with reason and allowed_next_step. Stores/audits a redacted body, digest, and heuristic summary, not the full text; never put secrets in the input. Does not launch/wake the recipient, contact a remote service, or prove the recipient read it. Use agentsecure.reply_message to respond in an existing thread. Example: {"from_agent": "frontend-agent", "to": "backend-agent", "body": "Please review src/app.py."}.

Reply to a local Mesh message addressed to from_agent. Marks the original read first, then checks send_message policy and creates a type=reply message to the original sender, preserving thread_id and resource and setting reply_to. Returns blocked=false and message, or a policy denial with blocked=true, reason, and allowed_next_step; the original can remain read even if sending is blocked. Unknown messages or recipient mismatches cause an error. Reply body is redacted with a summary/hash, not full-text delivery. Use agentsecure.send_message for a new thread.

Create a local pending approval record when a Mesh policy hint requires human review. Returns an approval object with approval_id, status=pending, requested_by, action, resource, required_approver, and timestamps; reason is redacted with a summary/hash. Writes local state and audit but does not send a message, notify a human, execute the action, or change policy. Repeated calls create separate requests. Use agentsecure.get_approval_status with the returned ID; approval decisions are made outside these MCP tools. An approved record does not automatically unblock policy. Example: {"requested_by": "frontend-agent", "action": "deploy_preview", "reason": "Please review the preview deployment."}.

Read a previously created local approval without changing it. Returns an approval object with status (pending, approved, denied, or needs_info), action/resource, required_approver, and recorded decision details/timestamps. Reason text remains redacted with summary/hash metadata. Unknown IDs cause an error. This tool neither requests nor grants approval, and an approved record does not execute an action or automatically lift policy restrictions. Use agentsecure.request_approval to create a request and agentsecure.get_policy_hint to inspect current action policy.

Evaluate a proposed Mesh action against the current local agent policy without executing it. Checks cannot, can_message (when a send_message target is supplied), requires_human_for, and sensitive markers in action/resource. Returns allowed, blocked, reason, action, sanitized resource, and allowed_next_step. This is guidance, not an authorization token or a guarantee about external permissions; existing approval records are not consulted. Use agentsecure.request_approval to record a review request, or agentsecure.policy.describe for HTTP network/secret configuration. Example: {"agent_id": "frontend-agent", "action": "send_message", "target": "backend-agent"}.

Inspect recent local Mesh history for troubleshooting messages, registrations, approvals, or policy denials. Returns an events array containing only mesh.* records from the configured audit log, optionally filtered by resource, with the last limit matches in log order (oldest first within that slice). A missing log returns an empty array and malformed JSON lines are skipped. Does not change state or include non-Mesh HTTP/secret audit events. Text fields may be redacted with summary/hash metadata; this is not an immutable audit service. Example: {"limit": 10}.