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mqtt-mcp-server

An MCP server for MQTT that remembers. It subscribes to a broker, stores every message with a timestamp in SQLite, and lets an AI agent ask questions about the past — not just about the next message that happens to arrive.

Why another MQTT MCP server

The existing ones answer "wait for the next message on this topic". That is the wrong question for diagnosing home automation:

  • A battery-powered sensor (Shelly H&T) sleeps for hours. Waiting for its next message means waiting for hours.

  • A broken device sends nothing at all. Waiting tells you nothing — you need to know when it last spoke.

  • "No data" is ambiguous. Was the device silent, or was the collector not listening? Without a record of connection state, both look identical.

This server answers all three.

Related MCP server: SQLite MCP Server

Tools

Tool

Purpose

list_topics(pattern, seit_stunden)

Topic inventory — what exists, how many messages, last seen

get_last(topic)

Last known value immediately, no waiting

get_history(topic, seit_stunden, limit)

Timestamped history — the core feature

get_tree(prefix, tiefe)

Topic tree, like MQTT Explorer

find_silent(still_seit_stunden)

Topics that stopped reporting

get_gaps(seit_stunden)

When was the collector disconnected?

broker_konflikte(seit_stunden, nur_verdaechtige)

Which topics are fed by more than one broker — and is that a bridge or two writers?

status()

Connection, data volume, write mode

publish(topic, payload, qos, retain)

Send a message — disabled by default

find_silent and get_gaps belong together

find_silent deliberately warns you when connection gaps exist in the queried period. A topic can look "silent" simply because nobody was listening. The server refuses to let you confuse the two.

A failed connection is not a quiet one

If the broker cannot be reached at all — DNS, routing, firewall, refused — paho never calls on_disconnect, because there was never a connection. Up to v0.1.0 that case left no trace: status() showed verbunden: false with letzter_fehler: null, and get_gaps showed nothing, so a collector that could not connect looked exactly like one that simply received no messages.

Since v0.2.0 a failed attempt is recorded:

  • status().letzter_fehler carries the real cause and the number of attempts, e.g. connect fehlgeschlagen (7x): OSError: [Errno 65] No route to host.

  • One disconnected event per failure streak (not one per retry — paho keeps retrying with backoff up to 120 s). get_gaps shows it as an open gap ("hinweis": "noch offen") until the next successful connect closes it.

Install

git clone https://github.com/Schimmilab/mqtt-mcp-server.git
cd mqtt-mcp-server
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e .

Register with Claude Code:

claude mcp add mqtt --scope user \
  --env MQTT_MCP_HOST=192.168.1.10 \
  -- /ABSOLUTE/PATH/TO/mqtt-mcp-server/.venv/bin/mqtt-mcp-server

A newly registered server is only picked up by a new session — MCP connections are fixed at session start.

Configuration

Variable

Default

MQTT_MCP_HOST

localhost

broker host

MQTT_MCP_PORT

1883

MQTT_MCP_USERNAME / _PASSWORD

—

optional auth

MQTT_MCP_TOPICS

#

comma-separated subscription filters

MQTT_MCP_DB

~/.local/share/mqtt-mcp/history.db

one file per broker — see below

MQTT_MCP_PEER_DBS

all other *.db next to MQTT_MCP_DB

databases to compare against

MQTT_MCP_RETENTION_TAGE

30

delete messages older than this

MQTT_MCP_MAX_DB_MB

2048

hard cap, triggers oldest-first deletion

MQTT_MCP_ALLOW_PUBLISH

false

write mode

MQTT_MCP_BLOCKED_TOPICS

see config.py

never published to, even in write mode

Running two brokers side by side

Migrating a home automation system rarely happens in one jump. While the old and the new broker run in parallel, the same topic exists on both — and a value without a recorded origin is not wrong, it is unattributable. That is the worse kind of error, because it still looks like a measurement.

Two things make this visible:

  • Every row carries a broker column (host:port). Rows written before this existed stay NULL — deliberately. Backfilling them with the current broker would be an invented origin.

  • Give each broker its own database file (MQTT_MCP_DB). The origin is then guaranteed structurally, not merely by a column somebody has to fill correctly. broker_konflikte() attaches all of them read-only and answers the one question that matters: which topics are fed by more than one broker?

The result carries a messbar ("measurable") field, and it is the point of the whole tool: an empty conflict list is only an all-clear when messbar is true. If a peer database could not be read, or if most rows predate the broker column, you get "teilweise" plus a warning — because "no conflicts found" is exactly the answer you were hoping for, and that is precisely when a broken measurement does the most damage.

A bridge is not a conflict

If a bridge runs between the brokers, both carry the same topics — that is the normal state, not the anomaly. The first real run reported 129 of 147 topics, none of which needed action. A tool that flags 88 % gets ignored by the third time, so every doubled topic is classified:

gespiegelt

bridge proven — for each message, the nearest message on the other broker carries an identical payload

wahrscheinlich_gespiegelt

same pattern, but too few pairs to call it proven

kaum_ueberlappung

the two rarely send at the same time — that is a migration, not double control

unabhaengig

the real finding: overlapping in time, different payloads

unklar

not decidable — reported as such rather than guessed

Two details decide whether the classification is honest rather than merely confident:

  • Nearest partner per message, not all pairs in the window. The naive version is a cross join and lies badly on high-frequency topics.

  • No partner ≠ different payload. Dividing hits by all messages turns absence into "0 % identical", which reads as "two writers". It isn't.

nur_verdaechtige=True (default) lists only what is not cleared, and counts the rest in entwarnt_nicht_gelistet.

Verify the canary itself. A canary that finds nothing is indistinguishable from a broken one, so tools/canary-doppelbesitz.py publishes two test topics: one written independently by both brokers (must be reported as unabhaengig) and one written identically by both (must be cleared). Run it, then call broker_konflikte(seit_stunden=0.1) and check that exactly the first one shows up. Without the second topic the first proves nothing — a canary that flags everything would pass it too.

Writing is off by default — on purpose

publish requires two conditions: write mode enabled and the topic not on the block list. The default block list covers power switches and device restarts.

⚠️ The block list is a guard rail, not a security boundary. Anyone with access to the server can change it. Real enforcement requires a broker-side ACL.

The default exists because of a real incident: a switched socket in front of two servers failed and took the whole home automation down for nine days, costing seven weeks of measurement data. Measuring is safe; switching is not.

Retained messages

On connect, a broker delivers its entire retained backlog at once — potentially tens of thousands of messages with old content but a fresh arrival time. Storing those naively corrupts every history from the first second.

This server stores them, but flags them: aus_startschwall: true. get_last uses them (that is how a sleeping sensor still has a value); get_history can exclude them.

Known limitations

Broker authentication, connection gaps and silence detection are tested end-to-end against a real broker since v0.3.0: tests/test_broker_e2e.py starts a killable test broker (amqtt, pure Python, its own process) and checks

case

positive control

must go red

auth

correct credentials connect

wrong password → not connected, error + open gap recorded

get_gaps

no outage → no gap

broker killed and restarted → exactly one closed gap

find_silent

both test devices arrive

the device that stopped is reported, the active one is not

Each test was checked against deliberately broken server code (outage not recorded, credentials not passed) and fails as it should.

uv run --group dev pytest -q tests/test_broker_e2e.py

Only username/password auth is covered; TLS is not.

History only covers times when the server was running. It is a debugging tool started on demand, not a 24/7 collector. If something breaks while you are away and no session is open, nothing is recorded.

macOS: the collector inherits the Local Network permission of whatever launched it. Started from an IDE's terminal (IntelliJ, CLion, VS Code …), Python and Node get EHOSTUNREACH / No route to host for every LAN address if that IDE lacks System Settings → Privacy & Security → Local Network. Apple's own binaries (nc, curl) are not affected, which makes the failure look selective. Granting the permission takes effect only after restarting the IDE. Since v0.2.0 the cause shows up in status().letzter_fehler; before, it did not.

Retention

Runs at startup and hourly: delete older than N days, then — if still over the size cap — delete oldest-first. Every cleanup reports what it removed to stderr, including the oldest remaining timestamp. Silent deletion would quietly destroy the answer to "since when has this device been quiet?".

Check which limit actually applies: on a busy broker the size cap wins long before the day limit. In practice ~1.8 GB held about four days of a home installation with ~200 topics — status().bestand.aeltestes tells you the real horizon.

License

MIT

Available Tools

9 tools
broker_konflikteA

Topics, die von MEHR ALS EINEM Broker bespielt werden.

Der Ownership-Canary fuer den Parallelbetrieb zweier Broker: Die gefaehrliche Lage ist nicht "ein Geraet antwortet nicht", sondern "zwei Systeme schreiben auf dasselbe Topic und keiner merkt es".

Verglichen wird ueber ALLE Broker-Datenbanken nebeneinander (jeder Server hat seit dem 22.08. seine eigene). messbar sagt, ob das Ergebnis ueberhaupt belastbar ist — bei false oder "teilweise" ist eine leere Konfliktliste ausdruecklich KEINE Entwarnung.

⛔ Eine BRIDGE ist kein Konflikt. Laeuft eine Bridge zwischen den Brokern, fuehren beide dieselben Topics — das ist der Normalzustand, nicht die Anomalie. Jedes Doppel-Topic wird deshalb eingeordnet:

gespiegelt Bridge belegt (hohe Payload-Gleichheit) wahrscheinlich_gespiegelt Payloads zu einfoermig fuer einen Beweis, aber der Zeitversatz spricht dafuer unabhaengig ⛔ der echte Befund: zwei Schreiber unklar nicht entscheidbar — von Hand ansehen

nur_verdaechtige=True (Default) listet Gespiegeltes nicht, sondern zaehlt es in gespiegelt_nicht_gelistet. Auf False setzen, um alles zu sehen.

Inputs: limit, stichprobe, seit_stunden, nur_verdaechtige. Returns: object

find_silentA

Topics, die seit X Stunden NICHT mehr gemeldet haben.

Die Frage vom 2026-08-01: 'seit wann meldet dieser Stecker nichts mehr?' (sonoff-4854 war seit dem 02.06. still — ein defekter Zwischenstecker).

Inputs: limit, still_seit_stunden. Returns: object

get_gapsB

Zeitraeume, in denen der Sammler NICHT mit dem Broker verbunden war.

Trennt 'Geraet ist still' von 'ich habe nicht zugehoert'. Ohne diese Auskunft sehen beide Faelle in den Daten identisch aus.

Inputs: seit_stunden. Returns: object

get_historyB

Verlauf eines Topics mit Zeitstempeln — die Kernfunktion dieses Servers.

mit_startschwall=False blendet den retained-Altbestand aus, der direkt nach dem Verbinden ankommt und einen irrefuehrend frischen Zeitstempel traegt.

Inputs: topic (required), limit, seit_stunden, mit_startschwall. Returns: object

get_lastA

Letzter bekannter Wert eines Topics — sofort, ohne auf die naechste Nachricht zu warten.

Genau das, was fertige MQTT-MCP-Server nicht koennen: bei einem schlafenden Batteriesensor (Shelly H&T) kaeme die naechste Nachricht erst in Stunden.

Inputs: topic (required). Returns: object

get_treeC

Topic-Baum ab einem Praefix — der Ueberblick wie im MQTT Explorer.

Inputs: limit, tiefe, prefix. Returns: object

list_topicsB

Topic-Inventar: welche Topics gibt es, wie viele Nachrichten, wann zuletzt.

pattern: Glob wie 'tele/*' oder '*SENSOR'. seit_stunden schraenkt auf den juengeren Zeitraum ein.

Inputs: limit, pattern, seit_stunden. Returns: object

publishA

Nachricht senden. Nur bei aktivem Schreibmodus und nicht auf gesperrte Topics.

⚠️ Die Sperrliste ist eine Bremse gegen Fehlgriffe, keine Sicherheitsgrenze.

Inputs: topic (required), payload (required), qos, retain. Returns: object

statusA

Zustand des Servers: Verbindung, Datenbestand, Schreibmodus.

Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: object

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A3.5/5.0

    Scored across 9 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    Most tools have clearly distinct purposes: broker_konflikte, find_silent, get_gaps, get_history, get_last, get_tree, list_topics, publish, and status each target a different query. There is mild overlap between list_topics and get_tree (inventory vs. tree view) and between find_silent and get_gaps (device silent vs. collector disconnected), but the descriptions explicitly distinguish these cases.

    Naming Consistency3/5

    Four tools follow a clean get_* pattern (get_gaps, get_history, get_last, get_tree) plus list_topics, but broker_konflikte is a German noun-first name and find_silent uses a different verb style, while publish and status are bare verbs/nouns. All snake_case, but the verb conventions are mixed and languages are inconsistent.

    Tool Count5/5

    Nine tools is well-scoped for an MQTT broker client, covering query, diagnostics, write, and status without redundancy. Each tool earns its place in the workflow.

    Completeness4/5

    The surface covers topic history, latest value, tree/list inventory, silence and gap diagnostics, conflict detection, publish, and status — a solid read/diagnostic/write lifecycle. Minor gaps like retained-message management or subscription/streaming operations exist but are not essential.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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