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attest-mcp

attest-mcp

attest-mcp

OpenSSF Best Practices

Listed on the official MCP Registry as io.github.SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp.

MCP server and CLI for Spazio Genesi's attestation service — attest, verify, and check the existence of digital works from any MCP-capable AI agent (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, etc.) or straight from a terminal / CI pipeline.

Full privacy: file bytes never leave your device. The fingerprint (SHA-256) is computed locally, streamed from disk — only the hash and optional metadata are sent.

📖 English documentation: attestazione.spaziogenesi.org/en — site, developer docs, and tiers/terms are all available in English.

What it does

The attestation service timestamps a file's SHA-256 fingerprint, signs it (HMAC), and can produce a signed PDF certificate plus an OpenTimestamps proof anchored in Bitcoin. This server exposes that service as MCP tools, so an agent can attest and verify works on your behalf without a browser.

Related MCP server: AgentLedger

Why this, not just an OpenTimestamps wrapper

Several MCP servers can submit a hash to an OpenTimestamps calendar. As far as we know, this is the only one that hands back a complete proof of existence — a signed PDF certificate, a recognized RFC 3161 timestamp, and a Bitcoin anchor — for free, with the file's bytes never leaving the caller's machine. No account, no upload, no paid notarization chain. If you know of another MCP server with the same combination (full certificate + free + local hashing), we'd genuinely like to hear about it — open an issue.

Spazio Genesi is an Italian non-profit (ETS – Ente del Terzo Settore). The attestation service behind this package was designed with the EU regulatory environment in mind, not adapted to it afterwards:

  • GDPR-first, privacy by design: the file itself never reaches our servers — only its SHA-256 fingerprint (and any metadata you choose to declare) is sent.

  • EU data residency: certificates and proofs are archived on Cloudflare R2 under EU jurisdiction.

  • Recognized timestamping, no single point of trust: every certificate carries an RFC 3161 timestamp from an AATL-rooted authority (trusted by Adobe and most PDF readers) and an independent Bitcoin anchor via OpenTimestamps.

  • Honest about eIDAS: this is not (yet) an eIDAS qualified trust service — the signer identity is currently self-signed, and a qualified electronic seal is a planned but unimplemented upgrade. See the technical whitepaper for the full, unvarnished breakdown of what is and isn't guaranteed.

Full tiers and terms: attestazione.spaziogenesi.org/en/condizioni.

Install

Claude Desktop — one command, no manual JSON editing:

npx -y @spazio-genesi/attest-mcp-setup

This finds your claude_desktop_config.json (Windows/macOS/Linux), adds the attest-mcp entry, and backs up the original file first. It refuses to touch anything if the existing file isn't valid JSON — it never guesses. Restart Claude Desktop afterwards. To remove it again: add --uninstall. To preview without writing: add --dry-run.

Claude Code:

claude mcp add attest-mcp -- npx -y @spazio-genesi/attest-mcp

Manual / other clients — add this to your MCP client's config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "attest-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@spazio-genesi/attest-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Authentication

Two ways to authenticate, matching the underlying service:

  1. API key (for partner integrations, issued manually by Spazio Genesi): set the IMGAUTH_API_KEY environment variable.

  2. Device flow (for personal/agent use): call the authorize tool with no arguments. It returns a URL — open it, approve with the human-verification widget, then call authorize again with the returned code. The session token (24h, 20 attestations) is saved to ~/.config/attest-mcp/credentials.json (permissions 600 where supported) and used automatically after that.

Either way, the credential only unlocks the anti-bot check on attestation — the server-side timestamp, cryptographic signature, and rate limits are unchanged.

Tools

Tool

What it does

authorize

Start or continue the device-flow authorization.

attest_file

Hash a local file (streamed) and attest it.

get_certificate_pdf

Mint a fresh signed PDF, or recover an already-archived one, saved to disk.

verify_file

Hash a local file and check it against a declared hash + signature.

verify_certificate

Verify a certificate's signature without a local file.

check_anchor

Check/download the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin) proof.

service_status

Traffic-light status of the attestation service.

CLI (sg-attest)

Same package, no separate install. The CLI is a bin alongside the MCP server, sharing the same hashing/API/config code — same full privacy (streamed local hash, file bytes never sent), same credentials.

npx -y -p @spazio-genesi/attest-mcp sg-attest attest ./work.png
npx -y -p @spazio-genesi/attest-mcp sg-attest verify ./work.png --hash <sha256>

(-p is required: sg-attest is a secondary bin of the package, and plain npx -y @spazio-genesi/attest-mcp runs the MCP server instead.)

One advantage over the site: no 1 GB cap. The browser is limited by WebCrypto (which loads the whole file into memory); this CLI streams from disk on Node, so it can attest files of any size.

Command

What it does

Credential

attest <file> [--title --author --year --note] [--pdf <out>]

Hash locally (streamed) → attest → print fingerprint, attestation, HMAC. Nothing is archived and no /c/<hash> page exists without --pdf; only --pdf <out> mints the signed certificate and prints the verification link

Yes

verify <file> [--hash <sha256>]

Hash locally; with --hash, compares (exit 2 if different); also reports archive/anchor status

No

verify-cert --hash --attestazione --hmac [--titolo --autore --anno --note]

Verifies a certificate's HMAC signature, no local file involved

No

cert <hash> [-o <file.pdf>]

Recovers an already-archived certificate

No

anchor <hash> [-o <file.ots>]

Checks/downloads the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin) proof

No

status

Traffic-light status of the service

No

authorize

Device flow: prints a URL to approve, polls, saves the token

—

--version / --help

Version (from package.json) and usage

—

Every command accepts --json (emits one JSON object on stdout, for scripting) and --quiet (reduces non-essential human-readable output). Errors go to stderr; the CLI never prints a credential (API key or session token) to stdout, stderr, or --json output — same discipline as the MCP server.

Exit codes (a stable contract, for CI/scripting):

Code

Meaning

0

Success / positive outcome

1

Operational error (network, auth, bad input)

2

Negative verification outcome (hash mismatch, invalid signature)

Authentication is the same as the MCP server: IMGAUTH_API_KEY env var, or a session token saved by sg-attest authorize (device flow). There is no --key flag — a credential on the command line ends up in shell history; use the env var (or a CI secret) instead.

A GitHub Action that uses this CLI to attest build artifacts in CI lives in a companion repo: attest-action.

Standalone binaries (no Node required)

For a machine or CI runner without Node.js, download a pre-compiled sg-attest executable from the Releases page — same commands, same behavior, nothing to install.

OS

Architecture

File

Linux

x64

sg-attest-linux-x64

Linux

arm64

sg-attest-linux-arm64

macOS

Intel

sg-attest-macos-x64

macOS

Apple Silicon

sg-attest-macos-arm64

Windows

x64

sg-attest-windows-x64.exe

Windows

ARM64

sg-attest-windows-arm64.exe

Each release also includes SHA256SUMS.txt. Verify the download before running it:

sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS.txt --ignore-missing   # Linux/macOS
(Get-FileHash .\sg-attest-windows-x64.exe -Algorithm SHA256).Hash   # compare by eye to SHA256SUMS.txt

⚠️ The binaries are not code-signed: expect an "unknown publisher" warning from Windows SmartScreen or macOS Gatekeeper the first time you run one. The checksum above is the integrity guarantee in the meantime — the binary is built and published by GitHub Actions directly from this repo's source, nothing hand-uploaded.

Usage is identical to the npm-installed CLI, just call the file directly:

chmod +x ./sg-attest-linux-x64          # Linux/macOS only
./sg-attest-linux-x64 attest ./work.png --pdf cert.pdf
./sg-attest-linux-x64 status

npx/npm remain the primary distribution channel (and what attest-action uses in CI) — the binaries are an additional channel, not a replacement.

Build provenance (SLSA/in-toto)

The checksum above answers "is this file intact?" — it says nothing about where the bytes came from. Every release since v0.4.2 also carries a signed build provenance attestation (actions/attest-build-provenance, job release in release-binaries.yml): cryptographic proof that the file was built by this repo's own workflow, from a specific commit and tag, not hand-uploaded or swapped afterward.

The GitHub CLI can verify it, but gh attestation verify requires an authenticated gh session even on this public repo (confirmed: it fails with "please run gh auth login" without one) — a real gap if the point is a check anyone can run with zero setup:

gh attestation verify sg-attest-linux-x64 --repo SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp

scripts/verify-provenance.mjs does the same verification with no GitHub credentials at all — only the public attestations REST endpoint (confirmed reachable unauthenticated, even on this public repo) and the sigstore library, which checks the signature against Sigstore's own public infrastructure (Rekor, Fulcio, TUF — no account needed there either):

git clone https://github.com/SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp
cd attest-mcp && npm install
node scripts/verify-provenance.mjs ./sg-attest-linux-x64 \
  --repo SPAZIO-GENESI/attest-mcp --tag v0.4.2

Exits 0 on success, 1 if the file doesn't match anything the workflow actually built (e.g. a single altered byte makes the digest — and therefore the lookup key itself — no longer match any attestation).

Configuration

Env var

Default

Purpose

IMGAUTH_API_KEY

—

API key credential, bypasses the device flow.

IMGAUTH_BASE_URL

https://imgauth.spaziogenesi.org

Override for local development (http://localhost:8787).

IMGAUTH_CERT_PAGE_BASE

https://attestazione.spaziogenesi.org

Override for the permanent-certificate-page base URL.

Troubleshooting

If your client reports "Server disconnected", check its log first: this server writes diagnostics to stderr, which MCP clients capture. On Claude Desktop the log lives in %APPDATA%\Claude\logs\mcp-server-attest-mcp.log (Windows) or ~/Library/Logs/Claude/mcp-server-attest-mcp.log (macOS).

You should see one line per lifecycle event:

[attest-mcp 2026-07-21T11:14:12.948Z] v0.2.2 ready on stdio (node v22.22.2, pid 32316)
[attest-mcp 2026-07-21T11:14:12.965Z] exiting (code 0)
  • exiting (code 0) — ordinary shutdown: the client closed stdin. After a laptop sleep or a client restart this is expected; just restart the client to reconnect.

  • fatal: … followed by exiting (code 1) — a real crash, with the stack trace on the preceding line. Please open an issue with it.

  • No ready line at all — the process never started: check that node is on PATH and at least v18 (node --version).

stdout carries the JSON-RPC protocol and is never used for logging.

Known limitation

The certificate PDF and its text are in Italian (Spazio Genesi is an Italian non-profit and the certificate is a legal-facing document). The MCP tool descriptions and this README are in English for an international audience.

Development

npm install
npm test          # unit tests (hash vectors, CLI argument parsing)
IMGAUTH_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8787 npm start   # MCP server against a local `wrangler dev`
IMGAUTH_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8787 node src/cli.js status   # CLI against the same

test/cli-smoke.local.mjs is a local-only harness (not run by npm test) that exercises every sg-attest command end-to-end against an isolated wrangler dev imgauth instance — see the header comment in that file for the required env vars.

Security

Report vulnerabilities → /sicurezza/ (responsible disclosure policy, safe harbor for good-faith research) — this repo has no security.txt of its own (npm package, no static assets), but the policy covers the whole project.

Contributing

Bug reports and feature requests: open an issue. Pull requests are welcome — keep them focused (one change per PR), make sure npm test passes, and explain the "why" in the description, not just the "what". Test policy: any PR that adds new functionality should add a test for it under test/; npm run lint and npm test both run in CI on every push and pull request. For anything that touches the attestation contract itself (hashing, HMAC verification, the API surface), open an issue first: this client mirrors a contract owned by imgauth, so changes need to stay compatible with it.

License

MIT — see LICENSE. This is a client for the attestation service; the service itself (imgauth) is AGPL-3.0.

Available Tools

7 tools
attest_fileAttest a fileA

Compute the SHA-256 fingerprint of a local file (streamed, never sent anywhere) and attest it: the server timestamps it and returns a signed attestation. Requires a credential — run 'authorize' first, or set IMGAUTH_API_KEY. Optional declared metadata (titolo/autore/anno/note) is bound to the signature.

Inputs: path (required), anno, note, autore, +1 more.

authorizeAuthorize this agentA

Start or continue the device-flow authorization. Call with no arguments to begin: show the returned verification_url to the human and ask them to open it and approve. Then call again passing the same code, a few seconds apart, until status is 'approved' (token saved automatically) or 'expired' (start over). Grants 20 attestations for 24 hours.

Inputs: code.

check_anchorCheck the Bitcoin anchoring proofB

Check whether a fingerprint has an OpenTimestamps proof, optionally saving the .ots proof file to disk.

Inputs: hash (required), save_to.

get_certificate_pdfGet the certificate PDFA

Get the signed certificate PDF for an attested work, saving it to a local file. Pass attestation (the exact object returned by attest_file) right after attesting, to mint a freshly-signed PDF. Pass only hash to recover an already-archived certificate instead (no credential needed).

Inputs: hash (required), save_to, attestation.

service_statusCheck service statusA

Get the traffic-light status of the attestation service (worker, archive, signer, Bitcoin anchor).

Inputs: no named parameters.

verify_certificateVerify a certificate's signatureA

Verify the HMAC signature of a certificate's attestation (+ declared metadata, if any) without checking against any local file. Confirms authenticity and integrity of the declared data, not that a given file matches.

Inputs: hash (required), hmac (required), attestazione (required), anno, +3 more.

verify_fileVerify a file against a certificateB

Compute the SHA-256 of a local file and check it against a declared hash/attestation, plus verify the HMAC signature server-side (no file bytes are ever sent). Pass the fields as read from the certificate (hash, attestazione, hmac, and any declared titolo/autore/anno/note).

Inputs: path (required), anno, hash, hmac, +4 more.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A3.9/5.0

    Scored across 7 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool serves a distinct purpose: authorization, attestation, verification, certificate retrieval, anchor checking, and service status. No overlap or ambiguity.

    Naming Consistency4/5

    Most tools follow verb_noun pattern (attest_file, check_anchor, get_certificate_pdf, verify_certificate, verify_file), but 'authorize' is a bare verb and 'service_status' is noun_noun, introducing minor inconsistency.

    Tool Count5/5

    Seven tools cover the core workflow without being excessive. The scope is well-defined for an attestation service.

    Completeness4/5

    The set covers authorization, attestation, verification, certificate retrieval, anchor checking, and service status. Missing update/delete for attestations, but those are atypical for immutable attestations.

    Maintenance

    ActivityInactive
    ResponsivenessNo recent community issues

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