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RudrenduPaul

ComputeLedger MCP Server

Verify a compute usage receipt

verify_receipt

Verify a signed ComputeLedger receipt is authentic and untampered, so you can trust its usage data before relying on it; returns valid with a reason if invalid.

Instructions

Independently checks whether a single signed ComputeLedger receipt is authentic and untampered, without needing to trust whoever issued it. Call this whenever you're handed a receipt (from record_usage, computeledger record, or a third party) and need to confirm it's cryptographically valid before trusting the usage numbers inside it. No prerequisites: it needs nothing on local disk beyond the receipt object itself, and does not require the signer's private key.

Side effects: read-only, no ledger writes, no file access beyond the in-memory argument, no network calls. Fully idempotent, the same receipt always verifies the same way. It never raises on an invalid receipt, instead it returns a normal result with is_error=true, so check the 'valid' field rather than relying on an exception.

Parameters: receipt (dict) - the full signed receipt object as produced by record_usage or computeledger record (must include version, hash, signature, and the other receipt fields). Equivalent CLI: computeledger verify receipt.json --json.

Returns {"valid": true} on success, or {"valid": false, "reason": "<invalid_signature|hash_mismatch|unsupported_version|malformed_receipt>"} on failure, so callers can distinguish exactly why a receipt failed.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
receiptYesA signed ComputeLedger receipt object, as produced by record_usage or `computeledger record`
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does an excellent job. It discloses side effects ('read-only, no ledger writes, no file access beyond the in-memory argument, no network calls'), idempotency, and error behavior ('never raises on an invalid receipt, instead returns a normal result with is_error=true'). This far exceeds typical transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured and front-loaded, moving from purpose to usage to side effects to error handling to parameters/returns. Every sentence carries essential information, and the formatting with separate paragraphs improves readability. It is comprehensive without being verbose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given there is no output schema and only one parameter, the description must explain return values and error handling fully. It does so with explicit success/failure shapes and reason codes ('invalid_signature|hash_mismatch|unsupported_version|malformed_receipt'). It also covers prerequisites, side effects, and idempotency, making it complete for a fairly simple but security-relevant tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single receipt parameter, but the description enriches it significantly by specifying 'must include version, hash, signature, and the other receipt fields' and identifying it as the output of record_usage or the CLI. This adds structural expectations beyond the schema's generic object type, making the parameter's usage clearer.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description begins with 'Independently checks whether a single signed ComputeLedger receipt is authentic and untampered' which clearly states a specific verb, resource, and scope. It distinguishes from siblings by focusing on a single receipt, contrasting with verify_ledger's likely whole-ledger scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says 'Call this whenever you're handed a receipt... and need to confirm it's cryptographically valid before trusting the usage numbers inside it.' This gives clear when-to-use context, and it lists sources like record_usage and third-party receipts. However, it doesn't explicitly mention when not to use it or name alternative tools beyond sources, so it lacks full exclusion guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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