iyke_pkg_trust_list

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It describes the output format and implies a read-only operation by listing trust states, but it does not explicitly state it is non-destructive or mention any side effects, authentication needs, or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose, followed by output details and usage guidance. No unnecessary words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description explains the return fields adequately despite lacking an output schema. It does not cover error cases or data format details, but for a simple listing tool, it is sufficiently complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There are zero parameters, so schema coverage is effectively 100%. The description does not need to explain parameters. Baseline for no parameters is 4.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it lists trust state for every installed package and specifies the output fields (state, permissions summary, last grant timestamp). However, it does not explicitly contrast with sibling tools like iyke_pkg_trust_status (which likely checks a single package) or iyke_pkg_list (which lists packages without trust info), so it loses a point for not differentiating.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The second sentence explicitly advises using this tool when surveying which third-party packages need user approval before invoking their MCP tools. This provides clear context. It does not list when not to use it, but for a simple list tool, this is sufficient.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.