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confirm-gate-mcp

Confirm-before-act for MCP. Put it in front of any MCP server. Read tools pass straight through. Every write tool becomes a pending card, and only the user's own tap or voice, on a device they paired, can release it.

The guarantee doesn't depend on a prompt. The agent never holds the one-time nonce or the device key that a confirmation needs, so it can't approve its own action, however it's instructed. A prompt injection can make the agent ask, but it can't make anything happen.

agent ──MCP (bearer token)──▶  confirm-gate  ──▶ upstream MCP server
                                  │  ▲
           nonce + cards ─────────┘  └──── signed evidence (tap / voice)
                              user's paired device  (/approve page or your own app)

60 seconds

pip install "git+https://github.com/Prashant-thakur77/confirm-gate-mcp"
confirm-gate serve --upstream-cmd "uvx mcp-server-time"       # or --upstream http://host:port/mcp

It prints three things:

  • the agent's endpoint, http://127.0.0.1:8800/mcp, with a bearer token;

  • the approval page, http://127.0.0.1:8800/approve;

  • a 6-digit pairing code.

Open the page, enter the code, and point your agent at the endpoint. When the agent calls a write tool, it gets back:

{"status": "pending_user_confirmation", "pending_id": "p_3f…", "preview": ["write_note(name='a', text='hi')"],
 "message": "Waiting for the user to confirm on their device. Nothing has changed yet."}

The card appears on your page, and nothing happens until you approve it there.

Related MCP server: SINT Protocol

In your own server (20 lines)

examples/wrap_any_server.py wraps an in-process server. The same build_app(upstream, …) call accepts any of these:

  • an MCPServer object;

  • a Streamable HTTP URL;

  • StdioServerParameters.

To build the gate into a server you're writing, register tools through GatedServer:

from mcp.server import MCPServer
from confirm_gate import GatedServer, SqliteStore

mcp = MCPServer("home")
gs = GatedServer(mcp, store=SqliteStore("gate.db"))

@gs.read()
def door_status() -> dict:
    """Is the front door locked?"""
    return {"locked": True}

@gs.write(risk=lambda a: "low" if a["locked"] else "high",
          preview=lambda a: "Lock the front door" if a["locked"] else "Unlock the front door")
def door_lock(locked: bool) -> dict:
    """Lock or unlock the front door."""
    ...  # runs only after the user confirms

Then mount confirm_gate.device_routes(gs.gate, gs.devices, transcribe=...) next to /mcp for your device app.

What confirm checks

Anyone may call confirm(pending_id, evidence_ref), the agent included. It executes only if every check passes, and each check is listed by name in the receipt:

check

refuses

user_evidence_exists

no evidence, a made-up id, "the user said yes"

evidence_is_for_this_card_set

evidence from another card set

from_a_paired_device

an unknown or revoked device, or another user's device

card_set_still_open

a second confirm of the same set (replay)

card_set_not_expired, evidence_not_expired

stale cards (120 s; 60 s for the second yes)

evidence_not_used

evidence used before

user_words_choose_a_card

"no", "not two", "um", or a number on a yes/no card

action_unchanged_since_shown

arguments that changed after the user chose

nonce_consumed_once

racing confirms: exactly one wins (atomic in every store)

The device channel adds its own protections:

  • Every request is HMAC-signed with the device key.

  • Each signature is accepted once, inside a ±60 s window.

  • Pairing codes are one-time, valid for 10 minutes, and lock after 5 wrong tries.

  • A voice recording's fingerprint can't be used twice.

  • High-risk actions need a second, separately nonced yes.

Voice

Voice evidence is audio. The server transcribes it with your recogniser, so the words come from the user's own recording, never from the model's account of what they said. confirm_gate.consent.decide turns the words into a decision:

  • Picks a card: "two", "the second one", "number 2", "option three". In Hinglish: "doosra", "do number", "teen number", "दो नंबर".

  • Confirms the final card: "yes", "haan", "theek hai".

  • Cancels: "no", "cancel", "nahin", "mat karo".

  • Refused: everything else, including a bare "do", "not two", "yes no", or a sound-alike such as "to".

Stores

  • MemoryStore: tests and single process.

  • SqliteStore: one file, safe across threads and processes.

  • DynamoStore: one on-demand table, conditional writes for one-time use.

All three give the same put_if_absent / set_once guarantees, and the same 216 tests run against each.

Receipts

Every executed write leaves a receipt with:

  • who confirmed (user and device);

  • what ran (action, arguments, and the card text shown);

  • when it was proposed, confirmed and executed;

  • how it was confirmed: tap or voice, the server's transcript, and the audio fingerprint;

  • every check, by name.

receipt.verify_fingerprint(r) detects a receipt edited after it was issued.

License

MIT

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