fenrir-mcp
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fenrir-mcp
MCP server. Wraps DFIR-FENRIR v2 REST API. Talks to Claude Code over stdio. Python. stdio only. No listening port.
HOW-TO — first run
Do once. Replace https://HOST with your FENRIR browser URL. VPN up.
# 1. get code + deps
git clone <repo> dfir-fenrir-mcp
cd dfir-fenrir-mcp
uv sync
# 2. get the internal CA onto this machine
scp deploy-host:/path/dfir-fenrir-v2/certs/ca.crt ~/ca.crt
# 3. verify the CA matches the live server (expect: {"needs_setup":false})
curl --cacert ~/ca.crt https://HOST/api/auth/setup-check
# 4. write deployment config
mkdir -p ~/.config/fenrir-mcp && chmod 700 ~/.config/fenrir-mcp
printf 'FENRIR_URL=https://HOST\nFENRIR_CA_CERT=%s/ca.crt\n' "$HOME" > ~/.config/fenrir-mcp/env
chmod 600 ~/.config/fenrir-mcp/env
# 5. mint a token (asks user + pass + TOTP, then role cap: analyst for standard)
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp login
# 6. register with Claude Code (run from the project dir you want the tools in)
claude mcp add-json fenrir '{"type":"stdio","command":"'"$PWD"'/.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp","env":{"FENRIR_MCP_MODE":"standard","FENRIR_MCP_UPLOAD_DIRS":"'"$HOME"'/cases"}}'Or skip 4–6: run ./install.sh (prompts for all of it, can fetch+pin the CA).
Verify: start claude, run /mcp → fenrir ✔ connected, ask run fenrir_whoami.
Related MCP server: SIFTAgent
HOW-TO — operate
# start of day: mint fresh 8 h token
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp login
# check state any time
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp status # user, token role, mode, live server check
# work: in Claude Code, plain language. examples:
# "triage INC-0006" (loads the SOC skill)
# "list open critical incidents"
# "analyze ~/cases/x.eml into INC-0006 and promote the IOCs"
# "verify the custody chain on INC-0006"
# "write up findings and close INC-0006"
# end of day: revoke
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp logout401 from a tool = token expired. Re-run
login. Nothing in-session fixes it.403 on a write = token cap too low for the mode. Re-
login, pick a higher cap.Change mode/upload dirs = edit the
.mcp.jsonregistration, restartclaude.New server code (git pull) = restart
claude(editable install, no reinstall).
What
52 tools over the FENRIR API. Mode-tiered: readonly 22, standard +25, full +5.
51 curated tools + 1 escape hatch (
fenrir_api, OpenAPI-validated).Auth = FENRIR bearer token. Minted by CLI after password + TOTP. 8 h TTL.
Read incidents/timeline/IOCs/entities/evidence. Write findings. Upload .eml/pcap/artifacts. Run analyses. Manage CoC. Close incidents.
Requires
Python >= 3.12
uv
claude CLI
Network path to FENRIR (VPN)
FENRIR internal CA file (
certs/ca.crton the deployment host)
Install
git clone <repo> dfir-fenrir-mcp
cd dfir-fenrir-mcp
./install.sh # prompts: URL, CA, mode, upload dirs, register, skillManual:
uv sync
mkdir -p ~/.config/fenrir-mcp && chmod 700 ~/.config/fenrir-mcp
printf 'FENRIR_URL=https://HOST\nFENRIR_CA_CERT=/abs/ca.crt\n' > ~/.config/fenrir-mcp/env
chmod 600 ~/.config/fenrir-mcp/env
claude mcp add-json fenrir '{"type":"stdio","command":"/abs/dfir-fenrir-mcp/.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp","env":{"FENRIR_MCP_MODE":"standard"}}'Use add-json, not flag-form add (mis-parses -e).
Auth
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp login # user + pass + TOTP, then pick role cap
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp status # token meta + live check
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp logout # revoke server-side + wipe local
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp tokens list # your FENRIR API tokens (never values)
.venv/bin/fenrir-mcp tokens revoke <id> # revoke one of your tokensToken role cap chosen at login. Never above your FENRIR account role.
Effective role per request = min(account role, token cap). Enforced by FENRIR.
Token stored in OS keyring, else 0600 file. Never in env, never in repo.
8 h client TTL. Re-login daily. 401 = expired.
Config
Env vars, or ~/.config/fenrir-mcp/env (KEY=VALUE). Real env wins.
var | req | meaning |
| yes | https base URL |
| rec | internal CA path; becomes only trust anchor |
| no | readonly (default) / standard / full |
| uploads | colon-sep allowlist; unset = uploads off |
| no | 1 = refuse 0600-file token fallback |
| no | 0 = raw responses (default strips null/empty) |
URL + CA = deployment facts, put in env file. Mode + upload dirs = per-project,
put in the .mcp.json registration.
Mode vs role
mode | tools | needs token cap |
readonly | reads | viewer |
standard | + writes, uploads | analyst |
full | + deletes, admin | analyst (admin tools need admin) |
Tools above the mode are not registered. GUI admin != token cap. Writes 403 = token cap too low; re-login higher.
Security rules (enforced in code)
Bytes flow toward FENRIR only. No evidence/export/photo/report bytes to disk. Hard denylist, curated + escape hatch, every mode. Text exports inline only.
MCP never mints tokens.
POST /api/tokensdenylisted. Login CLI only. FENRIR itself refuses a token create made with a Bearer token (403token_create_requires_session);loginmints on its password + TOTP session./api/auth/*denylisted.Principle (owner, 2026-10-07): through the MCP the model never receives a secret and never grants access; reducing/restoring access and reads stay. Not offered by the curated tools, and refused on every path (shared hard denylist, curated +
fenrir_api): user create, role/active/TOTP update, password reset, SIEM key generate, service-key set, SMTP/webhook/syslog config writes, team-member adds. Kept: unlock, session revoke, user delete, member remove, key deletes, config reads (backend redacts their secrets). Use the FENRIR GUI for the rest.fenrir_apirefuses all credential management, every verb:/api/tokens*,/api/admin/tokens*, sessions, user create/update/delete, password reset, unlock, SIEM key, service-key writes. Path decoded + case/..///normalised first (query/fragment cut before decoding, so%3F/%23hide nothing). Use the GUI orfenrir-mcp tokens list|revoke(docs/TOOLS.md).TLS 1.3 floor. Pinned CA. verify never off. Redirects off. (Pinned-CA path relaxes RFC 5280 strict-format check only — generate-certs.sh CAs lack keyUsage; chain + hostname still verified. System-store stays strict.)
Uploads only from
FENRIR_MCP_UPLOAD_DIRS. Path checked, no traversal out.Expensive calls (enrich-all, feed pull, reports, analyses) serialized, semaphore 1. FENRIR backend is single-worker.
Destructive ops in one tool (
fenrir_delete, full mode). Dispose needsconfirm=true.
Token efficiency
Responses slimmed (null/empty dropped).
FENRIR_MCP_SLIM=0disables.List tools take
fields=[...]andlimit. Pass them.incident_idacceptsINC-####ref or UUID. Ref→UUID map cached at~/.config/fenrir-mcp/refcache.json.readonly mode = 22 schemas loaded, not 52.
Skill
.claude/skills/fenrir-soc-analyst/ ships in the repo. SOC triage methodology
playbooks + token discipline. Loads only when triage work starts. Installer symlinks it to
~/.claude/skills/.
Layout
src/fenrir_mcp/
__main__.py entry: serve (default) | login | logout | status | tokens list|revoke
server.py MCPServer, tier-gated registration, startup checks
config.py env + env-file + upload allowlist
client.py httpx: TLS, bearer, errors, slim, ref-rewrite, semaphore
token_store.py keyring -> 0600 file
cli.py login / logout / status / tokens list|revoke
denylist.py single-source hard denylist + byte-drift scan
openapi_guard.py escape-hatch spec validation
refcache.py INC-ref -> UUID memory
tools/ 15 modules, @tool(tier) registry
tests/ 40 testsDev
uv run pytest # 35 tests: denylist, tiering, guard, uploads, tls, env, efficiencyCompromise response
fenrir-mcp logout. Or revoke elsewhere: fenrir-mcp tokens revoke <id>, GUI
Settings > Account > API tokens, admin GUI Admin > API Tokens or /api/admin/tokens. Audit filters on token prefix claude-mcp. Blast radius =
8 h TTL x role cap x VPN reach.
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