Checks up to 100 CVE IDs against a freshly fetched CISA KEV catalog to show which are known exploited; absence is not proof of no exploitation.
Check up to 100 CVEs against a freshly fetched CISA KEV catalog. Absence is not proof of no exploitation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_ids | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v0.1.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, openWorld, and non-destructive, so safety is covered. The description adds genuinely useful behavioral context beyond that: the catalog is 'freshly fetched' (a live network lookup with current data) and an empty result is explicitly not proof of no exploitation. It does not describe return shape, but an output schema exists to cover that.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, with the core action front-loaded and the interpretive caveat second. No filler, no repetition of schema details beyond the count limit.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a low-complexity, single-parameter lookup with an output schema and full safety annotations, the definition covers purpose, data freshness, and the key negative-result caveat. The one meaningful omission is guidance on when to reach for this tool versus the other vulnerability-data siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There is one required parameter with 0% schema description coverage, so the description could compensate more. It confirms the parameter is a list of CVEs capped at 100, but that cap is already enforced by schema maxItems and the CVE-ID format is only expressed in the schema pattern, not in prose.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (check) and a specific resource (CISA KEV catalog) with a scope limit (up to 100 CVEs). Naming the CISA KEV catalog uniquely distinguishes it from sibling tools like nvd_cve, osv_query, and epss, which cover different vulnerability data sources.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description says what the tool does but never says when to use it instead of nvd_cve, osv_vuln, or epss, nor when not to use it. 'Absence is not proof of no exploitation' is a result caveat, not usage guidance, so the agent must infer routing from the name alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.