pdfnative-mcp

Encrypt / re-secure a PDF

encrypt_pdf

Encrypt an existing PDF with AES-128 or AES-256, set owner/user passwords and permissions, and rotate passwords on already-encrypted files.

Instructions

Encrypt an existing PDF with the Standard Security Handler: AES-128 (default) or AES-256; RC4 is never emitted. ownerPassword required; optional userPassword (open password), permissions { print, copy, modify, extractText }. Rotate the password of an already-encrypted source by passing its current password. CAVEAT: the page tree is rebuilt — signatures and AcroForm are DROPPED, only URI links kept; encrypt BEFORE signing. Never cached.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`password`	No	Current password of an already-encrypted source (enables password rotation). Omit for an unencrypted source.
`algorithm`	No	aes128 (V4/R4, widest compatibility) or aes256 (V5/R6).	aes128
`pdfBase64`	Yes	Base64-encoded source PDF to encrypt. NOTE: existing signatures and AcroForm are dropped (page-tree rebuild).
`outputMode`	No	'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured).	base64
`outputPath`	No	Required when outputMode='file'. Relative path inside the sandbox; must end with .pdf.
`permissions`	No	Permission flags; each defaults to allowed.
`userPassword`	No	Open password; omitted/empty = opens without a prompt.
`ownerPassword`	Yes	Owner password (full access).

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`url`	No	Public URL of the file (file mode, only when PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_BASE_URL is set): base URL + sandbox-relative path, percent-encoded.
`mode`	Yes
`summary`	No	Tool-specific summary, when produced.
`filePath`	No	Sandboxed absolute path (file mode).
`sizeBytes`	Yes
`diagnostics`	No	Engine diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedv1.8.0Nov 3, 2026

changedOutput schema / description

Previous value: -"Result of a PDF-producing tool. base64 mode: the PDF arrives as an embedded `resource` content block (not duplicated here); file mode: `filePath`."New value: +"Result of a PDF-producing tool. base64 mode: the PDF arrives as an embedded `resource` content block (not duplicated here); file mode: `filePath` (and `url` when the operator maps the sandbox to a public base URL)."

addedOutput schema / properties / url

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Public URL of the file (file mode, only when PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_BASE_URL is set): base URL + sandbox-relative path, percent-encoded.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedv1.6.2Sep 27, 2026

changedOutput schema / properties / diagnostics / description

Previous value: -"PDF/A diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true)."New value: +"Engine diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true)."

Changed9 schema fields changedAug 24, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / algorithm / description

Previous value: -"Content cipher: aes128 (V4/R4, widest compatibility) or aes256 (V5/R6, strongest)."New value: +"aes128 (V4/R4, widest compatibility) or aes256 (V5/R6)."

addedInput schema / properties / outputMode / description

Added value: +"'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured)."

changedInput schema / properties / ownerPassword / description

Previous value: -"Owner password (required, non-empty). Controls permissions and full access."New value: +"Owner password (full access)."

changedInput schema / properties / permissions / description

Previous value: -"Access permission flags (enforced by conforming readers). Each defaults to allowed when omitted."New value: +"Permission flags; each defaults to allowed."

changedInput schema / properties / userPassword / description

Previous value: -"User (open) password. Omitted or empty string means the document opens without a password prompt."New value: +"Open password; omitted/empty = opens without a prompt."

changedOutput schema / description

Previous value: -"Structured result of a PDF-producing tool. In base64 mode the PDF bytes are delivered out-of-band as an embedded `resource` content block (data: URI), NOT duplicated here, to keep responses token-frugal. In file mode `filePath` is the sandboxed absolute path."New value: +"Result of a PDF-producing tool. base64 mode: the PDF arrives as an embedded `resource` content block (not duplicated here); file mode: `filePath`."

addedOutput schema / properties / diagnostics

Added value: +{
+  "description": "PDF/A diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true).",
+  "items": {
+    "additionalProperties": false,
+    "properties": {
+      "code": {
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "message": {
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "severity": {
+        "enum": [
+          "warning"
+        ],
+        "type": "string"
+      }
+    },
+    "required": [
+      "code",
+      "message",
+      "severity"
+    ],
+    "type": "object"
+  },
+  "type": "array"
+}

changedOutput schema / properties / filePath / description

Previous value: -"Absolute sandboxed file path (when mode='file')."New value: +"Sandboxed absolute path (file mode)."

addedOutput schema / properties / summary

Added value: +{
+  "additionalProperties": true,
+  "description": "Tool-specific summary, when produced.",
+  "type": "object"
+}

Addedv1.6.0Jul 22, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the lossy side effect — the page tree is rebuilt, signatures and AcroForm are dropped, only URI links survive — plus that the result is never cached and RC4 is never emitted. This is exactly the pre-call warning an agent needs, since destructiveHint=false alone would not prepare it for losing signatures and form fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but front-loaded: the operation and algorithm come first, then required/optional credentials, then the destructive caveat in a clearly labeled CAVEAT clause. Nearly every clause carries information; only the permissions enumeration lightly duplicates the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter tool with a nested permissions object and an output schema, the description covers the operation, credential model, security caveat, and ordering constraint against signing. Output routing (base64 vs sandboxed file) is left entirely to the schema, which is acceptable given outputMode/outputPath are fully described there.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents every parameter, including the password-rotation meaning and the AES variants. The description mostly restates that structure (ownerPassword required, userPassword optional, permission flag list) rather than adding syntax or edge-case meaning, so the baseline applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Encrypt an existing PDF") plus the exact handler family (Standard Security Handler) and the algorithm set it can and cannot emit. Its scope is also delineated against the closest siblings: password rotation covers the encrypted-source case that otherwise belongs to decrypt_pdf, and "encrypt BEFORE signing" positions it relative to sign_pdf.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear when-to-use conditions: pass `password` to rotate an already-encrypted source, omit it for a plain source, and encrypt before signing. It does not explicitly name decrypt_pdf as the alternative for removing protection, so the exclusion is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.