NEL VEIL MCP
This server gives MCP-compatible AI agents free, no-signup tools for assessing a domain's public security posture, each returning a 0–100 score plus actionable findings.
check_email_spoofing— check if a domain can be impersonated in email via DMARC/SPF/DKIM.check_tls— get a TLS strength assessment and known weaknesses via Qualys SSL Labs (active third-party check).check_security_headers— check for protective HTTP security headers like CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options.check_exposed_files— check a fixed list of sensitive paths like.envand.git/configfor public exposure.check_subdomain_takeover— detect dangling DNS records that could allow subdomain hijacking.scan_domain— run an all-in-one passive security posture scan covering email, TLS, headers, exposed files, subdomain takeover, admin panels, and more.get_scan_report— retrieve results of an existing NEL VEIL scan by itsscn_…id.
All tools are read-only and avoid port scanning or exploit testing; some make ordinary HTTP requests or trigger Qualys SSL Labs assessment, so they are best used on domains you own or are authorised to test.
Uses Qualys SSL Labs to perform TLS security assessments, returning grades and known weaknesses for a domain.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@NEL VEIL MCP Can you check if my domain example.com is vulnerable to email spoofing?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
NEL VEIL MCP — free domain security checks for AI agents
Ask your agent "can someone spoof email from example.com?" and get a real answer in about ten seconds.
NEL VEIL MCP gives any MCP-compatible agent nine tools for checking a domain's public security posture: email spoofing (DMARC/SPF/DKIM), TLS weaknesses, HTTP security headers, publicly exposed files, subdomain-takeover risk, a combined scan, retrieval of an earlier scan, and compliance readiness against a register of 102 global frameworks.
Free. No API key. No signup.
Install
Claude Code — one command:
claude mcp add nel-veil -- npx -y nel-veil-mcpAny MCP client — add this to your config file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"nel-veil": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "nel-veil-mcp"]
}
}
}Run it directly, to check it works:
npx -y nel-veil-mcpIt prints a ready line to stderr — something like nel-veil-mcp 0.2.1 ready — 9 tools, free passive tier. — and then waits for JSON-RPC on stdin. That is correct: it is a stdio server, not a CLI, and stdout carries the protocol, so nothing else is ever written there.
Requires Node 18 or newer.
Related MCP server: Dechonet MCP
30 seconds: is your domain spoofable?
After installing, ask your agent:
Check if example.com can be email-spoofed.
It calls check_email_spoofing. Real output for example.com at the time of writing:
Check if a domain can be email-spoofed — example.com
Score: 100/100 (done)
2 findings:
[LOW] DMARC has no reporting address (rua/ruf), you have no visibility into spoofing
[LOW] DKIM key may be 1024-bit (weak), 2048-bit recommended
Free check, built from public information. No port scanning and no exploit testing —
though some checks (well-known path requests, admin-panel reachability) do more than
passive reading; see nelprofessional.com/mcp. Active scanning requires verified domain
ownership and runs only at nelprofessional.com.
More: https://www.nelprofessional.com/mcpThat domain is in good shape. The finding people are most often surprised by is a DMARC policy of p=none — it looks configured, monitors everything, and blocks nothing.
Tools
Tool | Answers |
| Can someone send email that appears to come from this domain? (DMARC/SPF/DKIM) |
| Is this domain's certificate valid, trusted and not about to expire — and is the connection still negotiating a deprecated TLS version? |
| Does this site send the headers that protect visitors in the browser? |
| Is this domain publicly serving files it should not be? |
| Are there DNS records pointing at services someone else could claim? |
| All of the above at once, with a per-module score. |
| Retrieve a scan already run at nelprofessional.com, by its |
| Which laws and standards can this be checked against — and which can it not? |
| What do these findings suggest about alignment with GDPR, NIS2, PIPEDA, CCPA, ISO 27001, SOC 2 and 96 more? |
Each returns a 0–100 score plus specific findings you can act on.
Compliance
check_compliance maps one passive scan onto a register of 102 frameworks
across Canada, the United States, the EU/EEA, the United Kingdom, Asia-Pacific,
Africa and the global standards — citing the specific provision each finding
bears on.
Read the coverage field before repeating a score. Every framework reports
how many of the scan categories it relies on were actually observed, as 9/16:
A framework whose relevant checks did not run has a null score and the tier "Not assessed", with a reason. That is unknown, not clean.
A clean result over fewer than half a framework's categories is "Partial", not "Strong".
26 of the 102 are "Not assessable" — an anti-money-laundering regime, a consumer-protection statute, a criminal offences provision or a securities disclosure rule imposes no technical safeguard an external scan could ever evidence. They are listed and explained, never scored.
These are indicative readiness signals from public-surface evidence. They are not an audit, not a certification and not legal advice, and every framework also carries a note on what it requires that no external scan can see — consent records, impact assessments, retention schedules, vendor agreements, board governance.
What this sends — stated plainly
Being precise here matters more than sounding safe, because this is the paragraph you rely on when deciding whether you may point a tool at someone else's domain.
No tool here does port scanning or exploit testing. Those are genuinely intrusive, they need the domain owner's permission, and they are deliberately not exposed over MCP at all.
But "passive" is not the same as "invisible", and several of these tools do more than read public records:
check_tlsconnects to the domain, but only as a browser would. It makes one ordinary TLS handshake to port 443, from NEL's own infrastructure, and reads what the server presents: certificate issuer and subject, the validity window and how many days remain, the subject alternative names, and the negotiated protocol and cipher. Nothing else is contacted, and no third party is asked to test the target. It reports an expired certificate, one expiring within 14 or 30 days, a self-signed certificate, an untrusted chain, a certificate that does not cover the hostname, and a connection negotiated over TLS 1.0 or 1.1. What one handshake cannot tell you: it shows what the server chose for that connection, not everything the server would accept. It does not enumerate supported cipher suites, does not test for Heartbleed, POODLE, DROWN or RC4 support, and produces no letter grade. Those need the deep assessment described below.check_subdomain_takeoveris not DNS-only. It resolves a small fixed list of common subdomain names and makes one HTTPS request to any that point at a known cloud host. It never claims or modifies anything.check_exposed_filesrequests a small fixed list of well-known paths (.env,.git/configand similar). It never brute-forces or fuzzes — the list does not grow or adapt — but these are paths a crawler would not request, so they are recognisable in a target's logs as a security check.scan_domainruns all of the above, and additionally checks whether common admin panels (/phpmyadmin/,/manager/html) are publicly reachable.
Everything above is information the domain publishes. None of it attacks anything. But it is more than ordinary crawling, so prefer running it against a domain you own or are authorised to assess.
Active scanning — port exposure, API probing, proof-of-concept checks, and the deep TLS assessment (tls_labs) that produces the Qualys SSL Labs grade along with the Heartbleed, POODLE, DROWN and RC4 tests — lives at nelprofessional.com, behind DNS-TXT proof that you control the domain. None of it is reachable from this MCP server. That is the right place for it, because a human proves ownership once and NEL can stand behind the result.
Rate limits. Ten single checks and three full scans per minute, per IP address. If you hit it, wait a minute.
Privacy. This package sends no API key, no email address, and no account identifier. Each request carries the domain you asked about and a nel-veil-mcp user-agent. Note that, like any HTTP service, NEL sees the IP the request came from — it is what the rate limit is keyed on.
Configuration
Variable | Default | Purpose |
|
| Point at a self-hosted NEL backend. Only needed for local development. |
Development
These steps need the git repository, not the published npm package — the tarball ships only dist/, so src/ and scripts/ are not in it.
git clone https://github.com/NELPROINC/nel-veil-mcp.git
cd nel-veil-mcp
npm install
npm run build
node scripts/mcp-smoke.mjs example.comscripts/mcp-smoke.mjs launches the built server exactly as npx would, performs the MCP handshake, lists the tools and calls one for real — so it catches transport and schema problems a unit test would not.
About NEL VEIL
NEL VEIL is the security scanner behind NEL Professional, a marketplace connecting organisations with verified cybersecurity professionals. The same modules that power this MCP server power the scans on the site.
Full documentation: nelprofessional.com/mcp
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Available Tools
7 toolscheck_email_spoofingCheck if a domain can be email-spoofedARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: can someone send email that appears to come from this domain? Checks the published SPF, DKIM and DMARC DNS records — whether DMARC exists, whether its policy actually blocks spoofed mail (p=none only monitors, it does not stop anything), whether SPF is present and not overly permissive, and whether the records are syntactically valid. Returns a 0-100 score plus specific findings, each tied to the record it came from, so the exact problem can be quoted. This is a free check that uses public information: DNS records and ordinary HTTP requests. It does no port scanning and no exploit testing. Use this for any question about email spoofing, phishing impersonation, DMARC/SPF/DKIM setup, or whether an email domain is protected. For a broader picture covering TLS, headers and exposed files too, use scan_domain instead.
Inputs: domain (required).
check_exposed_filesCheck a domain for publicly exposed sensitive filesARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: is this domain publicly serving files it should not be? Requests a small, fixed list of well-known sensitive paths — things like .env, .git/config, backup archives and exposed configuration — and reports which return real content rather than a 404. Returns a 0-100 score plus a finding per exposed path. How it works, stated plainly: it makes ordinary GET requests for a small FIXED list of well-known paths. It does not brute-force, fuzz, or enumerate — the list never grows and never adapts to what it finds. Note that these are paths an ordinary crawler would not request (.env, .git/config), so the requests are recognisable in a target's logs as a security check rather than routine crawling. This is a free check that uses public information: DNS records and ordinary HTTP requests. It does no port scanning and no exploit testing. Use this for leaked secrets, exposed configuration, or accidentally published files. It does not discover subdomains.
Inputs: domain (required).
check_security_headersCheck a domain's HTTP security headersARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: does this site send the HTTP response headers that protect visitors in the browser? Checks for Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors, Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy — whether each is present and whether its value is actually protective rather than nominal. Returns a 0-100 score plus a finding per header explaining what a missing or weak value exposes. This is a free check that uses public information: DNS records and ordinary HTTP requests. It does no port scanning and no exploit testing. Use this for clickjacking, XSS mitigation, CSP or HSTS questions. It does not check the TLS certificate itself — use check_tls for that.
Inputs: domain (required).
check_subdomain_takeoverCheck a domain for subdomain-takeover riskARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: does this domain have DNS records pointing at services someone else could claim? Inspects published DNS records for dangling CNAMEs — entries still pointing at a de-provisioned cloud or SaaS host (an unclaimed bucket, an expired app instance) that an attacker could register and then serve content from a hostname users already trust. Returns a 0-100 score plus a finding per at-risk record, naming the record and the service it points to. How it works, stated plainly: it resolves a small fixed list of common subdomain names (www, mail, dev, staging and similar) and, for any that resolve to a known cloud or SaaS host, makes one ordinary HTTPS GET to check for that provider's unclaimed-resource page. So it is not DNS-only — it does send a small number of HTTP requests to subdomains of the target. It never registers, claims, or modifies anything. This is a free check that uses public information: DNS records and ordinary HTTP requests. It does no port scanning and no exploit testing. Use this for dangling DNS, abandoned cloud resources, or subdomain hijacking risk.
Inputs: domain (required).
check_tlsCheck a domain's HTTPS/TLS configurationARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: does this domain's TLS configuration have known weaknesses? Returns the Qualys SSL Labs assessment grade for the host, plus findings for specific known problems when present: Heartbleed, POODLE, RC4 support, deprecated protocol versions, missing forward secrecy, and certificate chain issues. IMPORTANT — this one is NOT passive. It queries Qualys SSL Labs, which performs an ACTIVE assessment of the target from Qualys's own infrastructure (reusing a recent cached result when Qualys has one). NEL sends no probe itself, but running this does cause the target to be actively tested by a third party. Prefer it for a domain you own or are authorised to test. It is free, and it does no port scanning and no exploit testing of its own. It does NOT report certificate expiry dates, the issuer, or hostname validity — if you need those, read the certificate directly. It also does not check HTTP security headers — use check_security_headers for those.
Inputs: domain (required).
get_scan_reportRetrieve a previously run NEL VEIL scan by its idARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: what did an earlier NEL VEIL scan find? Fetches the stored results of a scan already run at nelprofessional.com, by its scan id (the scn_... identifier shown on the scan page and in its shareable report link). Returns the saved findings and score for that scan. Use this to pull a scan someone already ran on the website into the conversation — to summarise it, compare it against a later scan, or turn it into a remediation plan. It cannot start a new scan: use scan_domain for that. It only reads scans that exist and are publicly retrievable by id.
Inputs: scan_id (required).
scan_domainRun a full passive security posture scan of a domainARead-onlyIdempotent
Answers: what is this domain's overall security posture? Runs every passive NEL VEIL module in one pass — DNS, email authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC), TLS, HTTP security headers, cookies, CORS, exposed files, subdomain-takeover risk, technology fingerprinting, breach exposure, domain reputation, cloud misconfiguration and JavaScript supply chain — and returns findings from all of them with a per-module score. Use this when the question is broad: how secure is this domain, review this vendor, what should we fix first. For a single specific question prefer the narrower tool — check_email_spoofing, check_tls, check_security_headers, check_exposed_files or check_subdomain_takeover — which is faster and easier to read. It is free. What it actually sends, stated plainly, because "passive" means different things to different people. It performs NO port scanning and NO exploit testing. It DOES: request a fixed list of well-known paths, including common admin panels such as /phpmyadmin/ and /manager/html, to report whether they are publicly reachable; resolve a small fixed list of common subdomain names and make one HTTPS request to any that point at a known cloud host; and query Qualys SSL Labs, which performs its own ACTIVE TLS assessment of the target from Qualys's infrastructure. None of that is intrusive in the sense of attacking anything, and all of it is information the domain publishes — but it is more than a crawler does, and it is recognisable in the target's logs as a security scan. Prefer running it against a domain you own or are authorised to assess. Active scanning (port scans, API probing, proof-of-concept exploit checks) is deliberately not available through this MCP server; it requires proving control of the domain and runs only at nelprofessional.com.
Inputs: domain (required).
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Each check_* tool targets a distinct security aspect (email spoofing, TLS, headers, exposed files, subdomain takeover) with no overlap. scan_domain explicitly aggregates all passive checks and directs users to narrow tools for specific questions, while get_scan_report handles historical retrieval—all clearly differentiated.
All tools follow a consistent verb_noun snake_case pattern: check_* for individual checks, scan_domain for the full scan, and get_scan_report for retrieval. The naming is uniform and predictable, making tool selection obvious.
With 7 tools, the server is well-scoped for a domain security scanner: five focused checks, one aggregate scan, and one report fetcher. Each tool earns its place without redundancy or bloat, fitting neatly within the ideal 3-15 range.
The tool surface covers the core lifecycle of domain security scanning: specific checks for common vulnerabilities, a full scan combining all modules, and retrieval of past scans. No obvious dead ends or missing operations exist within the stated passive-scanning scope.
Maintenance
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