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MichaelEnny

healthsec-mcp

by MichaelEnny

compute_sps

Evaluate clinical AI models by computing a Security Posture Score from adversarial robustness, threat mitigation, audit completeness, and compliance inputs.

Instructions

Compose the Security Posture Score from four dimension inputs.

    `auroc_drop` should be the WORST-CASE drop across all adversarial
    attack runs performed (max, not mean, across FGSM/boundary and
    any datasets evaluated) -- that's what the validated weighting
    was calibrated against. `compliance_score` is a fraction (0-1),
    e.g. `score_compliance`'s `overall_pct` divided by 100.

    Returns the composite SPS (0-100), a deployment recommendation
    tier, and each dimension's subscore/weight/contribution for a
    transparent breakdown.
    

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
auroc_dropYes
threat_totalYes
threat_passedYes
threat_testedYes
threat_partialYes
compliance_scoreYes
threat_mitigatedYes
rbac_enforcement_rateYes
audit_completeness_rateYes
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must disclose behaviors. It explains the return value (composite SPS 0-100, deployment recommendation tier, subscore breakdown) and clarifies input meanings (auroc_drop worst-case, compliance_score fraction). However, it omits side effects, idempotency, or state changes, and does not mention authorizations or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is relatively concise with two paragraphs, front-loaded with the main purpose. It includes necessary detail about auroc_drop and output but could be more structured (e.g., using bullet points) for clarity. Every sentence adds value, though some redundancy exists.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 9 required parameters, no output schema, and no annotations, the description is incomplete. It explains the composite output concept but lacks detailed descriptions of most input parameters, output structure, validation rules, or handling of edge cases. More context is needed for reliable agent invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, requiring the description to explain all 9 parameters. Only auroc_drop and compliance_score are described with specific meaning and constraints. The other 7 parameters (threat_tested, threat_passed, etc.) are merely named in the schema with type but not explained, leaving significant gaps.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool composes the Security Posture Score from four dimension inputs, listing specific inputs like auroc_drop, threat metrics, audit completeness, etc. It distinguishes from sibling tools by being the composite calculator, contrasting with individual assessment tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage when all dimension inputs are available but provides no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like assess_attack_coverage or score_compliance. It instructs on the proper format for auroc_drop and compliance_score but lacks when-not-to-use or prerequisite context.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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