io.github.Michael-Drake/rentctl
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@io.github.Michael-Drake/rentctlstart a dev environment for myapp and give me the URL"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
rentctl
A dev server should never outlive the work that needed it.
rentctl rents dev environments to your AI coding sessions. Every environment is a
lease: it dies when the session ends, when the lease expires, or when you say so —
whichever comes first. Cleanup is owned by code, not by an agent remembering to clean up.
Ships as both a CLI (rent) and an MCP server, so an agent can start and stop
environments through tools instead of shelling out to a raw npm run dev it will forget
about.
Why
An AI coding session starts a dev server. Then the session ends — crashes, is closed, or just moves on — and the server keeps running. By Friday there are six of them, three are on ports you've forgotten, and one is quietly serving stale code that makes a bug look unreproducible.
Telling the agent to clean up doesn't fix this, because the failure mode is the agent
not doing what it was told. rentctl makes the cleanup structural: the environment has an
expiry, and something other than the agent enforces it.
Related MCP server: @reachpad/mcp
Install
uv tool install rentctl # or: pipx install rentctl, or: pip install rentctlRequires Python 3.12+. macOS and Linux. There is no Windows support and no Windows claim — POSIX sessions are the safety-critical mechanism here, and they have no tested Windows equivalent yet.
Upgrading from 1.0.x? Drain first. Run rent down --all in each project before you
upgrade, then restart your agent sessions so their MCP servers load the new version.
Skipping it is safe but degraded: a 1.0.x environment keeps working under 1.1 — rent up renews it, and rent down and rent sweep stop it by its whole session — but a
1.0.x watchdog still running from before the upgrade enforces its expiry with the old
code, which can miss a child that outlived its shell.
First run
A framework-free server, so nothing but Python is involved. In a scratch repo:
mkdir hello && cd hello && git init -q
cat > rentctl.toml <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "hello"
runner = "process"
[profiles.default]
cmd = 'python3 -m http.server --bind 127.0.0.1 "$PORT"'
cwd = "."
port_env = "PORT"
EOF
rent initinit shows you exactly what it will run and waits for an explicit yes:
Enroll project 'hello' (runner: process)
source: /home/you/hello
port block: 6200-6209
rentctl will run these commands on your behalf:
[default]
command: python3 -m http.server --bind 127.0.0.1 "$PORT"
in: /home/you/hello
port via $PORT
Approve and enroll? [y/N] yYour block will differ — blocks are drawn from 5100 upward, lowest free first. Then:
$ rent up hello
{
"ok": true,
"project": "hello",
…
"url": "http://localhost:6200",
"port": 6200,
…
"lease_expires": "2026-09-28T15:50:21.327166-05:00",
"already_running": false,
"state": "running",
"supervisor_pid": 24202,
…
"readiness": "answered"
}
$ rent ls # one row: hello, port 6200, "state": "running", "healthy": true
$ curl -sI http://localhost:6200/
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
$ rent down --all --cwd . --reason session-end # what the SessionEnd hook runs
{
"ok": true,
…
"downed": [ { "project": "hello", …, "port": 6200, "was_running": true,
"stopped": null, "pending": true, "state": "stopping",
"detail": "supervisor 24202 is completing cleanup; rent ls shows the outcome" } ]
}
$ curl -sI http://localhost:6200/ || echo gone
gone(Output trimmed where marked ….) That last step is the whole product: in an enrolled
Claude Code or Gemini CLI session you never type rent down — the session ending does.
The hook doesn't wait for the server to die; it asks, and the environment's supervisor
finishes the job (see How cleanup actually happens).
rent down hello, typed by hand, waits and answers "stopped": true.
rent events --summary afterwards shows the teardown and which cleanup layer did it.
If something doesn't behave, see Troubleshooting.
Enroll a project
A project describes itself in a rentctl.toml at its repo root (a devctl.toml
left over from before the rename is still read, so nothing needs renaming to keep
working):
[project]
name = "myapp" # lowercase, no separators — it is used as a filename
runner = "process"
[profiles.default]
cmd = 'npm run dev -- --port "$PORT" --strictPort'
cwd = "frontend" # repo-relative, never absolute
port_env = "PORT" # rentctl sets this in the child's environmentThen, from the repo:
rent initinit shows you the exact command it will run, asks you to approve it, claims a block of
ports for the project, registers the MCP server, installs the cleanup hooks (unless the
Claude Code plugin already supplies them), and adds a short rule to CLAUDE.md /
GEMINI.md telling agents to start servers through rentctl rather than by hand. Nobody
else has to edit anything.
There is no port field. Ports are drawn when a server starts, not written down in a tracked file — so two checkouts of the same repo get different ports instead of fighting, and a config file can't hand out a number the allocator never heard of. Each project owns a contiguous block of 10 ports.
Use
rent up myapp # start (or renew) — prints the URL and the port
rent down myapp # stop it; waits up to 15 s (--wait SECONDS, --wait 0 = don't wait)
rent down --all --cwd . # stop everything leased to this directory
rent ls # every environment on this machine, with its state
rent sweep # reconcile: stop what's expired or dead
rent events --summary # what happened, and which cleanup layer did it
rent sync # re-approve a changed rentctl.toml
rent doctor # are the shims, registry and hooks actually working?
rent report-kill myapp --note "…" # "you killed something I was using"report-kill exists because rentctl cannot tell, on its own, whether a teardown
was unwanted — a kill you asked for and a kill you regret look identical from the
inside. The report lands in the same append-only log as everything else and is
matched to the teardown it disputes, so an unwanted kill becomes a fact on the
record rather than an anecdote.
Leases default to 120 minutes and are capped at 480. rent up on a live lease
renews it rather than starting a second server.
Which clients get automatic cleanup
Client | How it is wired | Session-end cleanup |
Claude Code | the plugin (guide), or | Yes — SessionEnd releases the session's claim ( |
Codex | the plugin (guide) | Yes, once you trust the plugin's hooks ( |
Gemini CLI |
| Yes — same hooks, scoped by |
Any other MCP client | register | No — lease expiry and sweep only |
A plain shell |
| No — lease expiry and sweep only |
"Expiry and sweep only" still guarantees the server dies — just at the end of its lease (120 minutes by default), not when you close the window.
Plugin-only installs need the CLI too. The plugin (Claude Code or Codex) calls the rent and
rent-mcp you installed with uv tool install rentctl; it does not bundle them, and it
deliberately does not fetch its own copy — a second, different rentctl acting on the same
leases is worse than none. Without rent on PATH, session-end cleanup is off: every
session then starts with a warning saying so and naming the install command. Install the
package first, then run rent doctor, which reports whether each project's hooks come
from the plugin, from settings.local.json, or from both.
From the MCP Registry, a client runs uvx rentctl@<version>: the rentctl
executable is the MCP server, the same as rent-mcp (typed in a terminal it waits for a
client on stdin). That gives you the tools with expiry-and-sweep cleanup only — the
hooks come from the plugin or rent init. rent --version says which version you are
running.
How cleanup actually happens
Every environment has its own supervisor: a small rentctl process that starts your command inside a POSIX session it owns and stays until that whole session — the command, its children, and anything they spawned — has been checked and found empty. The lease is written before the command starts, so there is no moment when something is running that rentctl has no record of.
Every stop, whatever asked for it, is the same: SIGTERM to every process in the
session, SIGTERM to anything forked while it shuts down, SIGKILL to each process
still there after 10 s, then a final scan. A child that ignores SIGTERM, or that
outlived the shell that launched it, is stopped with the rest.
Four independent layers decide when, so no single failure leaves an orphan:
You ask —
rent down.The session ends — a
SessionEndhook releases that session's claim on everything leased to that directory. The server stops if no other session still holds a claim.The lease expires — the supervisor starts the stop within about a second of the lease running out, even if the session died without running its hook.
The next sweep —
rent sweep(which the hooks also run at session start) andrent lsclean up what the first three missed, including an environment whose supervisor was killed.
What rent down tells you is what the lease says, in one of three shapes:
"stopped": true— the session was scanned empty and the lease removed."stopped": false, "state": "cleanup_incomplete", "survivors": [...]— something could not be stopped (a child that switched user withsudo, say). The lease is kept, so the survivors stay named and the port stays out of the draw; the supervisor keeps retrying (5 s, 15 s, 60 s, then every minute),rent downretries at once, andrent uprefuses withCLEANUP_INCOMPLETEuntil it clears."stopped": null, "pending": true— the stop was accepted and is still running;rent lsshows how it ended. This is"ok": true: the supervisor finishes regardless.
rent down waits up to 15 s for the first two (--wait SECONDS; --wait 0 returns
at once). The MCP tool env_down takes the same wait as wait_s — 15 s by default,
60 s at most.
Session end returns fast; cleanup finishes in the background. Claude Code gives a
plugin's SessionEnd hook about 1.5 s. So the hook's rent down --all --reason session-end doesn't wait: it records a stop for every lease that no other session still
holds, wakes each supervisor, and returns pending. The supervisors don't need the session to finish. A lease with no
living supervisor is handed to a detached recovery process rather than stopped halfway.
A crashed session is cleaned up by layers 3 and 4, not 2. If the session dies
without firing its hook, its server keeps running until the lease expires — up to the
full lease length. Shorter leases (rent up myapp --lease-minutes 30) shorten that
window. A sweep does not stop a live, unexpired lease; it cannot tell a crashed session
from one that is still working.
If a supervisor is killed, recovery waits for the next command. The server keeps
serving. The next rent ls, sweep, up or down notices, marks the lease
unsupervised, and records supervisor_lost; it is not killed early. At its expiry the
next of those commands stops it, and rent down stops it now. Nothing notices at the
moment the supervisor dies, because nothing else is running to notice.
There is no daemon. There is one supervisor per live environment, and it exits once its environment is verified gone. State lives on disk and the OS process table is the source of truth, so there is no background service to babysit, and nothing to resurrect after a reboot.
What supervision covers, per platform
macOS. Every process that stays in the environment's session is found and stopped:
orphans of a launch shell that exited, processes that ignore SIGTERM, processes that
move into their own process group, children forked during shutdown. A process that calls
setsid() — which is what daemonizing (double-fork plus setsid) does — leaves the
session and is outside supervision. rentctl never signals it; if it holds the lease's
port, the teardown reports it. When a command daemonizes during startup — its own
session empties while a process outside it answers the port — rent up fails with
UNSUPERVISABLE instead of reporting a start it cannot own. Run such servers in the
foreground.
Linux. Each supervisor also makes itself a child subreaper
(prctl(PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER), no privileges needed), so orphaned descendants are
reparented to it instead of to init. Every descendant of your command is captured,
including a daemon that double-forks and calls setsid(). Signals to single processes
go through a pidfd where the kernel has them. What still escapes is work that is not
your command's descendant — handed to another manager such as systemd-run, a
container runtime, an already-running tmux server, or at/cron — and the orphaned
children of a process placed in another PID namespace with setns(2) (which needs
CAP_SYS_ADMIN over that namespace): they go to that namespace's init. The capture also
ends if the supervisor itself is killed. Where the subreaper is refused (some
restricted containers), Linux gets the macOS guarantee.
rent doctor reports which one is in effect: supervision: session or
supervision: session+subreaper. Neither is a sandbox — a command that sets out to
escape supervision can.
Several sessions in one checkout share one server
A lease belongs to a (project, directory) pair, so two agent sessions in the same
checkout share one server and one port. Each session that runs rent up holds its own
expiring claim on it, and the lease lasts as long as its latest claim. A session's
up renews only its own claim. rent ls and the up result list the claims, and
shared_with names the other sessions.
When a session ends, its SessionEnd hook releases that session's claim. The server
stops only when no other session still holds one. A session that never leased the
server changes nothing when it ends. The MCP tool env_down also releases by default:
it answers "stopped": false with held_by while others hold the server, and
force: true stops it for everyone. rent down typed by a person always stops, and
lists any other sessions' claims it overrode in overrode_claims.
This depends on knowing which session is asking. Claude Code hooks send the session id
on stdin, and rentctl also reads DEVCTL_SESSION_ID, CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID and
GEMINI_SESSION_ID. rent doctor says which one it found. A caller with none of them is
unknown, and every unknown caller shares one claim. A release can never remove
another session's claim, so an unidentified session end leaves the server running until
it expires. It never stops a server another session is using.
Separate git worktrees still give each session its own server, port and lease.
Where rentctl has to run: somewhere it can see processes
Supervision works by reading the process table: every process in a workload's session is found by its session id, and a stop is only reported as verified once that session is provably empty. So rentctl must run where it can list processes and read their session ids.
Works: the MCP server launched by your agent host (Claude Code, for example), and
renttyped in an ordinary terminal.Does not work:
rentinvoked from inside an agent's command sandbox that blocks process inspection. Codex's macOS sandbox is one (Operation not permitted (originated from sysctl())).
Where inspection is denied, rent up refuses with UNSUPPORTED_ENVIRONMENT and starts
nothing. If inspection is lost after a server started, rentctl treats ownership as
unknown: it keeps the lease, signals nothing, and never reports cleanup as verified.
The record shows cleanup_incomplete with identity_ambiguous until a later attempt
can see the session again. Denied inspection never reads as "no processes". The fix is
to run rentctl from the host side, not to grant the sandbox wider privileges.
It won't kill things it doesn't own
Every lease records its supervisor's PID and start time, and the supervisor's PID is
the environment's session id (a lease from 1.0.x uses its server's instead). A process is the environment's only if it is in that
session (or, on Linux, descends from the supervisor), and each one's identity is
re-checked immediately before it is signalled. If the session's PID has been recycled
onto some unrelated process, nothing under it can be proved ours: the lease is kept,
marked identity_ambiguous, and nothing is signalled — a stale lease can't get your
database killed.
A listener inside an enrolled project's port block with no lease behind it is a squatter. What happens to it depends on the machine's enforcement mode:
advisory (the default, and the only mode any command sets) —
rent uproutes around it, andrent ls/rent sweepreport it. It is never signalled.strict —
rent sweepsends each squatterSIGTERM, and reports what it killed. Since the session-start hook runsrent sweep, under strict that happens at every session start. Strict is set by theenforcementfield in rentctl's machine-local registry; nothing turns it on for you. See Development machines only before you do.
When it genuinely cannot tell whether a port is in use — no usable probe on the host — it says so, rather than reporting the port as free. "No squatters found" means something looked.
What it can see is limited to what you can see. The port probe (lsof, or psutil
on Linux) runs as your user, and an unprivileged probe can miss sockets owned by other
users. So "free" means free as far as this user can see. A real collision still surfaces:
the server's own bind() fails, and rent up reports the failed start (with the log
tail) instead of writing a lease.
Security: what you are trusting
Read this part. rentctl runs a command out of a config file in your repo.
That is arbitrary code execution, and no tool can make it not be. If you can run
npm run dev, you can run anything. What rentctl guarantees is narrower and more
useful: it adds no silent path to it.
The command from
rentctl.tomlis shown to you and approved once, explicitly, atrent init.On approval it is copied into
rentctl's own registry along with a hash of the execution-determining fields:runner,cmd,cwdandport_env.If the repo's
rentctl.tomllater changes any of them, the next start stops (CMD_CHANGED) and shows you a diff of approved-versus-current. It does not run the new command. You re-approve withrent syncor you don't.
The hash deliberately covers only the fields that determine execution, not the whole file — hashing everything trains you to click through re-approvals for comment edits, which defeats the point.
Approval pins the command, not the code it runs. npm run dev is the same string
whatever package.json says dev means. An edit to a package.json script, a Makefile,
or the application code itself changes what actually executes without tripping
CMD_CHANGED. The pin stops a changed rentctl.toml from quietly running something new;
it is not a review of the repo. Treat pulling someone else's branch the way you already
would before running its dev server by hand.
Consequences worth being explicit about:
git pullcannot change the approved command. It can change the file, and it can change the code that command runs; it cannot change which commandrentctlruns.A repo cannot walk
rentctlout of its own directory.cwdis repo-relative and rejected if it is absolute, contains.., or symlinks outside the repo. Project names are filename-safe or refused.Non-interactive enrollment is explicit. CI passes
--trust-repo, which is recorded as trust-on-first-use rather than being the quiet default.rentctlonly manages what you enrolled. Test-framework servers (pytest fixtures, Playwright'swebServer) own their own lifecycle and use ephemeral ports;rentctlnever touches them.
To report a vulnerability, see SECURITY.md.
Development machines only
Install this on machines where dev servers are meant to be disposable. Not on a host running anything you would mind losing.
A default install is safe: enforcement is advisory, and rentctl only scans the
port blocks of projects you enrolled. Nothing else on the machine is examined and nothing
unenrolled is ever signalled.
But rentctl's whole job is killing processes that outlive a session, and strict
enforcement exists to make that unavoidable. A tool built to reap servers you forgot
about is the wrong tool to arm on a host serving traffic — there, the servers outliving
their session are supposed to. Keep it on development machines.
Troubleshooting
Agent-client problems (missing tools, hooks, approval, cleanup that did not happen): docs/troubleshooting.md. Which clients and surfaces were tested, and how: docs/integrations.md.
rent doctorchecks that therentshim runs, the registry loads, and each enrolled project's hooks are wired, and says which supervision level this host gets and where it found this session's id (session-identity). Ifrentitself is missing, the same check runs aspython3 -m rentctl.doctor.Server logs are in
~/.local/state/devctl/logs/<project>-<timestamp>.log(under$XDG_STATE_HOMEif set). A failedrent upincludes the log's tail in its output.What happened, and why:
rent eventslists every start and teardown with the layer that did it; the raw log is~/.local/state/devctl/events.jsonl. A teardown'sdownevent says whether the stop was verified and whether it neededSIGKILL("escalated": true).stop_requestedmeans a stop was asked for (for example by the session-end hook) and is not itself a teardown. Neither isclaim_released: a session let go of a server that others still hold.rent lsshows each lease'sstateand whether its supervisor is alive:stoppingor"pending": true— a stop is under way; look again in a few seconds.unsupervised— its supervisor died. The server is still yours and still serving; it is stopped at expiry by the nextls/sweep/up/down, or now byrent down.rent upwill not renew it. (A lease started by 1.0.x also readsunsupervised, with"legacy": true;rent updoes renew that one.)cleanup_incompletewithsurvivors— those PIDs would not die. Find out why (a different user? stuck in the kernel?) before reusing the port;rent downretries.
UNSUPERVISABLEfromrent up— the command daemonized, so its server left the session rentctl supervises. Run it in the foreground. The stray server is left alone; stop it yourself.The supervisor notes what it did in the server's log, on lines prefixed
[rentctl supervisor <pid>].The registry of enrolled projects and approved commands is
~/.config/devctl/registry.json. It is rentctl's own record — change it withrent init/rent sync, not by hand.
(The directories say devctl, the project's former name. That is deliberate — renaming
them would orphan every live lease.)
Known gaps
Stated plainly, because a tool making safety claims should be honest about its edges:
The approval pin covers the command, not the code — see Security.
Sessions in one checkout share one server — see above. A session that rentctl cannot identify releases nothing when it ends, so its server lives until the lease expires.
Crash cleanup waits for expiry — a session that dies without its hook leaves its server up until the lease runs out.
Recovery waits for the next command — if a supervisor is killed, nothing acts until the next
rent ls/sweep/up/down.Daemonizing commands are not supervised on macOS, and on Linux work handed to another process manager is not — see What supervision covers.
Only Claude Code, Codex (with its hooks trusted) and Gemini CLI get session-end hooks. Other clients get expiry and sweep. Cloud agent sessions (claude.ai/code cloud, Codex Cloud) are not supported: they cannot reach your machine's processes.
runner = "compose"is designed but not implemented. Asking for it fails with a clear error rather than doing nothing.The only environment beyond the port is
port_env. Anything else a server needs has to ride insidecmdtoday.Windows: see Install. Not supported, not claimed.
Contributing
See CONTRIBUTING.md.
A note on the comments in the source
The source cites its own design decisions — ADR-0008, WI-0040, spec §10. Those
refer to this project's design log, which is kept privately; the reasoning around each
citation is written out where it is cited, so nothing is missing if you can't follow the
pointer.
License
Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE and NOTICE.
Copyright 2026 Michael Drake.
Available Tools
4 toolsenv_downAIdempotent
Release this session's hold on a project's environment; it stops when no other session holds it.
Other agent sessions in the same checkout may be using the same server. By
default this releases only YOUR session's claim: if another session still
holds one, the server keeps running and the result says stopped: false
with held_by naming them. If you held the last claim, it stops.
force=true stops it for everyone and lists overrode_claims — use it
only when the user asked to stop the server outright. Omit project to
act on everything leased to this cwd.
Waits up to wait_s seconds (default 15, at most 60) for verified
cleanup. Past that the result is pending: true — still ok: the
environment's supervisor finishes the stop, and env_ls shows the outcome.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | ||
| wait_s | No | ||
| project | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations only declare idempotent/non-destructive/non-read-only; the description adds the multi-session claim model, the fact that a non-final release returns stopped:false with held_by, that force overrides other sessions and reports overrode_claims, and that a timeout yields pending:true with ok status while the supervisor finishes. That is substantial behavior the structured fields cannot convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in sentence one; the remaining sentences each carry a distinct rule (default vs force, project omission, wait/pending). Dense but free of filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 3-parameter tool with no output schema, the description still names the return fields an agent must interpret (stopped, held_by, overrode_claims, pending) and covers every parameter's behavior and limits. Nothing needed to invoke or interpret it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% with no titles beyond property names, yet the description explains all three: force (override semantics plus a usage warning), wait_s (default 15, cap 60, and what pending:true means past it), and project (omit to target everything leased to the cwd). Nothing is left to guesswork.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence states a precise verb and resource: releasing this session's hold on a project's environment, with the key conditional (it stops when no other session holds it). That scope is distinct from env_up/env_sweep without needing to open either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit when-to-use guidance for each mode: default releases only your claim, force=true 'only when the user asked to stop the server outright', omit project to act on everything leased to this cwd. It also names env_ls as the way to see the eventual outcome, so the follow-up path is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
env_lsARead-only
List every broker-owned environment on the machine (live, reconciled inventory).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The parenthetical '(live, reconciled inventory)' adds genuine value by signaling results are current and internally consistent rather than cached, but return format and ordering remain undisclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler. The scope qualifier comes before the freshness qualifier, which is the right priority order.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a zero-parameter read-only list tool with no output schema, the description is essentially sufficient. Only the absence of any hint about result shape or volume keeps it short of a 5.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, which is the baseline-4 case; there is no parameter semantics to clarify and the schema is empty by design.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('List') and resource ('environment') with clear scope qualifiers: 'broker-owned' and 'on the machine'. It is easy to tell apart from the lifecycle siblings env_up/env_down/env_sweep, though the description never names them explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance is given, and no alternative tool is referenced. The agent must infer from the name that this is a discovery step preceding the lifecycle operations.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
env_sweepBDestructive
Reconcile every lease: stop expired/dead, report (or under strict, reclaim) squatters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so the description's job is to add detail, and it does say what is affected: expired/dead leases are stopped and squatters are reclaimed. The gap is the undefined 'strict' mode — the description implies two behavioral regimes without saying how either is selected, which matters for a destructive tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single tight sentence with the primary action front-loaded and the subordinate behaviors after the colon. It is dense with unexplained terms, but there is no padding or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a zero-parameter, no-output-schema, destructive tool the description covers the main outcome, but it leaves two things unresolved: what a 'squatter' is and how 'strict' mode is triggered when no input exists. An agent can call it, but cannot predict which of the two described behaviors will occur.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With zero parameters and 100% schema coverage there is nothing for the schema to document, so the baseline is high. The mention of a 'strict' mode is the only wrinkle, since it hints at a switch that no parameter can set, but no parameter is misdocumented.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
It names a specific action (reconcile leases) and enumerates sub-actions (stop expired/dead, report or reclaim squatters), which is more than a restatement of the name. However, the core nouns are jargon ('leases', 'squatters') and it never distinguishes itself from env_up/env_down/env_ls, so an agent must infer that this is the cleanup/reaper tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to reach for env_sweep versus env_down or env_ls, and no prerequisites or safety conditions. The only routing hint is the unexplained 'under strict' clause, which is not actionable guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
env_upAIdempotent
Start (or renew) this checkout's leased dev environment and return its URL.
Omit project to use the one this checkout declares in its rentctl.toml.
Use the returned url/port — never a conventional port — and check
readiness. Calling it again renews your session's lease. Errors come back
as ok: false with an error code: NOT_A_PROJECT / UNKNOWN_PROJECT
(not enrolled — a person runs rent init), CMD_CHANGED (a person must
re-approve with rent sync), START_TIMEOUT (read log_tail).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | No | default | |
| project | No | ||
| lease_minutes | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare the safety profile (readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=true), but the description goes well beyond them: lease-renewal semantics on repeat calls, the instruction to use the returned url/port rather than a conventional port, the readiness field, and a full error-code taxonomy (NOT_A_PROJECT, UNKNOWN_PROJECT, CMD_CHANGED, START_TIMEOUT) with remediation hints (log_tail, rent init, rent sync).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads purpose, then usage, then the error contract. Every clause carries information, though the error-code block is dense and the sentence about url/port could be tightened.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description usefully documents the returned url/port/readiness and the ok/error shape, which is exactly what an agent needs. The gap is the unexplained profile and lease_minutes parameters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the load, and it only explains one of three parameters (`project`'s default-to-rentctl.toml behavior). `profile` and `lease_minutes` are left entirely to their self-explanatory names and defaults, so compensation is partial.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Start/renew) and resource (this checkout's leased dev environment) plus the return value (its URL). It is clearly distinguishable from env_down/env_ls/env_sweep by contrast, but never names those siblings explicitly, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete when-to-use context: omit `project` to use the checkout's rentctl.toml declaration, and calling it again renews the session lease. It does not, however, state when NOT to use it or point to a specific alternative sibling.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
env_down - First observed
env_ls - First observed
env_sweep - First observed
env_up
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
env_up (start/renew) and env_down (release) are clearly opposed, and env_ls (list inventory) versus env_sweep (reconcile leases) are distinguishable, though an agent could plausibly reach for env_sweep when it means env_down since both stop environments. The descriptions do enough work to keep boundaries clear.
All four names use snake_case with a consistent env_ prefix, so the family is immediately recognizable. The action tokens mix directional (up/down) with verb/CLI-style (ls/sweep) forms, a minor deviation from a strict verb_noun pattern but still readable.
Four tools is a tight, plausible set for a lease manager covering start, release, inventory, and reconciliation, with no obvious filler. It sits at the low end of the recommended range, and a dedicated status/logs tool could arguably earn a fifth slot.
The core lifecycle (start, stop, list, reconcile) is covered, but there is no way to fetch logs for a specific environment even though errors reference log_tail, and no single-environment status/get beyond the full inventory listing. These are workable-but-notable gaps for debugging failed starts.
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