nextiva-mcp

MCP server for Nextiva (contact center platform, built on the acquired Thrio product — API host is login.thrio.com / *.thrio.io). Exposes the Thrio data and analytics API's users, campaigns, contacts, queues, and work item history as MCP tools.

Naming note: MSPbots' own integration is registered as "Nextiva" (subjectCode=NEXTIVA); the underlying API and all documentation reference "Thrio", the contact-center product Nextiva acquired. This MCP covers exactly the 5 methods MSPbots itself has configured.

MSPbots Connector

The MCP Gateway built for MSPs: visible, controlled, and your data stays where it belongs.

Get started at connect.mspbots.ai →

MSPbots Connector gives your AI clients one MCP URL to reach your entire MSP stack (RMM, PSA, documentation, security, finance), and gives you control over who can call which tool and a record of everything that was called.

Hosted service: connect.mspbots.ai · Free to use.

Why Connector

Quick start

1. Sign up at connect.mspbots.ai.

2. Connect your vendors. Pick from 150+ connectors and authorize each one on the vendor's own page, or bring your own API keys. No extra vendor accounts needed.

3. Set access. Create roles and decide which tools each role may call. Nothing is allowed until you allow it.

4. Add your MCP URL to your AI client. Copy the URL from your Connector dashboard into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, VS Code, Gemini, Codex, or any MCP-capable client.

5. Ask your AI to do real work, and watch every call appear in the audit log.

Features

Unified gateway

• One MCP URL for all your AI clients

• 150+ connectors across the MSP stack

• Custom MCP servers supported, free

• Authorization happens on each vendor's own page; the AI never sees passwords or tokens

• Bring your own credentials: use the vendor API keys you already have

• Multiple accounts per app; connect once, reuse across AI clients

• Tool search: finds the right action for the task

• One sign-in; vendor credentials are injected behind the scenes and OAuth tokens refresh automatically

Visibility

• Audit log for every tool call (who, which vendor, when)

• Usage dashboard: call volume, top vendors, error rate, per-user activity

• Export audit logs to CSV, or stream to Loki, Graylog, or LogScale (SIEM)

• Optional recording of tool arguments and result summaries (off by default, enabled per organization)

Control

• Per-role, per-tool allowlist, deny by default

• owner / admin / member roles

• SCIM provisioning with Entra ID, Okta, JumpCloud, and Google Workspace

Security

• Credentials encrypted one record at a time (AES-256-GCM, per-record key)

• AI clients authenticate with OAuth 2.1 + PKCE

• Vendor responses are scanned for prompt-injection patterns and returned as structured data. This is one layer of defense, not a guarantee against every attack.

• Static egress IP for customer firewall and API allowlisting

Pricing

Free.

Links: connect.mspbots.ai · mspbots.ai

Related MCP server: five9-mcp

Overview

• Stateless HTTP service. No credentials are ever persisted — each request supplies its own username/password via headers, used only for the lifetime of that single request.

• Supports concurrent requests; per-request credential isolation is done via Python contextvars, not a global/shared client instance.

• Entry points: POST /mcp (MCP protocol) and GET /health (health check).

• Default port: 8080 (configurable via MCP_HTTP_PORT).

Authentication

Thrio's auth call returns both a token and the actual per-tenant API host to use — Thrio is deployed across multiple regional clusters, so there is no single fixed data-plane hostname:

1. GET https://login.thrio.com/provider/token-with-authorities with HTTP Basic Auth (username:password) → {"location": "https://<tenant-cluster>.thrio.io", "token": "..."}.

2. Every real data/analytics call then goes to {location} (not login.thrio.com) with the token sent as-is in an Authorization header — no Bearer prefix.

Since there is no session to preserve, this server re-authenticates fresh on every single tool call — nothing is cached or persisted across MCP requests.

HEADER authentication parameters

Missing either header returns 401:

{
  "error": "Missing credentials",
  "message": "This server requires the X-Nextiva-Username and X-Nextiva-Password headers",
  "required_headers": ["X-Nextiva-Username", "X-Nextiva-Password"],
  "optional_headers": []
}

An invalid username/password surfaces as a tool-level error during the internal login step, not an HTTP-level error from this server.

Environment Variables

MCP Endpoint

• POST /mcp — MCP protocol (streamable HTTP transport)

• GET /health — health check, returns {"status": "ok"} (pure local probe, does not call the Nextiva/Thrio API)

Tool List

All 5 tools are read-only (readOnlyHint=True, idempotentHint=True); there are no write/delete tools.

Per-parameter documentation lives on each tool's parameter schema (visible via tools/list), not in this table — this table is a quick-reference only and parameter names here are kept in sync with the code.

Successful responses are the vendor's JSON, compactly serialized (no pretty-printing, ensure_ascii=False) and capped at ~20,000 characters — an oversized list response is truncated with truncated/original_count markers rather than returned in full. There is no vendor-documented limit/page-size parameter for these endpoints (pagination is a start offset only, see Known Gaps below), so there is nothing to clamp beyond this automatic character cap.

Errors are returned as a JSON error envelope (not an exception/HTTP error), e.g.:

{"error": {"code": "upstream_error", "message": "...", "retryable": true}}

code is one of not_configured / unauthorized / not_found / invalid_argument / rate_limited / upstream_error, mapped from the Thrio API's HTTP status code (see error_envelope/NextivaError.to_envelope in api_client.py). Outbound calls use a 5s connect / 30s read timeout, and retry up to 3 times with capped exponential backoff on 429/5xx responses (respecting Retry-After).

Test Example

# Health check
curl -s http://localhost:8080/health

# Call a tool via the MCP protocol (streamable HTTP) — requires an
# initialize handshake first per the MCP spec; abbreviated example below
# shows the tool-call request body only:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/mcp \
  -H "X-Nextiva-Username: admin@example.com" \
  -H "X-Nextiva-Password: <your-password>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
  -H "mcp-session-id: <session-id-from-initialize>" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "tools/call",
    "params": {
      "name": "nextiva_get_users",
      "arguments": {}
    }
  }'

Live-verified (2026-07-30) against a real Nextiva/Thrio tenant, all 5 tools called end-to-end through this running server: nextiva_get_users returned 101 real users; nextiva_get_campaigns returned 9 real campaigns (e.g. "Nextiva - Transfers"); nextiva_get_contacts returned 99 real contacts; nextiva_get_queues returned 18 real queues; and nextiva_get_workitems_history returned real summary totals (e.g. 297 inbound, 195 outbound, 500 contacts in the last 7 days) — all with the login step resolving the tenant's real cluster host dynamically (https://mancity.thrio.io).

API Reference

• Public, no login required: https://api.thrio.com/ (Postman-generated documentation covering Authentication, Objects/Data API, Analytics, and more)

Known Gaps

• Scope is exactly MSPbots' 5 configured endpoints, not the vendor's full API surface — Thrio's API also covers Workitem actions, List Management, Dashboards, Recordings, Contact Consent, State DID, Chat, CRM, Client, Number Verification, WFM, TEAMS, Callbacks, and more (per the public docs' own navigation); those are out of scope here.

• Pagination is a start offset, confirmed empirically (passing start=1 shifted the result window by one and updated the response's previous field accordingly) — the vendor's public docs describe this less explicitly than the request/response shape actually demonstrates, so this was verified against the live API rather than assumed from the docs alone.

• The session/login step described in the vendor's docs (POST {location}/users/api/login) is NOT used by this server — it appeared necessary only for creating a full interactive agent session (e.g. for telephony/ACD state), not for the read-only data/analytics endpoints MSPbots uses, which worked correctly with just the Authentication token. Confirmed by successfully calling all 5 endpoints without it.