Version vulnerability check

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only, idempotent, open-world, non-destructive, so the safety profile is settled. The description adds real behavioral substance: matching is gated on NVD CPE confirmation (so non-confirmed CVEs are excluded), results are ranked by KEV/EPSS/CVSS, and ruled-out CVEs are reported — useful expectations that annotations cannot convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The lead claim and the returned-content list are front-loaded, and the parameter examples are packed into the close. Dense but almost every clause carries information; only "Best tool for software risk" is slightly promotional padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does the work of describing returns (ranked findings, patch status, minimum safe version, ruled-out list), which is the key gap it needs to fill. The remaining hole is investigation_id semantics and any limits on the CPE-matching fallback when version is omitted.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description has to compensate, and it does for two parameters: software_name ('nginx', 'Apache httpd', 'OpenSSH') and version ('1.20.1', '8.9p1', omit only if unknown). The third parameter, investigation_id, is never mentioned, leaving its purpose and side effects undocumented in both schema and description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource chain: finds CVEs that NVD CPE data confirms affect this exact product version, then ranks, annotates patch status, and reports ruled-out CVEs. This clearly separates it from siblings like cve_search, nvd_lookup, and cisa_kev_check, which do single-source lookups rather than version-confirmed aggregation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Best tool for software risk" plus "Use for every product with a known version (e.g. from Shodan)" gives clear positive guidance and even a source hint for the version input. It does not explicitly name when to prefer cve_search or nvd_lookup instead, so it stops short of full when/when-not coverage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.