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Turbo Quant Memory MCP Server

Turbo Quant Memory MCP Server

by Lexus2016
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
Python
Local

set_secret

Store an encrypted secret in the active project's local vault using AES-256-GCM, keeping values on this machine and excluded from semantic search and hydration results.

Instructions

Store an encrypted secret in the active project's vault.

The value is encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a per-project master key resolved from TQMEMORY_SECRETS_PASSPHRASE or the OS keyring. Secrets are NEVER indexed, embedded, or returned via semantic_search / hydrate. They live in ~/.turbo-quant-memory/projects/<project_id>/secrets/vault.tqv and stay on this machine.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>",
      "value": "<value>"
    },
    "name": "set_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYes
valueYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.36.1

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full disclosure burden and does well: it names the cipher (AES-256-GCM), the key source (TQMEMORY_SECRETS_PASSPHRASE or OS keyring), the on-disk path, and that data stays local. It omits what happens on a name collision (overwrite vs error) and any permission/failure behavior, which matters for a write tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then supporting security detail; every sentence adds information. Slightly noisy with literal markdown filesystem paths and backticked function names, but no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values needn't be covered, and the security/storage story is thorough for a write tool. What's missing is the collision/overwrite contract for `name`, which is the main thing an agent needs beyond encryption detail.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and neither of the two parameters is described in the schema. The description does not compensate at all – it never explains what `name` accepts (uniqueness, allowed characters, namespacing) or what `value` may contain. For a 2-param tool with zero schema documentation, this is a real gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Store an encrypted secret in the active project's vault.' That is unambiguous and distinguishes it from read/delete siblings like get_secret and delete_secret, though the description never names an alternative explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Implied usage is clear (persist a credential to the vault), and the note that secrets are never surfaced through semantic_search or hydrate usefully signals these tools are not interchangeable. But there is no explicit 'use this when...' or 'do not use this for...' guidance, and the presence of list_secrets/get_secret/delete_secret siblings makes a routing hint valuable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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