riffado-mcp
by L480
README.md
# riffado-mcp
[](https://github.com/L480/riffado-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[](https://github.com/L480/riffado-mcp/actions/workflows/release.yml)
[](./LICENSE)
An MCP server for the [Riffado](https://riffado.com) voice-recording archive
(Plaud device → Riffado app): transcripts, AI summaries, key points, action
items. Strictly read-only. Talks to the Riffado Postgres database directly
(not the Riffado API), decrypts at-rest ciphertext in-process, and serves it
over MCP — stdio for Claude Code, Streamable HTTP + OAuth for Claude Web/iOS.
## Tools
| Tool | What it does |
| --------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `riffado_list_recordings` | List recordings (newest first by default), with title, date, duration, transcript sources, optional summary snippet. |
| `riffado_search` | Two-stage search over titles/summaries/key points/action items, then transcripts, in-process (the DB only holds ciphertext). `deep: true` widens transcript scanning — see below. |
| `riffado_get_recording` | Full detail for one recording: metadata, summary, key points, action items, a pageable transcript slice (fetched on demand). |
| `riffado_list_action_items` | Flattened action items across recordings, each tagged with its source recording. |
| `riffado_stats` | Recording count, total/median duration, first/last date, transcripts per source/provider, coverage gaps. |
### `riffado_search`: two-stage, and the `deep` parameter
Search runs in two stages. **Stage 1** scores the whole corpus against
pre-normalized titles/summaries/key points/action items only (cheap, always
in memory). **Stage 2** fetches and scans transcript text, but only for the
top-ranked stage-1 candidates (`K = min(max(limit * 3, 30), 200)`) — not the
whole corpus. `scope: "summary"` stops after stage 1 (no transcript fetch
at all); `scope: "all"` (default) and `scope: "transcript"` run stage 2 over
the candidate set.
This means a term that appears **only** in one recording's transcript, and
nowhere in any title/summary/key point/action item, may not surface unless
that recording happens to rank in the top-K by cheap-field score. Pass
**`deep: true`** to scan every recording's transcript that passes the
`from`/`to` date filter instead of just the candidates — slower, and its
cost scales with corpus size, so combine it with `from`/`to` when possible.
The tool's response says explicitly when results were narrowed this way
(i.e. whenever `deep` is `false`), so a client can tell a no-hit result from
a real absence rather than assume one.
`query` is capped at 500 characters.
Also: resource `riffado://index` (markdown index), resource template
`riffado://recording/{id}`, and prompt `riffado_ask` (carries the answering
rules — cite date+title, quote verbatim, transcript beats AI summary, flag
ASR misreads, never fill gaps from general knowledge).
## Example questions
Things you can ask Claude once the server is connected:
- "What did I record yesterday?"
- "What action items came out of my recordings this week?"
- "Give me the transcript of my last call with Sarah." (paged in slices for long recordings)
- "How many recordings do I have, and what's my average recording length?"
- "Which of my recordings don't have a transcript yet?"
More complex, research-style questions Claude can answer by combining
several tool calls (search → pull the matching recordings → read/quote
transcripts):
- "Across all my calls with customer Acme, what's the recurring technical
pain point they keep bringing up?"
- "What does customer Acme's current tool stack look like, based on
everything they've mentioned across our calls?"
- "When does Acme's contract expire, and did we discuss a renewal date in
any recent call?"
- "Do a deep search (`deep: true`) through all transcripts for 'Meier
contract' — this might not show up in summaries — and tell me what was
agreed."
- "Compare what customer X and customer Y said about pricing across all
our calls with them — where do their objections differ?"
- "Build a timeline of everything discussed with Acme this quarter, with
dates and direct quotes."
## Environment variables
| Var | Default | Notes |
| ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `DATABASE_URL` | _required_ | `postgresql://postgres:…@riffado-db:5432/riffado` |
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | _required_ | 64 hex chars (32-byte AES key) |
| `RIFFADO_USER_ID` | — | restrict to one user |
| `RIFFADO_APP_URL` | — | e.g. `https://riffado.example.com` → deep links in tool output |
| `TRANSPORT` | `stdio` | `stdio` \| `http` |
| `HTTP_PORT` / `HTTP_HOST` | `3000` / `localhost` | port 1-65535; container sets host `0.0.0.0` |
| `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN` | _required for `http`_ | shared secret, min 32 chars; the HTTP transport refuses to start without it (unused on `stdio`) |
| `HTTP_AUTH_HEADER_NAME` | `x-mcp-token` | |
| `HTTP_OAUTH_ENABLED` | `true` | wraps `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN` in an OAuth 2.1 login flow for Claude connectors |
| `HTTP_PUBLIC_URL` | — | OAuth issuer; must be HTTPS unless `localhost` |
| `HTTP_OAUTH_STATE_FILE` | `~/.riffado-mcp-oauth-state.json` | container: `/app/data/oauth-state.json` |
| `HTTP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS` | `claude.ai,claude.com,localhost,127.0.0.1,[::1]` | comma-separated hostnames OAuth clients may register redirect URIs for (exact match, no port; `https` required except loopback, which may use `http`). Wildcards like `*` are **not** supported. Clients persisted with a host no longer listed are dropped on start |
| `HTTP_CORS_ORIGINS` | _(empty: no CORS)_ | comma-separated browser origins allowed cross-origin access, e.g. `http://localhost:6274` for the MCP Inspector. Exact origins only (`scheme://host[:port]`, no path, no `*`). Claude's connector calls from Anthropic's servers and needs none |
| `HTTP_TRUST_PROXY` | `false` | Express `trust proxy` (`true`/`false`, a hop count 0-10, or a subnet/preset); **set it (e.g. `1`) behind a reverse proxy / Cloudflare Tunnel**, leave it off when clients connect directly (otherwise `X-Forwarded-For` is spoofable) |
| `HTTP_SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS` | `3600000` (1h) | idle-session expiry; `0` = no idle expiry (explicit opt-out, sessions close only on DELETE/transport close); max 2147483647 |
| `CACHE_TTL_MS` | `60000` | decrypted-store TTL; positive integer |
| `DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS` | `10000` | passed to the pg pool; positive integer (`0` would mean no limit, so it is rejected) |
Numeric variables must be plain integers within their range — a value like
`3000abc` or `1.5` fails at startup instead of being silently truncated.
## Health checks
`GET /health` is the one route auth never gates — liveness only:
`{ status, timestamp }`. `GET /health/details` adds session count, DB
reachability and the cached recording count, and requires the same
auth as every other route (shared token or OAuth).
`/health` is also exempt from rate limiting. Everything else is limited per
client IP in 15-minute windows: 50 failed authentications (401s) lock that
IP out with `429` for the rest of the window, even with a valid token;
authenticated traffic is capped at 1000 requests; `/register`,
`/authorize` and `/token` together at 30.
## Quickstart: Claude Code (stdio)
```bash
npm install
npm run build
```
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"riffado": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/riffado-mcp/dist/index.js"],
"env": {
"DATABASE_URL": "postgresql://postgres:...@riffado-db:5432/riffado",
"ENCRYPTION_KEY": "..."
}
}
}
}
```
## Quickstart: Claude Web / iOS (HTTP + OAuth)
1. Run the container with `TRANSPORT=http`, `HTTP_PUBLIC_URL` set to the
public HTTPS URL, `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN` set to a shared secret, and
`HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1` if it sits behind a reverse proxy or Cloudflare
Tunnel.
2. In Claude, add a custom connector pointing at
`https://riffado-mcp.example.com/mcp`.
3. Claude opens the login page, which names the host it will redirect to
(for Claude, `claude.ai`); paste the `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN` value. Claude
then holds a normal OAuth bearer token — the connector survives process
restarts because OAuth state is persisted to `HTTP_OAUTH_STATE_FILE`.
Rotating `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN` revokes every issued OAuth token and
registered client on the next start; connectors then log in again with
the new value. Access tokens live 1 hour and are refreshed silently;
a connector left idle for more than 90 days (refresh token lifetime)
has to log in again.
### Upgrade note: one-time re-login
The OAuth state file format changed (tokens are now stored only as
SHA-256 hashes, `version: 2`). On the first start after upgrading, the old
file is discarded and rewritten empty, so every connector has to log in
once more with `HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN`. Clients registered with a redirect host
outside `HTTP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS` are rejected from now on; if
you use an OAuth client other than Claude or a loopback tool, add its
callback host there.
## Docker Compose example
```yaml
services:
riffado-mcp:
image: ghcr.io/l480/riffado-mcp:latest
restart: unless-stopped
read_only: true
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
user: "7333:7333"
environment:
TZ: Europe/Berlin
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:...@riffado-db:5432/riffado
ENCRYPTION_KEY: "..."
HTTP_PUBLIC_URL: https://riffado-mcp.example.com
HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN: "..."
# Behind a reverse proxy / Cloudflare Tunnel (one hop). Omit when
# clients connect to the container directly.
HTTP_TRUST_PROXY: "1"
volumes:
- /opt/riffado-mcp/data:/app/data
networks: [root_default]
```
`/app/data` must be a writable volume — the image runs `--read-only`
otherwise, so it needs somewhere to persist `oauth-state.json` across
container recreation.
## Development
```bash
npm run lint # eslint
npm run format:check # prettier --check
npm run typecheck # tsc --noEmit, src + test
npm test # vitest, unit tests only
npm run build # tsc -> dist/
```
Integration tests need a real Postgres:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.test.yml up -d
TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/riffado_test \
npm run test:integration
docker compose -f docker-compose.test.yml down
```
## Performance
Search is two-stage: cheap fields (title/summary/key points/action items)
rank the whole corpus first, then only the top candidates get their
transcripts fetched and scanned — `deep: true` trades that speed for full
recall by scanning every date-filtered recording's transcript instead, and
is far slower by design. Headline number: a 3-term `scope: "all"` search at
20 000 recordings runs in ~175 ms (p50).
Full measured numbers and limitations: [`docs/performance.md`](./docs/performance.md).
Harness + reproduction steps: [`bench/README.md`](./bench/README.md).
## Security notes
- **Read-only, enforced by Postgres**: the pool's session starts with
`default_transaction_read_only=on` — a bug or prompt injection in a tool
handler cannot mutate Riffado, because Postgres itself rejects the write.
- **Use a dedicated read-only role anyway** (defence in depth: a session
can `SET default_transaction_read_only=off`, a role without write grants
can't write regardless). The server only reads `recordings`,
`transcriptions` and `ai_enhancements`:
```sql
CREATE ROLE riffado_mcp LOGIN PASSWORD '...';
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE riffado TO riffado_mcp;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO riffado_mcp;
GRANT SELECT ON recordings, transcriptions, ai_enhancements TO riffado_mcp;
```
then `DATABASE_URL=postgresql://riffado_mcp:...@riffado-db:5432/riffado`.
- **Encrypt the DB connection off-host**: when Postgres is not on the same
host or Docker network, add `?sslmode=require` to `DATABASE_URL` (or
`verify-full` with the server's CA), otherwise ciphertext _and_ the
credentials cross the network in the clear.
- **No plaintext at rest, ever**: recordings are decrypted in memory on
each cache refresh (default TTL 60s) and never written to disk.
- **No audio, no storage paths, no credentials, no other users' rows** are
exposed by any tool.
- Container runs rootless (`7333:7333`), `--read-only`, `cap-drop: ALL`.
## License
[MIT](./LICENSE)
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