Systems Manager

Manage Service

manage_service

DestructiveIdempotent

Start, stop, restart, enable, or disable system services cross-platform to control running state and startup behavior on managed hosts.

Instructions

Start/Stop/Restart/Enable/Disable services cross-platform.

CONCEPT:SM-OS.deployment.package-service-mutation: Package & Service Mutation

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "service_name": "<service_name>",
      "action": "<action>"
    },
    "name": "manage_service"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`action`	Yes	Action to perform: start, stop, restart, enable, disable
`confirm`	No	Explicit confirmation. Pass true when the client cannot answer an approval prompt.
`service_name`	Yes	Name of the service

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedv2.2.9Nov 3, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / confirm

Added value: +{
+  "default": false,
+  "description": "Explicit confirmation. Pass true when the client cannot answer an approval prompt.",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}

First observedv2.2.5Oct 24, 2026

TDQS

C2.8/5.0

Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and readOnlyHint=false, so the danger profile is covered by structured data. The description adds only 'cross-platform' – it never mentions that stopping/disabling a service can take down dependent workloads, that root/sudo is typically required, or how the 'confirm' approval path interacts with execution. For a destructive mutation tool this leaves a real behavioral gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first sentence is well front-loaded and dense with the actionable verb list. The second line is an opaque concept/deployment tag that a calling agent gains nothing from, so the definition carries avoidable noise.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, but this is a destructive multi-action mutation whose description never covers privilege requirements, blast radius of stop/disable, or the confirm semantics that distinguish agent-driven from interactive invocation. Given the tool's risk profile, the description falls short of what an agent needs to call it safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and all three parameters (service_name, action with its value list, confirm) are documented in the schema itself. The description adds no extra meaning, such as accepted service-name formats or when confirm must be true, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence names concrete verbs (start/stop/restart/enable/disable) and a concrete resource (services), plus the cross-platform scope, so an agent knows what operation it performs. It does not differentiate from siblings like list_services or sm_service_operations, and the trailing 'CONCEPT:SM-OS.deployment.package-service-mutation' line is internal taxonomy rather than a purpose statement.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus list_services (inspection) or sm_service_operations, nor any stated preconditions such as requiring elevated privileges. Usage is only inferable from the verb list, and nothing tells the agent when not to call it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.