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gitlab_get_vulnerability
Read-onlyIdempotent

Retrieves a single GitLab vulnerability by its global ID so you can inspect details for triage, incident response, or reporting.

Instructions

Get a single vulnerability by its global ID (Ultimate).

GET /vulnerabilities/{vulnerability_id}

Args: **kwargs: vulnerability_id (required).

Returns: Response: wrapper containing the original response and the parsed vulnerability (dict).

Raises: MissingParameterError: If vulnerability_id is missing. ParameterError: If invalid parameters are provided.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "gitlab_get_vulnerability"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataNo
pageNo
group_idNo
per_pageNo
max_pagesNo
project_idNo
package_managerNo
vulnerability_idNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv27.3.20
    • removedInput schema / properties / api_parameters
      Removed value: -{
      -  "anyOf": [
      -    {
      -      "additionalProperties": true,
      -      "type": "object"
      -    },
      -    {
      -      "type": "null"
      -    }
      -  ],
      -  "default": null
      -}
  2. First observedv27.3.13

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, openWorld behavior, so the bar is lower. The description still adds real context beyond them: the concrete REST endpoint, the declared error types (MissingParameterError, ParameterError), and the fact that the return is a wrapper containing both the raw response and a parsed dict. It does not mention pagination behavior of the extra page/per_page/max_pages params, which is a minor gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose and endpoint are front-loaded effectively in the first two lines. The rest is Sphinx-style docstring boilerplate, including the awkward "**kwargs: vulnerability_id (required)" phrasing, which is internal-framework noise rather than agent-facing guidance.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully sketches the return shape and the error contract. But for a tool exposing 8 schema properties with zero documentation and no required-field enforcement in the schema, the definition leaves an agent unsure which of the unrelated-looking parameters are meaningful versus vestigial.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% across 8 parameters, so the description has to carry the load. It does identify vulnerability_id as the required argument and the only one that matters, which is valuable signaling, but it never explains the remaining seven parameters (data, page, per_page, max_pages, group_id, project_id, package_manager) or why they exist on a single-resource getter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Get a single vulnerability by its global ID"), and the word "single" plus "global ID" implicitly separates it from the list-style siblings gitlab_get_project_vulnerabilities and gitlab_get_group_vulnerabilities. No sibling is named explicitly, so differentiation relies on inference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The "(Ultimate)" tag is a genuinely useful prerequisite, warning that this endpoint is unavailable on lower GitLab tiers. However, there is no explicit guidance on when to pick this tool over the project- or group-scoped vulnerability listing tools, and no note on where a global ID comes from.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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