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intruder

Fuzz HTTP endpoints using sniper, battering ram, pitchfork, and cluster bomb attacks. Define payload positions and filter results by status, timing, or length.

Instructions

Burp Intruder-style fuzzing with sniper, battering ram, pitchfork, and cluster bomb attack types. See rqwstr_docs(topic="intruder") for attack types and CSRF handling.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sniNoTLS SNI override. Decouples SNI from Host header for HTTPS requests.
urlYesTarget URL with §position§ markers
bodyNoRequest body (may contain §position§ markers)
methodYesHTTP method
headersNoRequest headers (may contain §position§ markers)
threadsNoConcurrent threads (default 1 max 50)
payloadsNoPosition name to payload values mapping
output_dirNoDirectory to save response bodies (creates if not exists)
timeout_msNoPer-request timeout in ms (default 30000)
attack_typeYesAttack type: sniper battering_ram pitchfork cluster_bomb
raw_headersNoRaw headers string (\r\n-separated). Appended after headers map. Allows duplicate headers and non-standard formatting.
filter_matchNoOnly show responses matching this regex
http_versionNoHTTP version: 1.1 or 2 (default 1.1; use 2 for HTTPS timing attacks)
filter_statusNoOnly show these status codes
payload_filesNoPosition name to relative hunt artifact path (one payload per line); absolute paths require RQWSTR_ALLOW_ABSOLUTE_FILE_PATHS=1
session_setupNoChain-like steps to run before each request. Fetches CSRF tokens and session state. Extracted variables substitute via double-brace syntax. Cookies auto-forward.
filter_time_gtNoOnly show responses slower than N milliseconds
filter_time_ltNoOnly show responses faster than N milliseconds
payload_rangesNoPosition name to range spec (e.g. 1-254 or 0-100:5)
request_targetNoOverride request-line target (RFC 7230 §5.3.2 absolute-form). May contain §position§ markers.
filter_length_gtNoOnly show responses larger than N bytes
filter_length_ltNoOnly show responses smaller than N bytes
filter_exclude_payloadNoRegex to exclude results where any payload value matches
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must disclose behavioral traits. It only states 'fuzzing' and references external docs. It does not mention safety concerns (e.g., potential for many requests, destructive effects) or request handling details beyond the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is extremely short, with no wasted words. However, it relies on an external reference for critical details (attack types, CSRF), which slightly reduces self-contained conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 23 parameters, no output schema, and no annotations, the description is too sparse. It lacks overview of the process, output format, prerequisites, or risk details. The high parameter count demands more context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% description coverage for all 23 parameters, each with a clear explanation. The tool description adds no extra parameter semantics, meeting the baseline for high schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the tool as performing Burp Intruder-style fuzzing with multiple attack types. It distinguishes it from siblings like 'send' or 'hunt', though it could specify the action verb more explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'send' or 'hunt'. The description mentions consulting external documentation for attack types and CSRF handling, but does not set decision rules.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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