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Kenny-666

Dynamics 365 MCP Server

by Kenny-666

get_principal_security_context

Read-only

Reads a user or team profile with direct roles and bounded visible team memberships/roles to review security context and retain partial or forbidden sources.

Instructions

Read a user/team profile, direct roles and bounded visible team memberships/roles. Preserves partial/forbidden sources and business-unit role identities. Does not reconstruct all inherited/group/shared/field privileges; use get_record_access for native record rights.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
roleLimitNoCompatibility alias for role_limit; conflicting values are rejected.
teamLimitNoCompatibility alias for team_limit; conflicting values are rejected.
role_limitNoMaximum role rows per direct/team source, default 50.
team_limitNoMaximum visible teams, default 10.
principalIdNoCompatibility alias for principal_id; conflicting values are rejected.
principal_idNo
principalTypeNoCompatibility alias for principal_type; conflicting values are rejected.
principal_typeNoDefault systemuser. Without a systemuser ID, inspects the current authenticated user.
includeTeamRolesNoCompatibility alias for include_team_roles; conflicting values are rejected.
include_team_rolesNoRead roles for visible user teams, default true.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only and non-destructive behavior. The description adds useful behavioral context by noting that partial/forbidden sources and business-unit role identities are preserved, which tells the agent how incomplete security data is handled.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences with no filler. The main read scope is front-loaded, followed by behavioral caveats and the explicit boundary/alternative.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only security-context tool with no output schema, the description sufficiently covers what data is read and what caveats to expect, including preserved partial/forbidden sources. It could say more about the response structure, but the essential invocation context is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 90%, so the schema already documents nearly all parameters and defaults. The description does not add parameter-level meaning beyond what is in the schema, but a baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the parameter documentation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: read a user/team profile, direct roles, and bounded visible team memberships/roles. It also explicitly distinguishes the scope from inherited/group/shared/field privileges and names get_record_access as the alternative for native record rights.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clearly states an exclusion: it does not reconstruct inherited/group/shared/field privileges, and it directs the agent to get_record_access for native record rights. It does not explicitly say when to choose this tool over siblings like query_security_principals or get_current_user_context, but the intended context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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