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K4PXD

cve-mcp-server

by K4PXD

Get EPSS exploitation scores

cve_get_epss
Read-onlyIdempotent

Retrieve Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) scores for one or more CVEs to prioritize patching by real-world exploitation likelihood and percentile ranking.

Instructions

Retrieve EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, by FIRST.org) scores for one or more CVEs.

EPSS estimates the probability (0-100%) that a CVE will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days, plus a percentile ranking across all scored CVEs. Useful for prioritizing patching beyond raw CVSS severity.

Args:

  • cve_ids (string[]): 1-100 CVE identifiers.

  • response_format ('markdown'|'json', default 'markdown').

Returns (json): { count, scores: [ { cve, epss, percentile, date } ] } (epss/percentile as fractions 0-1).

Examples:

  • "EPSS for CVE-2021-44228" -> cve_ids=["CVE-2021-44228"].

  • "Rank these three by exploitation likelihood" -> cve_ids=[...].

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idsYesOne or more CVE IDs to score (1-100).
response_formatNoOutput format: 'markdown' (default, human-readable) or 'json' (full structured data).markdown

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover readOnly/openWorld/idempotent/destructive behavior. The description adds useful behavioral context: the 30-day exploitation window, percentile ranking, date field, and return values expressed as fractions 0-1. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with purpose, background, args, return shape, and examples. It is slightly longer than strictly necessary because it duplicates schema details, but it is front-loaded and every section serves a clear purpose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter read-only tool with no output schema, the description adequately explains the return structure and includes usage examples. It does not cover error behavior or handling of invalid/unknown CVE IDs, which is a minor gap but not blocking.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, and both parameters are already well described in the schema. The description repeats the parameter definitions and adds helpful examples, but it does not add substantial semantic meaning beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states a specific action: retrieve EPSS scores for one or more CVEs, and explains what EPSS is (exploitation probability and percentile). It does not explicitly contrast itself with sibling tools like cve_get_kev or cve_get_details, so it stops short of full sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear when-to-use context: 'useful for prioritizing patching beyond raw CVSS severity.' It does not name alternatives or state when not to use the tool, so it lacks explicit exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.