mcp-exports

Shared, single-use download host for the house MCP servers.

https://exports.example.com · host port 8114 · no customer login

MCP server  --POST /put  (service token)-->  mcp-exports  -->  download URL
customer    --GET  /d/{token} (no auth)  -->  mcp-exports  -->  the file, once

Why it exists

A tool that returns a week of call records inline costs ~530,000 tokens; the same data as CSV is 1 MB and builds in 1.6 seconds. So exports return a link. The first version served that link from the MCP server itself, which broke three ways:

1. The MCP hosts sit behind an Anthropic-only IP allow-list, but the thing fetching a download is a customer's browser on an arbitrary address. A separate hostname keeps the two access policies from fighting, instead of carving a path exemption out of a proxy config that also carries the streaming settings MCP needs.

2. MCP containers redeploy on every push, and an in-memory store died with them — invalidating live links mid-conversation.

3. The store belonged to one process, so a second worker would 404 at random.

Related MCP server: agent-secret

Security model, stated plainly

A download URL is a capability: whoever holds it gets the file, no login. Same trade as the NetSapiens recording URLs and Odoo portal PDFs we already hand out, and it is what makes a link work when clicked from a chat window. It is not authentication, and the weaknesses are real — a URL can be forwarded, logged by a proxy, or sit in a transcript forever.

So the design leans on what actually helps:

Uploading is authenticated — a per-server bearer token, because publishing files on a public host is not something the internet gets to do. The service refuses to start with an empty allow-list.

API

POST /put?filename=x.csv&sensitivity=data|financial&customer=Acme%20Movers
     &ttl=3600&max_downloads=1
     Authorization: Bearer <server token>
  -> 201 {download_url, filename, size, expires_in_seconds, expires_at,
          max_downloads, single_use}

GET  /d/{token}   -> 200 the file (then it is gone), or 404
GET  /healthz     -> counters + bytes held

ttl is clamped, not obeyed — ask for a week, get MCP_EXPORTS_TTL_MAX, and the response tells you what you actually got.

Using it from an MCP server

Copy client/export_client.py into the server and set MCP_EXPORTS_URL + MCP_EXPORTS_TOKEN. ExportClient.from_env() returns None when unconfigured, so a server can offer export tools only where the host is actually wired up rather than advertising a tool that always fails.

It raises rather than falling back to inline rows: if the host is down there is no safe degradation, because returning the rows is the failure mode exports exist to prevent.

Deploy

Portainer → Stacks → Repository, refs/heads/main, port 8114. Generate a token per MCP server:

python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))"

NPM: exports.example.com → 10.0.0.10:8114, no Access List (that is the point), Websockets off, standard timeouts.

Tests

python -m pytest tests -q

47 tests, no network. They cover the security properties specifically: single use actually deletes bytes, every bad token shape is indistinguishable, filenames cannot escape or inject headers, financial TTL is shorter, and the Dockerfile chowns the volume mount point before dropping root — without which a named volume arrives root-owned and every upload fails EACCES.