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businessapi-mcp

businessapi-mcp

by JoeFu

Rotate Webhook Secret

rotate_webhook_secret
Destructive

Invalidates a webhook's current signing secret and issues a new one shown once; keep the receiver accepting both secrets until the new secret is deployed everywhere.

Instructions

Invalidate the endpoint's current signing secret and issue a new one (returned ONCE). The receiver must accept both the old and new secret until the new one is deployed everywhere.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "webhook_id": "<webhook_id>"
    },
    "name": "rotate_webhook_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
webhook_idYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructive=true and idempotent=false, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description adds genuinely new behavior: the old secret is invalidated, the new one is returned only ONCE, and callers must plan a dual-secret window. It stops short of saying whether the old secret dies immediately or after a grace period, which matters for a destructive operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the destructive action and the ONCE caveat before the operational note. Every clause carries information an agent needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so the description needn't describe the returned secret's shape, and the destructive annotation covers risk. What remains missing is the timing semantics of invalidation and any authorization requirement, which would matter for an openWorld, non-idempotent mutation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% for the single required parameter, so the description carries the burden. Referring to 'the endpoint's current signing secret' implies webhook_id identifies the endpoint, but it never states the identifier format or where to obtain it. With one self-descriptively named parameter the gap is modest but real.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description pairs a specific verb with a specific resource: invalidate the endpoint's current signing secret and issue a new one. That is unambiguous and clearly distinct from a generic update_webhook, though no sibling is named explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives rollout guidance (the receiver must accept both old and new secrets until deployment completes), which is real usage context. It does not say when to rotate versus update_webhook, nor state prerequisites such as permissions or the fact that this should be coordinated with the receiving service before calling.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.