JEVULON VII (JVII)

sentinel_approve_escalation

Authorize or deny one escalated action with a single-use, payload-bound approval that expires, requiring an attributed human operator decision before execution.

Instructions

Operator authorization for one escalated action. Approvals are single-use, bound to the exact action payload, and expire. Approvals must be attributed: pass approvedBy with your host's operator identity — unattributed approvals, and decisions attributed to the identity that requested the escalation, are both refused. Configure your MCP host to always require human confirmation for this tool — the server cannot verify who calls it.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "actionId": "<actionId>",
      "approved": "<approved>"
    },
    "name": "sentinel_approve_escalation"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`reason`	No	Optional reasoning from the human operator
`actionId`	Yes	The actionId returned by sentinel_shield_inspect
`approved`	Yes	true to authorize execution, false to deny
`approvedBy`	No	Identity of whoever is deciding, when your host attributes it (recorded on the decision)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.1.0Sep 27, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: approvals are single-use, bound to the exact payload, and expire, and the server cannot verify the caller's identity. These are non-obvious consumption/auth semantics that an agent could not infer from the schema alone. No contradiction with structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose and the single-use/bound/expiring semantics, then the attribution constraint, then the host-configuration caveat. No sentence is redundant and none could be dropped without losing behaviorally significant information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description does not say what a successful approval returns (e.g., a token or decision record), which is the one gap for a gating tool. Everything else an agent needs — attribution requirement, refusal conditions, single-use and expiry behavior, host-side human confirmation — is covered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description still adds meaning beyond the schema: it converts approvedBy from the schema's permissive 'when your host attributes it' into a hard requirement, and warns that the requester's own identity is rejected. It does not explain reason or approved beyond what the schema already says.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (operator authorization of one escalated action) and immediately scopes it to a single action rather than a class of actions. It also names the sibling tool that produces the actionId (sentinel_shield_inspect), so an agent can place it in the workflow without opening another schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use it (authorizing one escalated action), the preconditions (approvedBy with the host's operator identity), and the cases where a decision is refused (unattributed approvals, self-attribution by the requester). It also instructs the operator to configure the host to require human confirmation, which is direct usage guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server