get_certificate_signing_request

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the load and does disclose the key behavioral trait: the private key remains in the HSM and only the CSR leaves. It stops short of stating permissions, side effects, or return format, but the core safety-relevant behavior is explicit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose, security context, and parameter details are each given a concise block, front-loaded with the core purpose. No filler or repetition; the Args section is well-organized.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 3-parameter tool with no schema descriptions or output schema, the description covers what the tool does, why it is used, what the output is (a PKCS #10 CSR), and exactly how to populate every parameter.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so this is the only place parameters are documented. It explains key_identifier's ARN/alias format, signing_algorithm's allowed hash values, and certificate_subject's required vs optional fields with an example JSON object.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'get a PKCS #10 CSR for an APC-held asymmetric key.' It clarifies the deliverable is a CSR, not a certificate, and even names the payShield/Futurex counterpart, making it easy to tell apart from sibling certificate/key operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

States when to use it: when an external CA or partner PKI must issue a certificate, with typical TR-34 and ECDH scenarios. It does not explicitly say when not to use it or name alternatives such as get_public_key_certificate, but the context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.