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HuntX

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by IAZENT

auth_test_jwt

Detect JWT manipulation vulnerabilities by testing alg:none, RS256-to-HS256, and kid injection attacks. Pinpoint insecure token validation to secure authentication flows.

Instructions

Test JWT for manipulation vulnerabilities (alg:none, RS256→HS256, kid injection).

Runs deterministic checks against a JWT-protected endpoint:

  1. alg:none — strip signature, set alg to "none"

  2. RS256→HS256 — sign with public key as HMAC secret

  3. kid injection — path traversal in kid header

  4. Weak secret brute-force (opt-in, slow)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesURL to test (should require JWT auth).
tokenYesThe JWT token to manipulate.
methodYesHTTP method (GET, POST, etc.).
target_idYesIdentifier for the target.
public_keyNoRSA public key PEM for RS256→HS256 test.
auth_headerNoHeader name (default: "Authorization").
auth_prefixNoToken prefix (default: "Bearer ").
weak_secretsNoCustom list of secrets to try.
scope_excludeNoScope denylist patterns.
scope_includeNoScope allowlist patterns.
check_weak_secretsNoEnable weak secret brute-force (slow).

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the behavioral disclosure burden. It transparently lists the exact manipulations performed (e.g., stripping signature, using public key as HMAC secret, path traversal in kid) and flags weak-secret brute-force as opt-in and slow. It does not mention potential side effects like sending attack traffic to the target, but the core test behavior is well disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact, front-loaded with the tool's purpose, then organized as a numbered list of checks. Every sentence earns its place, and the 'opt-in, slow' note is precise and useful with zero filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a moderately complex tool with 11 parameters and multiple attack modes, the description covers the essential behavioral checks and the optional slow brute-force path. The output schema exists, so return-value details are not required, and parameter specifics are fully covered by the schema. Slight gaps remain around prerequisites such as endpoint availability or required setup for the public-key test, but overall the description is sufficiently complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and each parameter already has a clear description. The tool description adds minimal parameter meaning beyond the schema—mostly reinforcing that weak secrets are opt-in and slow, which the schema already states. It does not add syntax, formatting, or usage nuance beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'Test JWT for manipulation vulnerabilities', giving a specific verb, resource, and security-testing scope. It enumerates four distinct attack checks (alg:none, RS256→HS256, kid injection, weak secret brute-force), which clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like auth_test_oauth_redirect.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly establishes when to use the tool: against a JWT-protected endpoint to test for known manipulation flaws. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusion criteria, but the enumerated attack types and 'JWT-protected endpoint' context provide clear use-case guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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