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Glama

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
MOBILE_RE_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRSNoOptional sandbox: set MOBILE_RE_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS (':' separated on macOS/Linux, ';' on Windows) to restrict the tools to specific directories, e.g. "/Users/me/apks".

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{
  "listChanged": true
}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
android_api_extractorA

Decompiles an APK and extracts Retrofit HTTP annotations and OkHttp3 endpoints from smali bytecode. Outputs a list of API endpoints or a Postman collection.

apk_manifest_analyzerA

Parses AndroidManifest.xml from an APK. Extracts package info, activities, services, receivers, intent filters, and highlights security-relevant flags like exported components, debuggable, and allowBackup.

apk_permissions_checkerB

Extracts and categorizes permissions requested by an APK. Dangerous permissions (those that grant access to sensitive user data or device features) are highlighted separately.

android_google_servicesA

Extracts Google and Firebase configuration from an APK. Parses google-services.json if present, then scans resources.arsc for string values using the strings command. If a smali_folder (apktool output) is provided, parses res/values/strings.xml directly for structured key=value output.

android_secrets_scannerA

Scans an APK for hardcoded secrets and API keys. Without smali_folder: runs strings on classes*.dex and resources.arsc, plus scans text assets inside the APK. With smali_folder (apktool output): scans res/values/strings.xml and assets as plain text files.

android_native_librariesB

Enumerates every ELF .so shipped in an APK (per ABI), identifies known packer/RASP/framework/SDK libraries by name, and inspects ELF headers for stripped-or-packed section tables.

apk_diffA

Diffs two builds of the same app (APK vs APK): identity/SDK levels, security flags, permission and exported-component deltas, native-library changes (sha256), optional secret deltas and an archive inventory.

ios_manifest_analyzerA

Parses Info.plist from an IPA file. Extracts bundle ID, version, URL schemes, App Transport Security settings, background modes, and highlights insecure configurations.

ios_permissions_checkerB

Extracts privacy permission usage descriptions from an IPA's Info.plist. Each permission is categorized by risk level (HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW) with an explanation.

ios_entitlements_checkerA

Extracts and analyzes entitlements embedded in the iOS app binary using codesign. Detects dangerous entitlements like get-task-allow (debug builds), iCloud containers, and keychain groups.

ios_binary_stringsA

Extracts printable strings from an iOS app binary and filters for security-relevant patterns: HTTP/S URLs, API keys, AWS/Firebase/Google credentials, email addresses, and private IP addresses.

ios_frameworks_detectorA

Lists all third-party frameworks bundled inside an IPA (from the Frameworks/ directory). Maps known frameworks to categories: networking, analytics, ads, attribution, crash reporting, etc. Highlights privacy-relevant SDKs.

ios_google_servicesA

Extracts Google and Firebase configuration from an IPA. Parses GoogleService-Info.plist for API key, project ID, database URL, storage bucket, GCM sender ID, and OAuth client IDs. Also applies Google pattern scanning across all text plist and JSON files in the IPA.

ios_secrets_scannerB

Scans an IPA for hardcoded secrets and API keys. Layer 1: scans text resource files (JSON, XML, .strings, XML plists) inside the IPA. Layer 2: extracts the app binary and runs the strings command to find constants in compiled code.

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Scored across 14 tools

Disambiguation4/5

Android and iOS tools are cleanly separated by platform prefix, and each tool targets a distinct artifact (manifest, permissions, entitlements, secrets, google-services, frameworks, native libs). Minor overlap exists between the secrets scanners and the google-services tools, both of which perform pattern scanning over plists/resources, but the descriptions delineate them adequately.

Naming Consistency4/5

Names are consistently snake_case with a platform prefix (android_, apk_, ios_) followed by the target artifact, which is readable and predictable. The mix of apk_ and android_ prefixes for what is essentially the same platform is a small deviation from a single uniform convention.

Tool Count5/5

14 tools is squarely within a well-scoped range and each tool corresponds to a distinct static-analysis step on APK or IPA files. No tool feels redundant or padding.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the core mobile RE workflow: manifest/plist parsing, permissions, entitlements, secrets, embedded SDKs, native libraries, endpoint extraction, and APK diffing. Gaps remain—no certificate/signing verification, no iOS binary diff counterpart to apk_diff, and no network security config parsing—but these are workaroundable.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo recent community issues