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FlemingJohn

cyber-mcp-tools

by FlemingJohn

Look up a threat group, malware or tool

attack_actor

Identify threat actors, malware, tools, or campaigns by ATT&CK ID or name across all domains. Optionally include associated technique IDs.

Instructions

Find a group, malware, tool or campaign by ATT&CK id or name. Spans all domains, since many actors operate in more than one.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idOrNameYesATT&CK id such as G0007, or a name such as APT28
techniquesNoInclude the technique ids used

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds the behavioral note that the tool 'spans all domains' (i.e., results are not domain-restricted), which is useful. However, it does not mention side effects (though a lookup is presumably safe), response format, or any limitations such as pagination or access requirements. It is adequate but not rich.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise—two sentences—with the primary purpose front-loaded. The second sentence adds context about cross-domain operation, which is relevant for agent decision-making but not essential. No wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple lookup tool with two parameters and no output schema, the description covers the core purpose and one behavioral trait (cross-domain). However, it does not mention what results are returned (e.g., attributes, relationship info) or how the techniques flag affects output, leaving gaps an agent might need to infer. It is minimally complete but not comprehensive.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% coverage, with clear descriptions for both parameters: idOrName accepts a string like 'G0007' or 'APT28', and techniques is a boolean flag. The description does not add further semantic detail beyond what the schema already provides, so a baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Find') and resource ('a group, malware, tool or campaign'), and specifies the lookup by ATT&CK id or name. It is clear and distinct from sibling tools that focus on techniques, detections, or mitigations, though it doesn't explicitly name those alternatives.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus its siblings. The description implies it is for actor/malware/tool lookups, but does not state when NOT to use it or mention alternatives for techniques or other entities. This forces the agent to infer applicability from the title and resource list.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.