vault-ask (Erseni Vault)
Related Servers
Alternatives to vault-ask (Erseni Vault)
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to request passwords, API keys, passkeys, and other secrets from a person through one-time links encrypted in the browser, then store them in a local vault the agent can use without ever seeing them. Secrets can be referenced in commands and outputs are redacted, so agents can sign in or call APIs without exposing credentials in chat.2,904 npmMIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceShare encrypted, self-destructing secrets from your AI agent. Zero-knowledge E2E encryption. Agent-blind input sources (env:, file:, dotenv:) keep secrets out of LLM context.4264 npm1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI coding agents to securely inject API keys and secrets into environment files, configs, or commands without the agent ever seeing the secret values.7 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceSelf-hosted, zero-knowledge encrypted, self-destructing secrets for secure agent-to-agent coordination3AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI coding agents to manage and use API keys and secrets without ever seeing their values, by checking availability, listing names, requesting missing values, and running commands with injected secrets and redacted output.52 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceLets AI coding agents read project documentation and secret metadata, then use credentials by injecting them into child processes while redacting the values from all output. Agents can deploy, migrate databases, or SSH using real secrets without the values ever entering their context, transcripts, or logs.MIT
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
The three tools split along a clear axis: request_secret pulls secrets inbound into a file, run_with_secret uses a secret to execute one command, and send_secret generates/returns a secret outbound. request_secret and run_with_secret share the same ask-the-user/link flow and could momentarily be confused, but their end outcomes (write a file vs. run a command) are clearly spelled out.
All three follow a strict verb_secret pattern (request_secret, run_with_secret, send_secret). The verb meaning is consistent: the action describes what happens to the secret (request in, run with, send out).
Three tools is on the lean side but each covers a genuinely distinct secret lifecycle stage (acquire, use, issue). The set feels deliberately minimal rather than padded, which suits a security-sensitive vault.
Inbound acquisition, command usage, and outbound distribution with multiple destinations (file, env_file, command) are all covered, giving a coherent lifecycle. Minor gaps: no explicit tool for listing, rotating, or revoking previously stored secrets, though these could be handled outside the surface.